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Historically, juvenile justice in the United States has been the responsibility of state 
governments with limited federal support.  There is a notable gap in the empirical 
literature on factors that affect funding policies for state juvenile justice programs.  In this 
dissertation research, I used two theoretical perspectives to examine determinants of 
juvenile justice spending:  economic theory on intergovernmental aid and tenets of the 
Politics of Social Order Framework developed by Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2007) to 
investigate corrections spending.  Two research questions were considered:  1) What 
impact does federal aid have on state spending on juvenile justice programs? and 2) Can 
specific tenants of the Politics of Social Order Framework be extended to juvenile justice 
funding?   
The research sample included 30 states for which spending for juvenile justice was 
analyzed over an eleven-year period from 1996 – 2006.  I used a pooled time-series 
cross-sectional design to examine the determinants of state spending on juvenile justice 
programs.  A multiple regression analysis was conducted using ordinary least squares 
with panel corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable included as an 
independent variable as a correction for autocorrelation.  The research model was derived 
from the theory that state spending on juvenile justice is a function of the following types 
 iv 
of independent variables:  economic, social threat, fiscal health, alternative policy 
priority, juvenile crime, partisan politics, ideology, and structural and demographic 
control variables. 
Results of the analysis show that spending on juvenile justice represents less than one 
percent (1%) of total state spending per capita for the nation on average.  Further, the data 
show that federal aid is a statistically significant factor in juvenile justice spending 
decisions; however, its fiscal impact is minimal with evidence of substitution of federal 
aid for state own source spending.  Finally, results indicate that the theoretical basis for 
the Politics of Social Order Framework model does not hold true consistently in 
explaining determinants of juvenile justice spending.
 v 
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Historically, juvenile justice in the United States has been the responsibility of state 
and local governments, even in light of the fact that juveniles in crisis—from serious, 
violent, and chronic offenders to victims of abuse and neglect—pose a challenge to the 
nation.  State agencies designated to administer juvenile justice programs manage 
budgets that support a variety of services including activities related to juvenile 
delinquency prevention, control, diversion, treatment, rehabilitation, planning, education, 
training, and research.  It was not until the late 1960s that the federal government 
assumed a significant role in the juvenile justice policy arena through direct and indirect 
funding for juvenile justice agencies prompted by increasing juvenile crime rates.  In the 
1960s, federal policymakers began to exercise their authority to influence juvenile justice 
policy relative to legislation affecting treatment of juveniles, responses to juvenile crime, 
and standards for juvenile arrests, prosecution, and incarceration.  Since the 1960s, 
federal funding has varied with periods of stability, increase, and sharp decline.  
Nevertheless, the states have remained the primary funders of juvenile justice programs.  
As shown in data collected and analyzed for1996 through 2006 for the 30 states included 
in this study, the average federal aid was approximately 10.47% of total per capita 
appropriations for juvenile justice1.  
Spending on juvenile justice services represents important policy choices impacted by 
factors related to socio-economic issues, politics, crime, regional and cultural influences 
in the states and localities, and intergovernmental grants to states (Nunez-Neto, 2007a; 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 6, Table 5, Descriptive Statistics. 
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Fisher, 1996).  In fact, a state’s budget document may reflect its policy stance more 
comprehensively than any other document (Calderia & Cowart, 1980; Stucky, Heimer, & 
Lang 2007).  Given the current budget problems faced by most states due to recessions, 
unemployment, and declining tax revenue, policymakers are confronted with important 
choices about how to pay for important government services and programs.  Instability in 
state own source funding and in federal aid will likely be reflected in juvenile justice 
policy as states struggle to address ongoing problems with youth in the juvenile justice 
system in an environment of declining federal support.  
Insufficient funding for adequate staffing, training, and programming tends to be a 
systemic issue in the juvenile justice policy arena (Nelson, 2008).  Declines in federal aid 
to states for juvenile justice of approximately 38% (approximately $547 million to $339 
million) between 2002 and 2006 occurred at a time when states were already struggling to 
meet their balanced budget requirements.  Moreover, the 2011 federal aid appropriation 
for juvenile justice of approximately $276 million is 50% less than the 2002 appropriation 
(Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 2011a).  Declines in the federal investment in programs 
that prevent and reduce delinquency at a time when the economy is weak and states are 
struggling to provide services to their residents are reflected in state budgets, which reflect 
state policy concerning juvenile justice.  
  Accordingly, an examination of federal and individual state level spending behavior 
in a policy arena is a strong indicator of the relative importance of an issue at a given 
point in time. Further, as economic literature has shown, the availability of revenue 
sources affects spending decisions (Fisher 1996).  Considering these factors, I seek to 
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investigate the influence of federal aid and other social, economic, and political factors on 
state spending decisions for juvenile justice in this dissertation study.  
 
Magnitude of the Problem 
In addition to state and federal funding concerns, a number of seemingly intractable 
challenges plague the American juvenile justice system.  Included among these 
challenges are statistics that show a large number of juvenile arrests; issues related to 
racial disparity, gender, and drug related offenses; zero tolerance policies; and youth with 
disabilities.  These issues are important to the public that is affected by juvenile crime 
and to policymakers who must develop and fund effective programs for the children and 
families involved in the juvenile justice system.   
Arrests Statistics   
FBI Uniform Crime in the United States reports for 1994 through 2006 showed 
249,000 arrests for simple assaults2 and 196,000 arrests for drug violations for persons 
under age 18, an increase of 17.8% and 24.0% respectively from 1994 (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006, pp. 125-128, 157).3  Overall arrests reported by law enforcement for 
persons under age 18 during this period were approximately 2.2 million in 2006, a 
decline of approximately 18.2% from 1994 (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).4      
The literature does not offer specific explanations for the causes for the decline in 
overall arrests.  However, given the nature of delinquency, one can surmise that different 
                                                 
2
 Simple assaults are crimes against persons where no weapon is used and that do not result in serious or 
aggravated injury to the victim. 
3
 Much of the statistical data for this section are drawn from Juvenile Offenders and Victims:  2006 
National Report (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006), the most current source of comprehensive information on the 
nature of juvenile crime and victimization across the nation. 
4
 See also – Puzzanchera, C., Adams, B., & Kang, W.  (2008).  FBI Arrest Statistics for Persons under 18 in 
the United States 1994-2006.  Retrieved from http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/ucr_display.asp  
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developmental, social, and economic factors influenced the volume and nature of 
delinquent offenses by juveniles during this period.  Furthermore, differential responses 
by law enforcement in the various states to delinquent acts committed by juvenile 
offenders and the impact of laws that transfer juveniles to the adult system for more 
serious and violent offenses are likely to have contributed to the declining arrest statistics.  
Unequal Justice 
In 2003, Black youth accounted for 27% of total juvenile arrests; although they 
comprised only 16% of the United States juvenile population ages 10 – 17.  FBI Crime in 
the United States 2003 statistics showed that in 2003, these youth were disproportionately 
represented in juvenile arrests for robbery (63%), murder (48%), motor vehicle theft 
(40%), and aggravated assault (38%).  These statistics illuminate the apparent racial 
inequities in juvenile arrests, which improved only modestly over the past two decades.  
Comparing the Black juvenile violent crime arrest rate in 1988, which was six times the 
white rate, to the rate in 2003, which fell to four times the white rate, is a reflection of 
this modest improvement and the historic nature of the problem of racial disparity in the 
juvenile justice system (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006, pp. 125, 132). 
Gender Concerns 
Various sources show the rising need for gender specific and drug related programs in 
the juvenile justice system.  Snyder and Sickmund (2006) found an increase in the female 
proportion of youth entering the juvenile justice system for law violations from 20% in 
1980 to 29% by 2003 (p. 128).  Females also accounted for the majority of arrests for 
running away from home (59%) and prostitution and commercialized vice (69%) (p. 
125).   
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Drug Related Cases   
Stahl’s (2008) analysis of juvenile court statistics revealed that juvenile courts in the 
United States handled approximately 193,700 delinquency cases in 2004 in which a drug 
offense was the most serious charge.  This represents a 159% increase in drug offense 
cases handled by the juvenile courts in 2004 compared to 1985, and 192% increase 
compared to 1991 (p. 1).   
Zero Tolerance Policies 
Moreover, zero tolerance policies proposed by our nation’s schools have contributed 
to more youth being entangled in the formal justice system (Nelson, 2008).  Typically, 
such policies are enforced by school-based police officers resulting in an increase in 
delinquency cases originating in schools.  This propensity to rely on the juvenile court to 
address relatively minor misbehavior in schools has implications for capacity and funding 
problems in the juvenile justice system.  It is also a source of concern because many 
youth who enter the juvenile justice system for minor violations can easily wind up on 
probation, in juvenile detention, or in a juvenile correctional facility.   
Youth with Disabilities 
In addition to the education system, other public systems inappropriately abandon 
youth to the juvenile justice system.  Nelson (2008) argued that “youth with mental 
health problems and learning disabilities, as well as those in foster care or with child 
welfare case histories, are increasingly being steered into the juvenile justice system, 
including its secure institutions” (p. 13).  Furthermore, Skowyra and Cocozza   (2007) 
concluded that court involved teens were two to three times as likely to suffer mental 
health conditions as youth in the general population.  Similarly, Rosado (2000) argued 
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that schools frequently rely on court intervention to manage behavior problems of 
students with special needs.   Consequently, a disproportionate share of public school 
students referred to the juvenile justice system under zero tolerance policies are youth 
with educational disabilities and related problems, which are not within the primary 
scope of responsibility of the juvenile justice system. 
Why Should We Care? 
Why should we care about state and federal spending on juvenile justice?  We should 
care because the public has a right to safe and secure communities; juvenile offenders 
should be held accountable for their behavior; and the juvenile justice system should be 
held accountable for providing effective services.   Most importantly, among all of the 
policy areas affecting vulnerable children and families, juvenile justice probably serves 
the most unpopular and powerless population of behaviorally troubled, poor, mostly 
minority teenagers who need our support (Nelson, 2008).  Moreover, over the years 
juvenile justice has become a dumping ground for youth who should be served by other 
public systems (Nelson, 2008).  Consequently, the juvenile justice system needs adequate 
funding to meet these challenges.  Considering the magnitude of the problems faced by 
the juvenile justice system, it is critical that states and the federal government invest in it 
to secure the safety of America’s youth, families, and communities (Coalition for Juvenile 
Justice, 2011a).  However, prior research has shown that the level of funding is affected 
by many factors other than, or in addition to, a rational analysis of the amount needed to 
address the problem.  Those factors are the topic of this dissertation.      
 7 
Moving from this discussion of why we should be concerned about spending on 
juvenile justice, I focus specifically on the research problem central to my study and the 
overall purpose of the study.   
 
Research Problem and Purpose of Study 
In this study, I examine the factors that influence state spending decisions on juvenile 
justice programs with particular attention to the impact of federal aid.  I employed 
economic theory on intergovernmental aid and tenets of the Politics of Social Order 
Framework (POSOF), developed by Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2007) to examine 
determinants of juvenile justice spending.  I addressed two research questions.  1) What 
impact does federal aid have on state spending on juvenile justice programs? and 2) Can 
specific tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework be extended to juvenile justice 
funding?  
Federal Aid and Economic Theory 
Many empirical studies have shown that federal grants-in-aid have a statistically 
significant impact on state level spending in both domestic and infrastructure maintenance 
and development policy arenas (Benton, 1992; U. S. GAO, 1996b; Keiser, 1999; 
Montreal, 1999; Gordon, 2003; and Sandfort, Selden, & Sowa, 2007).  However, few 
studies have addressed federal aid and juvenile justice spending.5  My review of the 
relevant literature did not reveal much empirical evidence that directly addressed the 
                                                 
5
 Flores, Douglas, and Ellwood (1998); National Association of State Budget Officers (1999); and Ross 
(2001) provide descriptive information on state and federal spending for juvenile justice programs.  These 
studies are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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impact of federal aid along with other social and economic factors on state legislative 
spending decisions concerning their juvenile justice agencies.  
In light of my review of the literature, the first objective of this study is to respond to 
the literature void by addressing the important relationship between federal aid and state 
level juvenile justice spending.  Reductions in the federal role, marked by a precipitous 
drop in federal funding, occurred following the decline in youth violent crime beginning 
in the mid 1990s (Nelson, 2008; Snyder & Sickmund 2006).  Overall appropriations for 
juvenile justice within the Department of Justice (DOJ) decreased from approximately 
$500 million annually in FY1998 to about $349 million in FY2006, a 30.2% reduction 
(Nunez-Neto, 2008).   When one considers these funding changes, the impact of federal 
aid on state spending on juvenile justice programs emerges as a legitimate research 
question. 
Economic theory.  I used three basic arguments from economic theoretical 
perspectives on consumer demand for public services and intergovernmental grants to 
conceptualize the analytical model for addressing the impact of federal aid on state 
juvenile justice spending (Fisher, 1996; Gruber, 2007).  First, consumer demand theory 
holds that a government’s purchase of aided and non-aided services is constrained by its 
budget limitations in accordance with taxpayers’ collective preferences.  The assumption 
is that grants are likely to lead to changes in a state’s spending behavior.  Second, 
economic theory holds that federal grants-in-aid either stimulate state spending or increase 
substitution depending on grant design features.  Substitution occurs when states use 
federal grant dollars to reduce their own spending for the aided program either initially or 
over time.  Third, according to economic theory, matching grants tend to encourage more 
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state spending on the aided service than non-matching grants, other factors being equal.  
However, if demand for the service is price inelastic, a matching grant will increase total 
spending, but not stimulate increases in state spending.  Thus, due to the fungible nature 
of federal grant dollars, recipient states are likely to engage in substitution.   
Other Social and Economic Determinants of Juvenile Justice Spending 
In addition to the gap in the empirical literature on the impact of federal aid on state 
spending on juvenile justice programs and documented changes in the amount of available 
federal aid over the past decade, a number of issues and challenges face the juvenile 
justice system as described above.  When linked with these issues, an investigation of 
federal aid and other social and economic factors that affect state legislative spending 
decisions in the juvenile justice policy arena becomes even more significant as a research 
endeavor.  Thus, the second objective of this study it to examine other factors that may 
influence state spending decisions on juvenile justice using the theoretical arguments 
posited in the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF).    
Politics of Social Order Framework.  Generally, POSOF holds that legislators 
respond to environmental cues involving the dual concerns for maintaining social order 
and reelection when making spending decisions regarding corrections.  As formulated by 
Stucky and colleagues, the POSOF model does not include intergovernmental aid; 
therefore, I expanded the model by including federal aid as a key covariate predicting 
state juvenile justice spending decisions.  The POSOF examines annual variation in state 
level corrections expenditures.  The model embraces the notion that punishment and 
corrections spending are inherently an exercise of state power.  Punishment is believed to 
be driven by the state’s responsibility for maintenance of social order and the need for 
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state officials to maintain office through popular elections.  The POSOF model is used to 
clarify the role of partisan politics and potential links between partisan politics and 
economic and racial threat measured by the proportion of the population that is racial or 
ethnic minority.  A key assumption of the approach is that the state is relatively 
autonomous and state managers are expected to respond to environmental cues involving 
the dual concerns for maintaining social order and reelection, but they are not entirely 
motivated by them.  As a result, public action by legislators is considered through the lens 
of electoral politics.  Thus, variations in criminal punishment specifically and state 
policies generally are expected to be related to partisan politics, citizen ideology, 
economic and racial threat, alternative policy priorities, fiscal factors, and crime control, 
all factors that influence the maintenance of social order and/or electoral politics (Stucky, 
Heimer, & Lang, 2007, p. 95).   
Economic theory and POSOF: Complementary views.  Both POSOF and 
economic theory recognize the significant role of politics in the policy process.  The two 
approaches appear complementary and applicable to the reality of governmental and 
administrative policymaking for juvenile justice. Each focuses on the social and 
economic problems and politics that characterize state jurisdictions and resulting policies 
that may influence spending decisions.  POSOF attempts to link partisan politics and 
other social and economic factors that predict state spending on corrections.  Economic 
theory helps to explain how intergovernmental aid may affect spending decisions when 
the POSOF model is extended to juvenile justice.  I used these theoretical views to 
provide a broader understanding of factors influencing state level spending in the juvenile 




I used a variety of secondary variable data sources to gather data for state juvenile 
justice budget appropriations, partisan politics, citizen ideology, juvenile crime, fiscal, 
and demographic data relevant to the study.  Next, I collected data for each of the 50 
states and the District of Columbia over an eleven-year period between 1996 and 2006.  
The 30 states for which state appropriation and federal aid data were available for each 
year were included in the statistical analysis.  Finally, I used a pooled time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) design to examine the determinants of state spending on juvenile justice 
programs and specified a multiple regression model for the statistical analysis using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel-corrected standard errors. 
 
Contributions of the Study 
This study contributes to academic knowledge in several ways.  First, it seeks to 
address a gap in the academic literature on the influence of federal aid and other social 
and economic factors on state spending for juvenile justice programs.  Second, this 
dissertation contributes to the literature by addressing two gaps in the POSOF perspective:  
1) by including federal aid in the model to show that states are not completely 
autonomous, because the federal government influences their behavior through federal 
grants-in-aid; and 2) by extending the model to the study of juvenile justice.  Third, as 
explained in Chapter 5 -  Methodology, this study resulted in the creation of a data base 
including state level appropriations and federal aid for juvenile justice for 30 of the 50 
states, including all of the western states, for an eleven-year period from 1996 – 2006.  
Furthermore, this dissertation is important because it will offer state and federal public 
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administrators and legislators additional insight on how they assess and prioritize juvenile 
justice as reflected in their funding policies.  
 
Organization of the Study 
In Chapter 2, I present a discussion of the history of the juvenile justice system in the 
United States and the evolution of federal aid in this policy arena.  In Chapter 3, I 
continue with a review of the literature on federal grants-in-aid as an intergovernmental 
relations tool, economic and public finance theory on the impact of federal aid on states, 
and state spending on corrections and juvenile justice.  In Chapter 4, I formulate the 
theoretical concepts, research questions and hypotheses, and key variables underlying the 
study.  Chapter 5 outlines the methods and procedures I employed to conduct the study.  
Chapter 6 presents my findings and discussion of the results of the research analyses.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I present my conclusions and offer recommendations for future 












BACKGROUND:  HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Policy debates dealing with state or federal funding of juvenile justice have 
traditionally been marked by tension between the moral responsibility to safeguard 
children and the civic responsibility to protect society (McCord, Widom, & Crowell, 
2001).  This chapter provides the framework for understanding the historical context of 
the juvenile justice system in the United States and the evolution of federal involvement 
in juvenile justice.  By reviewing the history of juvenile justice interwoven with the 
evolution of federal involvement, one can observe the impact of intergovernmental 
relations and fiscal federalism in public policy, as well as present background information 
for the juvenile justice policy area.  The chapter is divided into four sections:  1) history of 
juvenile justice in the United States; 2) structure of the current juvenile justice system; 3) 
current federal role and funding concerns; and 4) summary.   
 
Historical Overview of Juvenile Justice in the United States 
Numerous scholars have written about the origin of the juvenile justice system in the 
United States.  I rely primarily on the concise historical summaries developed by Nunez-
Neto (2007a), Snyder and Sickmund (2006), and Eddy and Gribskov (1999) to develop 
the historical context for juvenile justice for this study.  The dominant theme in the 
creation of the juvenile justice system is the concept of rehabilitation through 
individualized justice.  Out of a desire to achieve real results based on these ideals, the 
system has undergone numerous efforts to improve policies and practices over the past 
200 years.  Essentially, the juvenile justice system has evolved through four phases over 
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the years.  Phase one represents the early history, covers 18th and 19th century 
developments, and focuses on juvenile crime and separate juvenile facilities.  Phase two 
covers creation of the juvenile court and focuses on the offender and rehabilitation.  Phase 
three focuses on the evolution of federal involvement and introduction of due process.  
Finally, phase four introduces the punitive model of juvenile justice and get tough on 
crime legislation.  Each phase established distinct strategies to deal with juvenile 
delinquency.     
Phase One:  Early History (18th and 19th Century)  
During the later part of the 18th century, children under the age of seven were 
traditionally considered to be below the age of reason, and therefore, presumed to be 
incapable of criminal intent.  These children were exempt from prosecution and 
punishment. Children seven and older who broke the law could be subject to trial in 
criminal court and sentenced to prison, or death sentence, if found guilty (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006, p. 94).   These practices, inherited by the American colonists from 
England, were grounded in Common Law doctrine, which held that a juvenile age seven 
or older could receive the same punishment as an adult.  Consequently, juveniles were 
housed in facilities with adults; however, evidence shows that the most severe 
punishments were seldom given to juveniles (Taylor, Fritsch, & Caeti, 2002).  These 
colonial practices had three fundamental features:  they established local control of the 
justice system, gave families the responsibility and legal liability for their children’s 
actions, and discriminated between deserving and undeserving poor people (Nunez-Neto, 
2007a).  
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The 19th century introduced industrialization, the early American juvenile institutions, 
and a group of progressive reformers who were the catalyst to the modern day juvenile 
justice system.  During the Industrial Revolution period (approximately 1820 – 1870) in 
America, the country experienced a shift in population from rural areas to urban centers.  
As industries and factories arose, people moved from farms to the cities leading to 
dramatic increases in city populations.  This led to other issues, particularly for the poor 
who were more vulnerable in the new urban areas.  Overcrowding was a serious problem 
and traditional family structures and extended family networks that previously provided 
support, socialization, and supervision for lower class children were disrupted.  
Consequently, the numbers of impoverished, unsupervised, homeless children on city 
streets increased as did stealing and juvenile property crimes (Bernard, 1993).    
Focus on juvenile crime and separate juvenile facilities.  As juvenile crime and 
delinquency began to emerge as a significant social problem, the 19th century reform 
movement that ultimately led to the establishment of the juvenile court in the United 
States was born.  The early reformers sought to change the perception of children as 
small adults to one of persons whose moral and cognitive abilities were not fully 
developed.  They argued for separate treatment of juveniles based on three key 
assumptions:  juveniles are less mature than adults; they are incapable of the same level 
of intent as adults; and they are more easily rehabilitated than adults (Taylor et al., 2002). 
By 1825, the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents was organized in 
New York.  Their advocacy led to the opening of the first House of Refuge in the United 
States in New York in 1825 as the official reformatory for juveniles.  Soon after, the 
House of Refuge model of privately operated facilities exclusively for juveniles was 
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established in most major cities.   Once committed, youth remained at a house of refuge 
until adulthood, typically age 21.  By mid-century, Massachusetts opened the first totally 
state supported and operated reform schools for boys and girls.  Other states followed and 
took on the responsibility of operating juvenile facilities as a means of addressing the 
problems of delinquency.  By the turn of the 20th century, refuge houses had been 
renamed industrial, trade, or training schools. 
Phase Two:  Creation of the Juvenile Court - Focus on the Offender and  
Rehabilitation (First Half of the 20th Century) 
 
The next phase in the development of the juvenile justice system began to shift focus 
away from establishing institutions specifically for juvenile punishment to the juvenile 
offender and rehabilitation.  The Illinois state legislature led the way in this transition and 
passed the Juvenile Court Act of 1899, which established the nation’s first juvenile court 
in Cook County, Chicago, Illinois.  The new juvenile court was based on the British 
doctrine of parens patriae, which held that the state has inherent power and authority to 
protect persons who are legally unable to act on their own behalf.  This doctrine was used 
as rationale to explain the state’s interest in distinguishing between adults and children in 
its dispensation of justice (Nunez-Neto, 2007a).  Because children do not possess fully 
developed cognitive or legal capacity, the doctrine was interpreted to grant state 
government inherent power and responsibility to provide protection and treatment for 
children whose parents were unable or unwilling to provide adequate care and 
supervision.  The key element in this new phase of development for juvenile justice in the 
United States was the focus on the welfare of the child and using the juvenile courts to 
intervene where needed. 
Early juvenile courts.  Key features of the Chicago juvenile court model were:   
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• the definition of juvenile as a child under the age of 16;6 
• the separation of children and adults in correctional institutions;  
• the establishment of special, informal procedural rules, which eliminated 
indictments, pleadings, and jury trials as a result of the court’s benevolent mission 
to protect and provide for the welfare of the child;  
• a broad range of dispositions for judges tailored to the best interest of the child, 
which became part of the treatment plan for the juvenile; and  
• the provision of probation officers to monitor juveniles released into the 
community; and prohibition of the detention of children below the age of 12 in a 
jail or police station (Nunez-Neto, 2007a).  
The Chicago juvenile court became the model for other states establishing juvenile justice 
systems throughout the first half of the 20th century.  By 1914, the practice of diversion 
was instituted as a key element of the emerging juvenile justice system.  This practice 
involved stopping the official criminal proceedings against a juvenile with the goal of 
providing treatment outside of the formal juvenile justice system to turn delinquents into 
productive citizens.  By 1925, the majority of state legislatures had enacted similar laws 
giving juvenile courts the broad undefined task of serving the best interests of the child.  
Over the next 50 years, the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
youth under 18 who were charged with violating criminal laws (Snyder & Sickmund, 
2006).  As one might expect, problems arose with the broad interpretation of the meaning 
of best interest of the child as evidenced in the use of intrusive practices by the juvenile 
                                                 
6
 Currently, age guidelines for juveniles subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court may vary by state. 
 18 
courts involving placement of children committed for relatively minor offenses into 
reform schools for long period of time (Eddy & Gribskov, 1999).   
Phase Three:  Evolution of Federal Involvement and Introduction of Due Process 
(1950s through 1970s) 
 
This section highlights some of the milestones of congressional and Supreme Court 
involvement in juvenile justice.   
Congressional role.  By 1951, Congress had begun to focus its efforts on enacting 
legislation specifically directed toward juvenile delinquents.  This was a departure from 
earlier federal government efforts to address delinquency, which were integrated with 
initiatives to address child welfare concerns.  The earliest federal government attempt to 
address these dual concerns occurred in 1909 at the White House Conference on the Care 
of Dependent Children.  This conference led to the creation of the United States 
Children’s Bureau in 1912, which administered the first federal aid program that 
provided grants for child welfare and juvenile delinquents (Nunez-Neto, 2007a).   
In 1951, however, Congress began formally to separate the administration of juvenile 
justice programming with the creation of the Juvenile Delinquency Bureau within the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).7  The location of this new bureau 
within HEW was a reflection of the early government focus on the treatment and 
prevention of juvenile delinquency, rather than on punishment.  There were no further 
congressional reform measures until the 1960s. 
 Congressional response to juvenile crime.  The Congressional response to 
increasing public awareness and concern about juvenile crime was the enactment of four 
major federal laws targeting juvenile delinquency.  These laws created the foundation for 
                                                 
7
 This department was renamed Department of Health and Human Services in 1979 when its education 
functions were transferred to the newly created Department of Education.  
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the federal government’s current role as an active partner with state and local communities 
to prevent and control delinquency. First, in 1961, passage of the Juvenile Delinquency 
and Youth Offenses Control Act provided grant funds totaling $10 million annually for 
three years to states, localities, and private nonprofit agencies.  These funds were provided 
to support the development of demonstration and evaluation projects for community 
programs to increase opportunities for youth to succeed in mainstream society.8     
In 1968, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation to provide federal funding 
for juvenile justice.  The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 was 
aimed at providing funding assistance to state and local governments and training justice 
personnel.  The second 1968 initiative was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act.  This Act authorized the distribution of grant funds through the Department of Justice, 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, to state and local enforcement agencies as 
an incentive to establish planning agencies and develop programs for education, research, 
and local crime control initiatives.   
An enormous increase of approximately 216% in juvenile arrests for violent crimes 
between 1960 and 1974 led to the eventual passage of the fourth of the initial 
Congressional initiatives aimed at providing funding to prevent juvenile delinquency, the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP)Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-415) 
(Nunez-Neto, 2007a, p. 2).  This 1974 legislation was the first comprehensive piece of 
juvenile justice legislation.  It featured three major components:  1) it established grant 
programs to assist states with setting up and running their juvenile justice systems; 2) it 
created a set of institutions within the federal government that were dedicated to 
                                                 
8
 See 42 United States Code, Chapter 29, Sections 254 to 2548. 
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/42C29.txt.      
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coordinating and administering federal juvenile justice efforts; and 3) it established core 
mandates for handling juvenile offenders in custody that states had to adhere to in order to 
be eligible to receive grant funding (Nunez-Neto, 2007a, p. 7).  (See Exhibit 1 for a 
description of the core mandates.)   
Most notably, the JJDP Act of 1974 created the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the Department of Justice as the coordinating 
agency for juvenile justice on the national level.  Currently, OJJDP is responsible for 
administering the primary grant programs for delinquency prevention authorized by 
Congress to assist states with improving services available to juveniles.  Exhibit 2 
describes the six major grant programs that were available to states through the JJDP Act 
and/or administered by OJJDP between 1996 and 2006, the period for this study.  The 
programs included the following:  State Formula Grants Program, Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Special Emphasis Program, Title V – Incentive Grants for Local 
Delinquency Prevention Programs, Challenge Grants, Juvenile Accountability Block 
Grants, and Enforcing Underage Drinking Laws Program.   
The administrator of OJJDP has broad authority to coordinate the federal 
government’s activities related to the treatment of juvenile offenders, including programs 
that focus on prevention, diversion, training, treatment, rehabilitation, evaluation, research, 
and efforts to influence and improve the states’ juvenile justice systems.  Early in the 
history of the JJDP Act, most federal aid was focused on preventing juvenile delinquency 
and rehabilitating juvenile offenders.  After undergoing several amendments over the past 
37 years, today, the JJDP Act now places more emphasis on influencing states to expand 
sanctions and other measures to hold juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior.   
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In spite of philosophical changes in approach to delinquency prevention, the three primary 
features of the JJDP Act as noted above have remained the same over the years.    
Impact of the United States Supreme Court.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
increasing juvenile crime rates and growing numbers of juveniles institutionalized for 
treatment purposes caused lawmakers, academics, and citizens to question the efficacy of 
the juvenile court’s ability to rehabilitate delinquents (Nunez-Neto, 2007a).  The concerns 
resulted in greater Congressional involvement and a series of landmark Supreme Court 
rulings between 1966 and 1975, which dramatically changed the character and procedures 
of the juvenile justice system.  The Supreme Court rulings rejected the doctrine of parens 
patriae referring to the concept as “murky and of dubious historical relevance” (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006, p. 100).  Instead, it embraced the notion that the role of the state is to act 
in the best interest of the child while providing fundamental fairness and due process.  In 
sum, while the juvenile court may be benevolently motivated, it is not a substitute for 
principle and procedure as required in the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the Supreme Court rulings, which signaled an 
important highlight of the third phase of development of juvenile justice in the United 









United States Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Due Process Cases, 1966 – 1975 
Case Citation Ruling 
Kent v. United States 383 U. S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966) Courts must provide the essentials 
of due process when transferring 
juveniles to the adult system. 
In re Gault 387 U. S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) In hearings that could result in 
commitment to an institution, 
juveniles have four basic 
constitutional rights. 
a) Notice of charges 
b) Right to counsel 
c) Right to question  
    witnesses 
d) Protection against self- 
    incrimination 
In re Winship 397 U. S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970) In delinquency matters, the state 
must prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U. S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971) Jury trials are not constitutionally 
required in juvenile court hearings. 
Breed v. Jones 421 U. S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975) Waiver of a juvenile to criminal 
court following adjudication in 
juvenile court constitutes double 
jeopardy. 
Source:  Snyder and Sickmund, 2006, pp. 100 – 102. 
 Phase Four:  Punitive Model – Get Tough on Crime Legislation (1980s to Present) 
In the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, the juvenile justice pendulum began to swing 
toward a law and order, “get tough” approach with the passage of state legislation to crack 
down on juvenile crime (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; Taylor et al., 2002).  This punitive 
legislative reaction was the response to the public’s perception that serious juvenile crime 
was increasing and that the system was too lenient with offenders.  The evidence shows 
that between 1980 and 1988, the violent crime index rate per 100,000 juveniles ages 10 -
17 was effectively constant, rising only slightly above 300 per 100,000.  The rate began to 
increase in 1989 and by 1994 had increased to 525 per 100,000, approximately 61% higher 
than the 1988 level (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006, p. 130 - 136)9.  Although the juvenile 
                                                 
9
 Violent crime index offenses include murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault.  Property crime index offenses include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
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violent crime index arrest rate reached a historic low in 2004, down 49% from its 1994 
peak (Puzzanchera, 2009),  the 1990s were marked by unprecedented change as state 
legislatures responded with more punitive juvenile laws to calm public concern over 
juvenile crime.  Five areas of change in state laws resulted:  1) transfer provisions making 
it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system to the adult criminal 
justice system; 2) expanded sentencing authority; 3) modification of traditional juvenile 
court confidentiality provisions making records and proceedings more open; 4) expanded 
involvement of victims of juvenile crime in the juvenile justice process; and 5) changes in 
correctional programming  as a result of new transfer and sentencing laws (Snyder & 
Sickmund, 2006).   These changes diminished the differences between the criminal and 
juvenile justice systems in recent years.  I use this aspect of the historical development of 
juvenile justice in the United States as background for the theoretical relevance of the 
Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF), used in the analysis of spending on adult 
corrections, in my analysis of state spending on juvenile justice. This factor and other 
characteristics of the juvenile justice policy area that support theoretical relevance of 
POSOF are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Summary 
 States and the federal government, in its funding initiatives, adjusted to philosophical 
and rhetorical shifts and changes concerning juvenile crime in their approach to handling 
juvenile delinquency during the years since the establishment of the first juvenile court in 
1899.  Even in light of more punitive laws being enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, it is 
remarkable that the purpose clause in most state juvenile justice statutes includes elements 
of the Balanced and Restorative Justice (BARJ) Model for dealing with juvenile 
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delinquency (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).10  Unlike the punitive model in which crime is 
viewed as an act against the state where the goal is to prevent future delinquency through 
punishment, BARJ views crime as an act against another person or the community.  The 
BARJ approach gives balanced attention to public safety, individual accountability to 
victims and the community, and development of skills and personal competencies to help 
juvenile offenders live more productive lives (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1997; Maloney, 
Romig, &Armstrong, 1988; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).   
 
Structure of the Current Juvenile Justice System  
There is no national or centralized juvenile justice system in the United States.  
Instead, there are at least 51 different juvenile justice systems represented by the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia.  Each has its own set of laws and within each state operation 
of the juvenile courts may differ.  Additionally, the federal government has established 
laws governing juveniles who commit crimes in areas under its jurisdiction, such as on 
Indian reservations or in national parks.  The juvenile court remains as the focal point of 
juvenile justice in the country operating under procedural due process with the goal of 
holding juveniles accountable, developing youth competencies, and providing safe 
communities.    
State agencies responsible for administering juvenile justice services and institutions 
fall into one of four categories in state government:  1) a separate agency in the executive 
branch; 2) a division or bureau under a human services umbrella; 3) a division within a 
child welfare or social services system; or 4) a division of a corrections department 
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housing both adult and juvenile services (Loughran, Godfrey, et al., 2007).  Further 
complicating the structure of the system, there is considerable variation within states in 
terms of the provision of juvenile justice services at the state versus the county level of 
government.  Three basic models explain how services are provided in the states:   
• Centralized States (12 states) - A state executive agency has across-the-board 
state control of delinquency services, including state-run juvenile probation 
services, institutional commitments, and aftercare. 
• Decentralized States (18 states) - The organization of basic delinquency 
services is characterized, at a minimum, by local control of ordinary probation 
services.  Often, local authorities run detention centers as well.  Some also 
share responsibility for the provision of aftercare services with state agencies.   
• Combination States (21 states) - The organization of basic delinquency 
services features a mix of state-controlled and locally operated delinquency 
services. For instance, they may have largely state-run systems, but with 
significant local control in the more populous, urban areas. Another possible 
scenario is that, although the state operates most delinquency services for 
youth, responsibility is divided between the executive and judicial branches. 
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of states categorized by the different 
service models.11  
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 Citation for Figure 1 and description of juvenile delinquency service models: Griffin, Patrick and King, 
Melanie. 2006. "National Overviews." State Juvenile Justice Profiles. Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for 




Figure 1.  Organization of Juvenile Delinquency Services 
This matrix of institutions creates a complex, dynamic, and sometimes overlapping 
system.  This unique characteristic of the juvenile justice system is exemplified by the 
interaction of the system with other public and private forms of control, including schools, 
mental health, public health, and other governmental agencies and the evolution of 
theories, policies, and practices since the late 18th century. 
 
Current Federal Role and Funding Concerns 
The federal government has continued to play a limited, nonetheless essential, role in 
preventing juvenile delinquency and improving the effectiveness of juvenile justice 
systems within the states since the enactment of the JJDPA of 1974.  Federal involvement 
has expanded to include a wide variety of delinquency prevention strategies, research, 
and development of evidence-based programs and practices in response to changes in the 
philosophical focus of juvenile justice over the decades (Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 
2009a).  In spite of advances in federal support, insufficient funding for adequate staffing, 
training, and programming tends to be a systemic issue. 
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According to the February 27, 2008, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 
for Congress, overall appropriations for juvenile justice within the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) remained comparatively stable from FY1999 to FY2002 ranging from $499 to 
$565 million for an average of approximately $550 million annually (Nunez-Neto, 
2008).12  Between FY2002 and FY2007, funding for juvenile justice programs within the 
DOJ declined by 38% to $339 million, then increased to $384 million in FY2008 (Nunez-
Neto, 2008).  Appropriations were cut by approximately $9 million in FY2009 to $375, 
increased to $424 million in FY2010 before experiencing a 35% decrease to $276 million 
in FY2011 (Coalition for Juvenile Justice, 2011a).   
Given this scenario of increases and reductions in federal aid to states, it is 
appropriate to address the question of the impact of federal aid as a factor influencing 
state spending decisions for juvenile justice programs.  Eddy & Gribskov (1999), Nelson 
(2008), Snyder & Sickmund (2006), and others argue that federal support is critical to 
help maintain delinquency prevention as a function of government and to help states 
embrace needed reforms and maintain quality programs.  Similar to other policy areas in 
the American federal system, states and localities rely on the federal government for 
financial support and guidance on how best to tackle juvenile justice challenges (Nelson, 
2008, p. 34).   
 
Summary 
The juvenile justice system in the United States has evolved through four phases of 
development, each with a unique focus and distinct strategies to address juvenile 
                                                 
12
 These funds were appropriated for programs administered by the Department of Justices’ Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
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delinquency.  Congressional and Supreme Court involvement in juvenile justice led to 
major milestones in funding and legislative initiatives aimed at delinquency prevention, 
system improvement, and implementation of due process in juvenile court proceedings.  
Today, the juvenile justice system is a complex, dynamic system with the juvenile court 
as the focal point.  Juvenile justice continues to be primarily a state responsibility with 
limited, yet essential federal support.  The juvenile justice system remains unique, guided 



































REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Juvenile justice in the United States receives a relatively small share of a state’s 
budget pie, but this policy area is dynamic and critical as indicated by its structural 
complexity and responsibility for services dealing with juvenile offenders.  A wide array 
of literature is available on prevention of delinquency, juvenile program evaluations, 
comparison of crime rates and offenses based on gender and race; education and 
delinquency, substance abuse and delinquency, and other topics related to juvenile 
justice.  However, unlike other policy areas, such as education, welfare, Medicare and 
Medicaid, highways and other infrastructure programs, which are distinguished by their 
much larger share of a state’s budget  (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009), my 
literature review revealed an inexplicable gap in empirical literature on factors that 
influence juvenile justice spending decisions.  As a result, I examined three fields of 
academic literature as a foundation for analyzing the impact of federal aid and other 
demographic, social, economic, and political factors on state spending policies for 
juvenile justice programs.  The three strands of literature include juvenile justice and 
corrections literature, economic literature on the development of federal grants-in-aid as 
an intergovernmental relations tool, and public finance literature on state spending 
decisions and the influence of federal grants-in-aid.  I used scholarly work from other 
policy areas and on related topics in these fields as a framework for explaining state 
spending on juvenile justice programs.   
This chapter includes six sections:  1) state spending on juvenile justice:  what we 
know from the literature, 2) federal grants-in-aid as a tool of government, 3) economic 
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theory on the impact of federal aid on state spending decisions and the results of 
empirical research, 4) discussion of the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) 
theory and related empirical research, 5) applicability POSOF to juvenile justice, and 6) 
summary of the review of the literature. 
 
State Spending on Juvenile Justice:  What We Know From the Literature 
 
There are numerous reports, studies, and evaluations of juvenile justice programs 
supported in part by federal grant funding and reports prepared by the United States 
General Accounting Office for Congress on federal juvenile justice funding trends.  
These reports typically seek to gather information on the status and types of programs 
receiving federal aid (GAO, 1996a; GAO, 1996b).   
My review of the literature revealed three studies which indirectly relate to my 
dissertation topic:   The Children’s Budget Report:  A Detailed Analysis of Spending on 
Low-Income Children’s Programs in 13 States, developed by Flores, Douglas, & 
Ellwood (1998); State Juvenile Justice Expenditures and Innovations, published by the 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) in 1999; and a 2001 dissertation 
study entitled, The Implications of State-Developed Funding Formulas:  A New Look at 
Distributive Politics, by Nancy Helen Ross.  The common factor among the studies is that 
each highlights the fact that historically juvenile justice has been primarily funded by the 
states with only modest federal support.   
The Children’s Budget Report 
The Children’s Budget Report examined state and federal spending on six categories 
of spending on low-income children’s programs in 13 states for state fiscal year 1994-
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1995:  1) cash assistance and training, 2) food and nutrition, 3) child care and early 
childhood development, 4) child protection and family services, 5) juvenile justice and 
youth services, and 6) health.  Juvenile justice spending received only minimal analysis; 
however, the report is worthy of note since the academic literature is scant in this policy 
area.  Prior to this report, there had been no detailed state-by-state research on what is 
actually spent on children (Flores, Douglas, & Ellwood, 1998).  The researchers collected 
actual expenditure data from state sources including state own source spending in 
addition to federal aid and state matching funds.  The Children’s Budget Report broke 
new ground because it presented fiscal data collected at the state level from state budget 
officers, state departments, and state documents.  Such data provided a more complete 
picture of state spending on children’s programs.   
The 13 states selected for the study were chosen to represent economic, geographic, 
and political diversity; and because they were heavily populated states representing about 
half of the nation’s population.  The states included Alabama, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.   
Findings from the report showed that federal funding played a significant role in 
expanding the ability of individual states to provide services and expanding the state’s 
fiscal capacity.  Additionally, The Children’s Budget Report found that states spent the 
majority of their funds on health (37%), cash assistance (30%), child protection (15%), 
and juvenile justice and youth services (10%) respectively (p. 22).  State level funding 
distribution tended to be greater for programs that support health (i.e., Medicaid) and less 
for other programs.  Overall, most spending on low-income children in the 13 states was 
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from federal sources.  For example, state and local spending averages $3,153 per poor 
child, but tripled to $10,111 with the addition of federal aid (Flores et al., 1998, p. 46).   
In regards to juvenile justice, the report analyzed spending relative to all children in 
the targeted states, not just poor children, because states serve all children through the 
juvenile justice system regardless of income status.  The juvenile justice and youth 
services category represented 10 percent of low-income children’s spending from state 
and local funds, but only 3 percent of spending from total funds, including federal aid 
(Flores et al., 1998, p. 43).  States provided more than 90 percent of the funding for 
juvenile justice and youth services programs reflecting the historical fact that states fund 
juvenile justice programs primarily from state revenues (p. 46).   Total and state juvenile 
justice expenditures were similar averaging $59 and $55 per child respectively (pp. 43-
44).  Moreover, results showed that New York spent the most state dollars on the juvenile 
justice category, with an expenditure level of $102 per child, with Florida and Wisconsin 
following with slightly lower expenditure levels of $101 and $95 per child respectively.  
The lowest state level expenditures were found in Mississippi and New Jersey, spending 
$17 and $28 per child respectively (pp. 44 and 57). 
In summary, The Children’s Budget Report is unique because it is the first study that 
offered a detailed state-by-state examination on what was actually spent on children.  
Among the conclusions draw from the report about federal and state spending priorities, 
two have significance for this dissertation study:  
1) The states provided the majority of funds for child protection and family 
services and juvenile justice and youth services.  2) States had strong funding 
preferences that reflected the many differences among the states, but especially 
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their priorities and their particular cultural and political histories. (Flores et al., 
1998, p. 45)   
Additionally, Flores et al. (1998) surmised that state spending priorities are the result of a 
number of factors, including incentives inherent in the federal funding structure, the cost 
of providing different services, need for services, and the relative importance placed on 
services.  Moreover, they concluded that some of the variation among states was 
explained by different populations, different methods of service delivery, costs of 
providing services, eligibility requirements, and need for services.  The examination of 
six categories of service illustrated in monetary terms the priorities of a particular state 
(Flores et al., 1998, p. 47).  The Children’s Budget Report broke new ground and 
provided a detailed descriptive analysis of spending on low-income children’s programs, 
including some information on juvenile justice spending.  
State Juvenile Justice Expenditures and Innovations 
The report on State Juvenile Justice Expenditures and Innovations was based on 
surveys conducted by NASBO in 1994 and 1998.  Forty-seven states and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico participated in the study, which provided the basis for 
analyzing overall changes in state juvenile justice spending over the four-year period 
from 1994 to 1998.  Expenditure data were collected in four specific categories:  
residential settings, community settings, delinquency prevention, and post-residential 
care.  However, survey results were limited because not all states responded and it was 
not possible to control for strict reporting of available data (NASBO, 1999).    
The report showed that states spent $4.22 billion in 1998 for juvenile justice related 
programs in response to national concerns about violent crime and incarceration rates 
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among juveniles ages 10 – 17.  This represented a 65.4 percent increase from the 1994 
expenditures of $2.55 billion, a large portion, but not a complete accounting of juvenile 
justice expenditures (NASBO, 1999, p. 1).   
NASBO allocated state, local, and federal expenditures among the four expenditure 
categories for each of the fiscal years.  Total expenditures for each category in 1994 and 
1998 are presented in Table 2 below.  
Table 2 
 
Total State Expenditures by Category and Percent Federal Funds, Fiscal Years 1994 and 
1998 
Expenditure Category FY 1994 Total Percent 
Federal 
FY 1998 Total Percent 
Federal 
Percent Change in 
Total Expenditures  
FY94-FY98 
Residential Setting 1,750,966,785 7.74 2,809,627,323 9.01 60.46 
Community Setting 591,371,447 14.98 904,533,022 20.04 52.96 
Delinquency 
Prevention 
211,205,636 7.04 354,884,044 8.31 68.03 
Post-Residential Care 88,584,866 1.31 154,055,565 4.36 73.91 
Total 2,642,128,734  4,223,099,954   
Note:  Source:  National Association of State Budget Officers.  (1999).  State juvenile 
justice expenditures and innovations.  Washington, D. C.:  National Association of State  
Budget Officers.  Retrieved from  
http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/information_briefs/juvenile_expend_1999.html 
 
A comparison of state spending with fund sources revealed that states spending 
accounted for the largest percentage of funds spent on juvenile programs.  As identified 
in The Children’s Budget Report, this finding also reflects the fact that states have 
historically been primarily responsible for funding juvenile justice programs.  
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that residential placements accounted for the largest share of 
state juvenile justice expenditures in 1994 and 1998.  Residential placements included 
any state operated or state funded residential facility, such as training schools, detention 
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centers, halfway houses and group homes (NASBO, 1999).  Delinquency prevention and 
post-residential care accounted for the smallest share of state juvenile justice 
expenditures for 1998, 8.40 and 3.60 percent, respectively.  These services included 
substance abuse, mental health, family services, and similar social services; whereas, 
post-residential services include supervision and case management in addition to 
delinquency prevention services.  Federal funds were allocated as a greater share of the 
expenditures for the community-setting category (14.98 and 20.04 percent for 1994 and 
1998, respectively) in comparison to the other three categories.  Community setting 
programs are typically used in lieu of more expensive residential placement and included 
foster homes, electronic monitoring, and day treatment (NASBO, 1999).   
The NASBO (1999) report provided the basis for analyzing overall changes in state 
juvenile justice spending between 1994 and 1998 and a synopsis of the programs the 
appropriations created.  The report indicated that state spending increases from 1994 to 
1998 might have been a response to concerns over the juvenile violent crime index arrest 
rate and the fact that over 100,000 youth were being held in residential facilities in 1997.  
Overall, NASBO concluded that states reported a variety of programs that confronted 
juvenile justice issues creatively, including intensive case management, early intervention 
programs to reduce the number of youth entering the juvenile justice system, and 
programs for development of comprehensive juvenile crime and delinquency plans.  
There has been no survey updating the NASBO report on state juvenile justice 




The Implications of State-Developed Funding Formulas 
The Ross study explored the relationship between the degree of professionalism in 
state legislatures and reliance on state developed funding formulas as a financial 
distribution approach through examination of juvenile justice and child welfare funding 
in twelve states from 1996 – 2000.  Ross (2001) found that the higher a state’s legislative 
professionalism score, the greater its reliance on funding formulas in shaping policy 
through the budget process for the two policy areas.  Furthermore, Ross (2001) found that 
states scoring high on the professionalism index tended to use formulas more often in 
both child welfare and juvenile justice budget decisions than other states.  As was 
expected, the relationship between low professionalism scores was strongest in states 
where limited use of funding formulas in budget development was evident (p. 140).  
Additionally, the Ross study showed that the federal government plays a much 
greater funding role in child welfare in contrast to juvenile justice and that juvenile 
justice remains largely a state initiative.  During the five years analyzed, approximately 
82% of funding allocated for juvenile justice programs came from state revenues as 
compared to 18% from federal aid (Ross, 2001, p. 86).  Moreover, reliance on formulas 
as a disbursement approach was found in juvenile justice programming at a rate of 
approximately two to one over child welfare services (p. 141).   This finding suggests that 
due to limited federal involvement, the states under investigation may have exercised 
greater latitude in developing funding goals and methods (Ross, 2001, p.141).   Finally, 
Ross (2001) surmised that that traditional determinants of distributive politics (process by 
which budgetary decisions are made), such as legislative influence and seniority, have 
less power in states where there is a greater reliance on funding formulas as a 
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disbursement approach (pp. 142-143).  In these states, Ross (2001) found a subtle shift of 
influence from senior elected officials to technical legislative staff that were integral in 
the state level budget policy process. 
Summary 
The Children’s Budget Report (Flores et al., 1998), the NASBO (1999) survey, and the 
Ross (2001) study all identified the fact that juvenile justice is primarily funded by state 
and local jurisdictions and federal aid is limited in this policy area.  Beyond that, these 
studies provided limited information about the affect of federal aid or other factors that 
may determine state juvenile justice spending decisions.  At best, these works are 
descriptive accounts of state spending policies involving juvenile justice.   My 
dissertation study is an effort to fill this void in the empirical literature on juvenile justice 
spending by providing an analysis of whether, and to what extent, federal aid and other 
socioeconomic and political factors, affect state spending decisions concerning juvenile 
justice programs. 
 
Federal Grants-in-Aid:  An Intergovernmental Relations Tool 
 
Recall, in Chapter 2, I provided historical background for including federal aid as a 
covariate in my model of per capita state spending on juvenile justice.  Hence, this 
chapter further defines grants-in-aid and provides information on federal aid as an 
intergovernmental relations tool.  Grants-in-aid are transfers of money between 
governments, usually from a higher level to a lower level of government in the American 
federal system.  The federal grant-in-aid system uses a fiscal relationship as a basis for 
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policymaking and programmatic cooperation and serves as an instrument of federal 
influence (Shafritz et al., 2007). 
Federal aid to state and local governments has a long history as a major instrument in 
American intergovernmental relations existing prior to the adoption of the United States 
Constitution in 1789.13  The grant-in-aid system in the United States has evolved from a 
few grants to hundreds with award allocations totaling hundreds of billions of dollars 
since its beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries when land grants were the principal form 
of federal aid.  Today, grants are among the most used policy tools of the American 
federal government (Beam & Conlan, 2002).  When viewed fiscally, only a few 
programs, such as Medicaid, which totaled approximately 46% of the federal total aid to 
state and local governments in 2005 (U. S. Census Bureau), seem to matter.  However, 
when viewed administratively or politically, each grant program merits separate 
recognition and consideration, which is the case with grant funding for juvenile justice 
programs.  In comparison to other funded programs, juvenile justice programs receive 
minimal federal aid, averaging approximately 0.10% of total federal aid to states in 2006 









                                                 
13
 Some of the most prominent contributors to the literature on the historical perspective of the significance 
of federal aid include Maxwell (1952); Reagan (1972); Reischauer (1977); Hale and Palley (1981); Brown, 
Fossett, and Palmer (1984); Peterson, Bovbjerg, Davis, Davis, Durman, and Gallo (1986); Montreal, 1999; 
Walker (2000); Beam and Conlan (2002); Monypenny (2007); O’Toole (2007); Shafritz, Russell, & Borick 
(2007); and Stephens and Wikstrom (2007).   
14
 Total federal aid to states in 2006 was $428,153,867,000; total federal aid for juvenile justice programs 
was $434,653,000. 
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Economic Theory and Empirical Research Findings  
 
Economic Theory:  Impact of Federal Aid on State Spending Decisions  
 
Economists use the general consumer demand model to predict how a state’s 
expenditure patterns are likely to change in response to a grant.  The model theorizes that 
consumers (states) maximize their individual welfare subject to their preferences for the 
goods and services available to them, the prices they must pay for the goods, and the 
resources they have to spend (GAO, 1996b; Gruber , 2007).  For example, the model 
predicts that a government using grants may purchase goods in one of three ways:  1) 
goods aided by grants, 2) unsubsidized public and private goods, and 3) some 
combination of grant aided and unaided goods.  The government’s purchasing power is 
constrained by its budget consisting of its own revenues plus additional revenue from 
federal aid.  Moreover, the consumer demand theory holds that a government will 
purchase as much of aided and non-aided goods as it can afford, within its budget 
constraint in accordance with the taxpayers’ collective preferences. 
According to economic theory, federal grants-in-aid work to stimulate state spending 
or increase substitution depending on the individual grant design features (Fisher, 1996; 
GAO, 1996b; Gruber, 2007).  There are three basic types of grants, categorical, block, 
and general purpose, organized along three dimensions:  restrictions on use, required state 
contribution, and limits on federal contribution.  Economic theory holds that grant design 
features can be used as incentives to encourage grant recipients to increase total spending 
in a policy area.  The incentives work by restricting the use of funds to a specific purpose, 
requiring recipients to provide matching funds to obtain grant funds, and providing 
unrestricted federal matching of state dollars.   
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There is considerable research on the types of intergovernmental grants and economic 
price effects of the different types.  However, my interest here is matching and 
nonmatching block grants, which are the primary types of federal aid included in the 
budgets for juvenile justice agencies in the states included in this study.  I limit the 
discussion below to the characteristics of matching and nonmatching block grants.15  
Exhibit 3 provides definitions of the different grant types and control mechanisms. 
 Block grants authorize funds to be used for a wide range of activities within a 
broadly defined functional area, such as juvenile justice, education, or social services.  
Both categorical and block grants are considered to be restricted or conditional grants. 
Economic theory holds that restricted grants encourage more total spending on grant 
activities than unrestricted grants and that unrestricted grants are likely to be used for tax 
relief (GAO, 1996b, p. 46).  For instance, consider the different spending responses of 
recipients to a gift certificate from a bookstore compared to an equivalent amount of 
cash.  If the gift certificate exceeds the amount recipients normally would spend on 
books, it will tend to increase their total spending on books.  With unrestricted cash, the 
recipients will likely spend each additional dollar of income according to their 
preferences for all goods.  Thus, spending on books may be a small share of each 
additional dollar, such as ten cents.  Economists recognize that federal grant dollars are 
fungible, or interchangeable, with other resources of recipient states and other local 
entities.  As a result, there will likely be a degree of substitution in every grant as 
recipients find ways to replace their own funds with federal funds, freeing up local 
resources for other purposes (Gruber, 2007, pp. 272-277).  This means that $1 in 
                                                 
15
 For a detailed discussion of the various grant types and design features, see the works of Beam and 
Conlan (2002), Fisher (1996), GAO (1996b), Gruber (2007), Hale and Palley (1981), Peterson et al. (1986), 
and Stephens & Wikstrom (2007).    
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conditional grants will not necessarily result in an additional $1 of state spending on the 
aided program. 
Matching provisions are federal control mechanisms that require states to share a 
designated percentage of the cost of providing the aided service with the federal 
government.  A match requirement may be in kind or cash.  Non-matching grants provide 
funds to recipients without any requirement for state cost sharing.  Matching and non-
matching grants may be allocated to states by formula (e.g., based on population) or 
project basis.     
According to economic theory, matching grants tend to encourage more state 
spending on the aided service than non-matching grants, other factors being equal (GAO, 
1996b; Fisher, 1996).  Fisher (1996) and Gruber (2007) provide extensive analyses of the 
effects of matching and non-matching grants.  They concluded that both provide 
additional income to recipient governments; however, matching grants, in addition to 
providing additional income, also lower the price to the recipient government of the aided 
service relative to the other services it could purchase with the funds (price effect).  In 
sum, the economic view holds that a non-matching categorical or general purpose grant 
will have an income effect on the recipient governments’ spending decisions by 
increasing resources available for government services.  Thus, their stimulative effect 
depends on the income elasticity of demand for the public goods and is difficult to 
predict.  On the other hand, a matching grant will have a price effect, in addition to 
providing additional income for the aided service.  If demand is price inelastic,16 a 
                                                 
16
 In economics, elasticity refers to the degree to which a demand or supply curve reacts to change in price.  
A good or service is considered to be highly elastic if a slight change in price leads to a sharp change in the 
quantity demanded or supplied.  Demand is price inelastic when quantity of service does not change, or 
changes minimally with sharp changes in price.  (Fisher, 1996, pp. 80-102; Gruber 2007)   
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matching grant will stimulate increases in total expenditures, but not stimulate increases 
in state money spent on the service, thus an element of substitution is involved in the 
recipient’s managing of grant funds (Fisher, 1996).  Demand for most government 
services, such as juvenile justice, tends to be price inelastic (Fisher, 1996). 
  While the consumer demand model is used here as the economic theoretical 
perspective for determining the impact of federal grants-in-aid on state spending, I am 
cognizant of alternative views.  Fisher (1996) argued that jurisdictions are seldom 
homogenous in income and since subnational governments determine how grant funds 
are to be spent, the effect of this type of income may not be clear.  He concluded that it is 
difficult to make generalizations about estimated effects of intergovernmental grants for 
two primary reasons: 1) there seems to be substantial variation in how different 
governments respond to different grants, and 2) the results of different economic studies 
often vary greatly even for the same grant program.  Considering these cautions, I 
extended my analytical model for state spending on juvenile justice to include other 
social, economic, and political variables, which research has shown to be contributing 
factors in state/government spending decisions.  
In the next section, I present the findings of empirical research on the impact of 
federal-grants-in-aid in various public policy areas.  As stated previously, there is a void 
in the academic literature on the impact of federal aid on state spending on juvenile 
justice programs; therefore, I used representative studies in other policy areas to show 
evidence of the response of policymakers to federal aid and other factors that may affect 
their spending decisions.  
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Empirical Research Findings 
This dissertation study examines the impact of federal aid on state spending for 
juvenile justice programs.  As previously stated, there is no shortage of empirical 
research on federal aid to states in specific policy areas.  Results of my review of the 
empirical literature supporting federal aid as an influential variable for examining state 
spending decisions in various policy arenas are presented below.  Topics addressed 
include:  1) the stimulative effect of federal aid on government spending, 2) the influence 
of federal aid and economic and political phenomena as predictors of government 
spending, 3) the effects of cut backs in federal aid, 4) a synthesis of economic literature 
on federal aid, and 5) some issues related to state dependence on federal.       
Federal aid:  Stimulative effect.  In general, federal aid has a stimulative effect.  
Several early studies support the notion that federal aid is a powerful predictor of total 
levels of state spending in different policy areas.  Most of these studies were conducted by 
economists and were mainly seeking to explain variation without a great deal of 
consideration of any theory that may have influenced variations in expenditures 
(Montreal, 1999).  In 1952, Fabricant (as cited in Bahl & Saunders, 1966) found that 
population density, urbanization, and income were key variables accounting for 72 
percent of variation in state and local expenditures.  Fabricant was the first to use these 
three basic variables (per capita income, population density, and urbanization) to analyze 
comprehensively the expenditure data of state and local governments of 48 states.   Fisher 
(1961) used the same three independent variables to explain state and local per capita 
expenditures in 1957.  His study revealed that 53 percent of state variation in expenditures 
could be explained by these factors.  Sacks and Harris (1964) expanded early research 
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models by introducing federal aid into the equations for their analysis of highway, 
welfare, and health and hospital expenditures for 1960.  The introduction of federal aid 
increased the explained variance for welfare and highway expenditures significantly; 
however, the increase for health and hospitals was minimal.  Sacks and Harris (1964) 
observed that the federal government had taken a direct interest in funding support for 
welfare and highway expenditures in comparison to health and hospitals, which saw a 
large increase in explanatory power after introducing state aid to the analysis.  On the 
other hand, the inclusion of state aid added little to the explanatory power of the other two 
functional categories.   Overall, these researchers found that limiting the analysis to use of 
population density, income, and percent urban as the only independent variables in regard 
to total direct general expenditures for welfare and highways yielded an R2 of .532.  When 
federal aid was added to the equation, the explanatory power increased yielding an R2 of 
.813.  These early research findings suggest that federal aid is an important variable in 
analysis of public policy expenditure decisions, particularly in areas where it is a 
substantial component of total spending, and that failure to consider it may neglect a 
major determinant of state expenditure levels.   
Osman (1966) and O’Brien (1971) contributed to the early research in their studies of 
the potential stimulative and/or substitutive effect of federal aid on state and local 
expenditure decisions.  Both analyzed five major policy areas in their studies:  education, 
highways, welfare, health and hospitals, and other general and administrative 
expenditures.  Osman (1966) found that per capita expenditures for a function rose with 
increases in per capita federal aid to that function and with increases in per capita aid to 
all other functions.  In general, he found that total federal aid per capita stimulated total 
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general expenditures.  Furthermore, increases in federal aid to other functions were 
associated with increases in state and local own source educational expenditures.  The 
implication was that states were engaging in substitution, using own source money made 
available by federal grants in other functional areas to spend on education; a similar 
impact of federal aid to other functions was not evident in highway or welfare 
expenditures.  O’Brien (1971), on the other hand, included the effects of individual state 
characteristics (e.g., per capita income, population density, percent urbanization, and 
education) on empirical estimates.  In contrast to Osman’s (1966) findings, he concluded 
that grants and expenditures are not simultaneously determined; that grants serve as 
explanatory variables in the determination of expenditures.  Moreover, his analysis 
showed that:  1) federal grants had a stimulative effect on state and local government 
expenditures from own source funds on aided categories and caused a reallocation of 
expenditures on other categories; and 2) individual state characteristics played a highly 
significant (.005 level of significance) role in determining how much individual states 
spend on a particular expenditure category.         
Influence of other factors.  Other scholars investigated the impact of changes in the 
level of federal aid on changes in the level of state and local expenditures.  For instance, 
Bahl and Saunders (1965) found that per capita federal aid to states was the only factor, 
which significantly affected changes in state and local per capita spending.  They 
analyzed data from 48 states in a five variable correlation model including per capita 
federal grants and four expenditure variables (total current expenditures; total current 
expenditures less federal aid; total general expenditures, including capital outlays; and 
total general expenditures less federal aid).  Their research further revealed that the impact 
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of federal aid was almost non-existent in the fifteen states with the highest income and 
population density.  This finding suggested that expenditures in wealthier states are driven 
more by their economic well-being than by other factors.  Dye (1966, p. 293) supported 
this finding in his argument that socioeconomic factors have greater explanatory power 
than political factors in determining state policy spending decisions.  In contrast, 
Sharkansky (1967) determined that political phenomena were more powerful than 
economic variables with respect to state government expenditures.  He concluded that:  1) 
political factors, such as previous expenditures, federal aid, tax effort, and state and local 
centralization seemed to affect current government spending more than the economic 
phenomena of per capita personal income or population; 2) the rate of change in state 
expenditures varied from one era to the next, with stability or decline alternating with 
increases; and 3) causes of expenditures change appeared to be situational with no 
apparent pattern (pp. 173, 191).  In a later study, Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969) 
concluded that the politics-policy relationship, such as electoral and institutional 
circumstances do not explain much of the variation in policy.  Inspite of high correlations 
between individual measures of voter turnout, party competitiveness, or the character of 
state legislatures and some aspects of governmental spending, these correlations 
disappeared when the effect of socioeconomic development was controlled.   
Research conducted by Bartle (1995) confirmed the stimulative effects of federal aid 
on state and local expenditures.  Specifically, he examined the effect of categorical federal 
and state grants-in-aid on local government expenditures and found small but important 
stimulative effects on spending.  He attributed this result to the design characteristics of 
the grant program, which would suggest that that grant design could influence the fiscal 
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response of the recipient governmental agency.17  Overall, Bartle’s (1995) work showed 
that the level of stimulation depends on a host of factors, such as type of grant, type of 
government, economic conditions, or the policy area of the expenditure.  
Federal aid:  Cutback effects.  There is considerable research supporting the 
position that federal aid is an important variable affecting expenditures in state budgets 
and that changes in levels of aid should cause changes in patterns of state expenditures 
(Jones, 1974; Strouse & Jones, 1974).   Strouse and Jones (1974) found convincing 
evidence of this impact in their examination of highway and welfare expenditures.  
Moreover, the GAO (1996b) analysis of the fiscal impact of grants found evidence that 
states may be more likely to replace cuts in federal funds used to fund ongoing state 
operations and priorities.  The GAO concluded that from a federal perspective, state 
replacement was a positive event; whereas, from the state perspective, because federal 
funds have been integrated into the structure of the state budget, replacing cuts in federal 
aid would require cutting funds in other programs, raising taxes, or both.   
Further, Stotsky (1991) studied periods of decline in intergovernmental grants and the 
effect of cutbacks.  She found that grant cutbacks led to reductions in state expenditures in 
all key programs, but that the level of reductions varied depending on where cuts were 
made and various state government financial conditions.  Volden (1999) used Aid for 
Dependent Children (AFDC)18 data to test the theory that policymakers respond 
differently to grant decreases than to grant increases because they face political and 
bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.  He found that grant recipients were more 
                                                 
17
 See Exhibit 3 for an explanation of grant types and design or control mechanisms. 
18
 AFDC is now the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, which provides cash 
assistance to indigent families with children. 
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responsive to grant increases than grant decreases.  This asymmetric finding was more 
marked in states where elected politicians give policy discretion to state bureaucrats. 
In contrast, Benton (1992) considered state and local expenditures in aggregate rather 
than expenditures in specific policy areas.  He investigated the impact of changes in 
federal grants, income, and population on state spending during four periods between 
1960 and 1988 and found that overall for the 28-year period federal aid had a positive 
statistically significant effect in explaining changes in state and local expenditures.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the influence of federal aid on the size of state and local 
government budgets was greater than for the two subsequent periods included in the study 
where the influence diminished by as much as two-thirds but still remained positive and 
significant.  As explained below, Benton’s (1992) findings for federal aid for each of the 
four periods showed different results during times of reductions and cutbacks:   
• The period from 1960 – 1977 (a period of substantial increase in federal aid to 
state and local governments) showed that the growth rate in state and local 
expenditures was positively related to the growth rate of federal aid and 
statistically significant (beta = .50, p <.05).  The analysis showed that 25% of the 
explained variance in the dependent variable (state-local expenditures) was 
attributable to federal aid. 
• Uncertainty due to inflation and reductions in federal aid marked the period from 
1977 – 1981.  Federal aid had a statistically insignificant impact on changes in 
state and local expenditures during this period (beta = .03) and R2 for federal aid 
was .00.     
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• The period from 1982 – 1985 marked a time immediately following reductions in 
the overall level of federal aid in 1982.  For this short-term period after the 1982 
reductions, the analysis showed that federal aid had a positive statistically 
significant (beta = .29) influence on state and local expenditures and accounted 
for approximately two-thirds of the explained variance when compared to the 
variance explained by the total model.   
• Benton (1992) described the period from 1985 – 1988 as the long-term following 
reduction in federal aid.   The results for this period revealed that the stimulative 
effect had disappeared.  Federal aid had a negative statistically insignificant (beta 
= -.01) effect; changes in aid had almost no influence on changes in state and 
local spending.  During this period, state and local spending were more responsive 
to changes in per capita income, which had a positive statistically significant 
impact (beta = .73). 
Synthesis of the economic literature.  Tsang and Levin (1983) studied the impact of 
different types of federal grants on state and local educational expenditure.  They 
analyzed the results of 40 empirical studies published from 1960 to 1980 and found 
significant effects of federal aid, as well as socioeconomic and demographic factors, such 
as property wealth, personal income, population density, age distribution, and 
composition of local tax base on the level of educational spending.  Their findings are 
presented below by type of grant: 
• Unrestricted state block grants for education had both a substitutive and 
stimulative effect on total educational expenditures of a local government.  
 50 
They found that approximate 50 cents of every unrestricted state block grant 
dollar resulted in new spending.   
• Every dollar of federal categorical grants for education resulted in an 
additional 70 cents for one dollar of local educational expenditures. 
• The impact of a federal matching grant was less stimulative than a state 
matching grant because states tended to reduce aid to a local government that 
received aid from the federal government (Tsang & Levin, 1983, pp. 360-
361). 
A similar study conducted by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO, 
1996b) based its conclusions on a synthesis of the body of economic literature, which 
isolated the statistical fiscal impact of federal grant funds and estimated their impact on 
total spending to examine for substitution in the 87 largest grant programs.  Examples of 
the grant programs included in the analysis were Medicaid, Highway Planning and 
Construction, education, health, and welfare.  Administration of Justice was included in 
the review in aggregate; however, no separate analysis of specific grant programs 
designated for juvenile justice was identified.   
Overall, the findings from the GAO study showed that each additional federal grant 
dollar contributed to increase total spending on aided functions; but due to substitution, 
total spending increased by less than a dollar (p. 12).  More specifically the GAO (1996b) 
study concluded that: 
• About 60 cents of every dollar of federal aid was used to free up state funds 
that otherwise would have been spent on that activity for other state programs 
or tax relief. 
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• Most grants were not designed to reduce substitution or to target funding to 
states with relatively greater programmatic needs and fewer fiscal resources as 
economic theory postulates. 
• Matching grants typically resulted in less substitution than non-matching 
grants.  For example, approximately 85 cents of every matching dollar 
represented new spending compared to approximately 42 cents of every non-
matching dollar resulting in new spending.  The clear implication was that 
states withdrew a portion of their own source spending to use for other 
purposes. 
Extending the research on the substitution effect of federal aid on state spending 
decisions, a 2004 GAO study on federal aid to highways from 1982 to 2002 found a 
preponderance of evidence that suggested that substitution was a significant factor in 
state utilization of these funds.  The statistical model estimated that state and local 
governments used about half of the increase in federal highway grants between 1982 and 
2002 to substitute for funding they would otherwise have spent from their own revenues.  
Furthermore, the results showed that the rate of grant substitution increased significantly 
over the study period, increasing from 18 cents on the dollar during the early 1980s to 
about 60 cents on the dollar during the 1990s. 
State dependence on federal aid.  Fosset’s (Brown et al., 1984) work offered a 
compelling analysis of the politics of dependence on federal aid to large cities, which has 
implications for federal aid to states.  Fossett contrasted the impact of federal grants in 
different jurisdictions and hypothesized that how a city uses the aid, which depends on its 
financial condition, the amount of discretion it has in using federal funds, and the degree 
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of political organization among the beneficiaries of federal programs helps determine the 
level of dependence.  For instance, cities with major financial problems, substantial 
discretion in the use of federal dollars, and well-organized political systems were more 
likely than other cities to have become financially dependent on federal dollars.  Except 
for the most financially stressed cities, the majority of cities avoided using federal aid to 
support ongoing activities. Cuts in federal aid in these cities were translated into 
reductions in social and other services deemed secondary or non-essential.   
In contrast, financially stressed cities had more complex problems because they 
tended to use federal funds to support basic services that were harder to discontinue than 
more politically peripheral activities.  Due to political pressure from interest groups and 
program beneficiaries in these jurisdictions, local officials were motivated to consider 
alternative funding sources, such as increased taxes, reduction in basic service levels, or 
both.  Fossett concluded that the major consequence of reduction in federal aid in more 
financially prosperous cities appeared to be a decline in the level of secondary services, 
while many of the financially stressed cities appeared to reduce the level of basic services 
as well (p. 158).  Based on my review of the literature, my expectation is that the 
conclusions drawn about the politics of dependence on federal aid in large cities has 
similar implications for financially prosperous and financially stressed states. 
As stated previously, federal aid may be provided to respond to a need or demand of 
state level constituents or the federal government’s desire to exert influence in a 
particular policy area.  Regardless of the purpose, a potential disadvantage of federal aid 
is that it can foster dependency and even instability in funding if federal aid levels 
fluctuate.  The problem of dependency is addressed in this study to provide a 
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comprehensive review of the academic literature on the impact of federal aid on state 
policy spending decisions; however, it is likely to be only a minor issue, if at all, in the 
juvenile justice policy arena.  Historically, the federal government has played a limited 
role in funding juvenile justice, providing an average of 10.47%19 of total spending on 
juvenile justice programs for the 30 states included in this study.  Nationally, aid for 
juvenile justice programs was approximately .10% of the total federal government grants 
to state and local governments in 2006 (U. S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to States for 
Fiscal Year 2006).  Thus, states are more reliant on their own resources to fund core 
juvenile justice services, such as secure commitment of delinquents and aftercare parole 
services.  Whereas, the federal role has largely been to provide seed funds and establish 
standards to support the enhancement of optimal juvenile justice and delinquency 
prevention services (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006; Nunez-Neto, 2007a).  This assessment is 
not intended to minimize federal aid for juvenile justice programs, which is highly sought 
after by states, but to place it in proper perspective in terms of the likelihood of fostering 
dependence among states.   
Summary 
My review of the literature on economic theory and the impact of federal grants on 
state spending behavior produced an abundance of empirical evidence from which to 
draw research questions about the influence of federal aid on state spending in the 
juvenile justice policy arena.  As stated previously, state spending in an environment 
where federal aid is available typically does not increase the full amount of a grant award 
due to the effects of substitution; however, there may be exceptions.   
                                                 
19
 See Chapter 6, Table 5, which presents descriptive statistics for this dissertation study. 
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The empirical evidence has shown that the influence of federal aid on state spending 
behavior in a given policy area is impacted by the design and type of available federal 
aid, as well as social, economic, and political characteristics of the state(s).  
Consequently, federal aid may lead to increases, decreases, or no significant change in 
spending behavior depending on these factors.  My literature review in this section does 
not include empirical research on the impact of federal aid in the juvenile justice policy 
arena due to the paucity of literature in this area.  The policy categories (e.g., education, 
highways, welfare, and health and hospital) discussed in the studies included in my 
review were generally selected by researchers because they are the ones for which 
consistent data were available over a number of years.   
   
Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF): Theory and Research on Corrections 
Spending 
 
In the previous section, I provided evidence from empirical research of the utility of 
economic theory in explaining the potential impacts that federal aid may have on state 
juvenile justice spending.  In this section, I provide a review of empirical research that 
shows the value of the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) as a complementary 
theoretical model for examining the nature of the various political and socioeconomic 
influences that impact state legislative spending decisions on juvenile justice.  The 
section is organized as follows: discussion of the development of POSOF, basic 
arguments and assumptions, the basic model, empirical research on corrections spending, 





The major arguments of the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) theory 
were development by Stucky, Heimer, and Lang and presented in their 2007 study 
entitled, A Bigger Piece of the Pie?  State Corrections Spending and Politics of Social 
Order.   The study examined variation in state-level corrections expenditures as a 
proportion of state expenditures from 1980 through 1998, a period not previously studied 
and marked by a large influx in the adult prison population.  The sample included data on 
the 49 states with bipartisan political systems for the 19 years included in the study 
(Nebraska was excluded).  The researchers argued that their data and methods for 
analysis were more appropriate than previous research on correctional spending and that 
this work was important to academic research because of the paucity of studies that had 
examined the aspects of corrections most directly under political control, which is 
correctional spending (Stucky et al., 2007).  Many prior studies had, instead, examined 
the role of partisan politics and imprisonment rates in the United States rather than 
corrections expenditures.  Although this study focused on adult criminal justice programs 
and populations, I attempt to expand its utility and applicability of the model in this 
dissertation study by using some of the key tenets in explaining spending on juvenile 
justice programs and including federal aid as a primary variable.       
Basic Arguments 
The POSOF view draws insight from theoretical arguments and recent research on 
criminal punishment conducted by scholars, such as Jacobs and Helms (1996, 1999), 
Jacobs and Carmichael (2001), and Beckett and Western (2001).  The basic arguments of 
POSOF are:  1) punishment is inherently an exercise of state power, thus theoretical 
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explanations of spending on criminal punishment must examine the role of the state; and 
2) punishment is driven by two factors:  a) the state’s responsibility for maintenance of 
social order and b) partisan politics – state officials need to maintain office through 
popular elections (Stucky et al., 2007).  Stucky et al. (2007) employed the POSOF to 
clarify the role of partisan politics and potential links between partisan politics and 
economic and racial threats.  In contrast to other research on the topic, which treated 
political and nonpolitical factors as more or less separate influences on punishment 
outcomes, POSOF attempts to provide fundamental logic linking political and 
nonpolitical variables.   
The Basic Model:  Key Factors That Explain Correctional Spending 
The POSOF perspective argues that corrections’ spending is a function of: 
• Partisan politics (gubernatorial and legislative); 
• Citizen ideology; 
• Social threat (racial threat based on the percentage Black and the percentage 
Hispanic population; economic threat based on the rate of poverty); 
• State fiscal health and alternative policy priorities (gross state product, public 
welfare expenditures, and education expenditures); and 
• Crime (index crime rate). 
These variables are included as primary predictors in the model because they affect  
strategies for maintaining social order, getting votes, and maintaining political office 




Empirical Research on Corrections Spending 
Most of the early research dealing with corrections and punishment primarily focused 
on economic explanations for punishment (Chiricos & Delone, 1992).   Research since 
1992 centered on political explanations with a focus on prison populations rather than 
corrections expenditures.  In contrast, Jacobs and Helms (1999) and Calderia and Cowart 
(1980) argued that much can be learned from examining a state’s spending on 
corrections.  Their positions are supported by the fact that corrections expenditures are 
under more direct political control than dependent variables, such as admissions and 
custody rates, typically used in punishment research (Jacobs & Helms (1999).  
Furthermore, budgets are one the most important tools through which all levels of 
government seek to achieve policy goals (Calderia & Cowart, 1980).   
National studies.  A 1999 national study conducted by Jacobs and Helms focused 
specifically on combined per capita corrections expenditures at the federal, state, and 
local levels combined from 1954 to 1990.  This research found that spending increased 
with the size of the non-white population, number of riots, crime rates, and previous 
births out of wedlock lagged 20 years.  Moreover, the findings showed that the strength 
of the Republican Party was associated with increases in corrections expenditures.  This 
study highlighted the influence of partisan politics, racial threat, and crime on corrections 
spending. 
Calderia and Cowart (1980) examined total criminal justice expenditures, rather than 
just spending designated for corrections.   The results of their work also showed that 
changes in crime rate explained changes in the federal budget dedicated to criminal 
justice agencies, including corrections, from 1935 to 1975.  Their findings further 
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revealed that expenditure increases were more likely under Republican presidents and 
that Republican presidents were more likely to respond to increasing crime by increasing 
expenditures.  Although dated, both the Jacobs and Helms (1999) and the Calderia and 
Cowart (1980) national studies provide insight for this research with respect to the role of 
partisan politics in corrections spending policy.   
In contrast, in an analysis of elections and the politics of crime, Calderia (1983) (as 
cited in Stucky et al., 2007) hypothesized that presidents facing elections may increase 
criminal justice expenditures to take advantage of public fear of crime and to get votes.  
This study showed that presidents were more likely to request higher criminal justice 
expenditures in election years irrespective of crime rates.  Moreover, Oliver and Marion 
(2006) and Marion and Oliver (2009), in work that replicated and updated the original 
research conducted by Calderia and Cowert (1980), theorized that in more recent years, 
criminal justice policy became more symbolic and was often a gesture used by presidents 
and Congress to gain political and popular support.  These more recent studies support 
one of the basic arguments put forth by Stucky et al. (2007) that  partisan politics 
influence variation in criminal justice spending policy.  Both studies found that budgetary 
allocations were no longer responsive to the rise and fall in official crime rates, thus 
demonstrating support for the theory of symbolic politics.20  While both studies are 
important in their contribution to the understanding of the role of politics in criminal 
justice expenditures, neither addressed other variables that are potentially important in the 
explanation of spending decisions in this policy arena.   
                                                 
20
 The theory of symbolic politics posits that political acts are viewed as symbols conveying a political 
meaning that are an end unto themselves (Marion & Oliver, 2009). 
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State level studies.  Stucky et al. (2007) cite two published state-level studies that 
deal with correctional spending.  First, Taggart (1989) conducted separate time-series 
models for the 48 contiguous states for 1945 to 1984.  This study showed that 
correctional spending was explained by a state’s total revenue base and overall state 
expenditures, but did not consider variables to evaluate political or social threat 
explanations.  Taggart & Winn (1991) conducted the second study.  These researchers 
used a cross-sectional design to analyze corrections expenditures in the 48 contiguous 
states in 1984.  In contrast, this research evaluated threat variables and found that higher 
crime rates and percentages of non-White males were related to increased corrections 
spending; however, partisan political control was found to be unrelated to spending.  
While both studies expand the body of knowledge concerning correctional spending, two 
distinct limitations were noted:  1) 1984 represented the last year of data analyzed in both 
studies; and 2) both were methodologically limited by current standards (Stucky et al., 
2007).  For example, Taggart used a time-series, rather than a pooled model in the 1989 
study, which could have reduced the efficiency of the estimation.  Likewise, the 1991 
study is limited by its use of cross-sectional data, raising concerns over causal ordering 
and statistical power because of the small sample size.  
Empirical Research on the Basic Tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework   
Stucky et al. (2007) argued that the primary advantage of the politics of social order 
approach is that it seeks to make sense of the various disparate explanations offered by 
recent empirical research on punishment and public policy.  Prior explanations address 
such factors as partisan politics, conservative preferences of citizens, racial and economic 
threat, crime control, fiscal factors, and alternative policy priorities.  The POSOF theory 
 60 
holds that these variables are significant because they connect strategies for maintaining 
social order, garnering votes, and maintaining political order.  An overview of research in 
which these variables were analyzed is presented next. 
Partisan politics.  An increasing body of research suggests that partisan political 
considerations influence variation in criminal punishment policies and highlight the 
importance of Republican power in state-level imprisonment trends (Jacob & 
Carmichael, 2001; and Stucky et al., 2005).   Political science researchers have added to 
the body of knowledge by arguing that partisan politics shape policy and spending 
through party control or party competition.  Specifically, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) 
argued that the traditional law and order rhetoric of the Republican Party is intended to 
increase votes among less affluent voters, who tend to be less likely to vote for 
conservative candidate, by appealing to their fear of crime.  Results of their study showed 
that Republican strength and minority threat led to higher imprisonment rates and that 
these relationships became stronger after greater Republican stress on law and order.  
Their findings confirmed the theoretical expectation that these relationships are 
historically contingent.  Moreover, Browning, Marshall and Tabb’s 1984 study (as cited 
in Stucky et al., 2007) also found that the racial composition of a state poses a potential 
political influence on corrections spending.  
Some studies on partisan influence in policy decision making have focused 
specifically on the role of governors and the executive branch.  In contrast to research 
that assumed that state executive branches were irrelevant (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 
1989), Barrilleaux (1999) argued that gubernatorial and executive branch characteristics 
modeled with citizen ideology and party legislative strength were forces that determined 
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the liberalism of state policies.  He further posited that governors have incentives to 
produce public policies that are more liberal because doing so provides benefits that are 
more widespread and allows politicians who seek to hold statewide office greater chances 
for political success.  Results of the study showed that bureaucratic professionalism and 
gubernatorial powers exert statistically and substantively significant influences on 
policymaking.   These findings were not conclusive.   
In a later study, Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) tested a model of gubernatorial 
influence on public policymaking in which gubernatorial power was defined as the 
governor’s power over the budgetary process relative to that of the state legislature.  They 
argued that “governors with greater control over the budget process use their power to 
create a higher proportion of policies that confer benefits to statewide versus more 
localized constituencies” (p. 409).  The study concluded that the political parties of 
governors and legislators showed no meaningful effects in the model.  However, 
empirical results showed that as a governor’s electoral security increased, their influence 
on localized spending was statistically significant.  On the other hand, increased electoral 
competition had the expected negative effect on the ratio of developmental to 
redistributive spending21.  These findings suggested that the nature of gubernatorial 
influence in public policies in the United States remains open to question.     
Citizen ideology.  Research supporting citizen ideology as an explanatory variable 
for correctional spending is based on the hypothesis that politicians tend to support public 
policies that reflect the preferences of their constituents (Stucky et al., 2007).   Consistent 
                                                 
21
 Developmental (distributive) spending is considered a concentrated benefit structured by geography and 
provides physical and social infrastructure; redistributive spending is considered a geographically diffuse 
benefit structured by social class that reallocates resources from the “haves” to the “have nots” (Peterson, 
1995, pp. 17, 41, 43). 
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with the notion that citizen ideology has an effect on criminal punishment independent of 
the effects of partisan politics, Jacobs and Helms (2001) found that, on average, states 
with more conservative citizens had higher incarceration rates.  Moreover, Yates and 
Fording’s (2005) work strongly supported the claim that law and order policymaking has 
been employed by the Republican Party to provide an ideological bridge between its 
wealthy fiscal conservative constituents and blue collar and middle class social 
conservatives, hence breaking up the traditional Democratic coalition.  Operating under 
this assumption, they found a strong, positive statistically significant relationship between 
imprisonment and conservative political strength in all branches of government.     
Racial and economic threats.  Racial and economic threat variables have also been 
investigated and revealed results, which offer more insight into understanding the factors 
that influence correctional spending.   
Racial threat.  Behrens, Uggen, and Manza (2003) and Liska (1992) put forth 
arguments suggesting that formal social control varies with the relative proportion of the 
population that is a racial or ethnic minority (as cited in Stucky et al., 2007, p. 99).  Such 
findings strengthen the validity of racial variables as an explanatory factor in the politics 
of social order perspective.  Furthermore, Jacobs and Carmichael’s (2001) concluded that 
imprisonment rates are significantly and positively related to the percent of Black and 
Hispanic population in a jurisdiction.  In other words, one can expect incarceration rates 
to be higher in jurisdictions with substantial Black and Hispanic populations.22  Yates and 
Fording (2005) expanded upon these findings in their study of imprisonment rates in 45 
states for the years 1977 – 1995.  They theorized that the political environment of a state 
                                                 
22
 The racial threat hypothesis suggests that incarceration rates will be greatest in jurisdictions with the 
most Blacks and Hispanics (Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). 
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influences the degree to which it incarcerates its citizens and the political determinants of 
state punitiveness may be conditional upon the racial subpopulation being incarcerated.  
The results showed that increases in state political conservatism contributed to growth in 
Black imprisonment rates and Black imprisonment disparity relative to whites.  Further, 
Yates and Fording (2005) also found that the poverty rate for both whites and Blacks was 
a positive, statistically significant determinant of imprisonment rates.     
Economic threat.  In addition to analyzing the effect of Republican party strength 
on minority imprisonment rates, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) argued that rates of 
punishment are “shaped by the menace of an economic rather than a racial or ethnic 
underclass” (p. 67).  They hypothesized that the more economically stratified a society 
becomes, the more dominate groups will enforce social norms of conduct by using 
methods, such as incarceration.  If the economic threat hypothesis is true, one would 
expect enhanced economic inequality to lead to increased incarceration rates.  However, 
results of this study were mixed.  The relationship between economic inequality and 
imprisonment rates was positive or negative based on whether state fixed effects or 
random effects were modeled.  In either case, results were statistically insignificant.  
Worthy of note, Stucky et al. (2007) found a positive, statistically insignificant 
relationship between poverty rate and corrections spending.    
Crime.  A rational choice view of crime holds that an increase in correctional 
spending is a result of increases in crime.   In the POSOF perspective, state officials 
would consider rising crime rates an indication of deteriorating social order and respond 
with proposals for increases in correctional spending as a measure for maintaining social 
order.  This relationship was supported by national level studies as noted previously.  
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However, state-level research on imprisonment highlights an inconsistent association 
between crime rates and incarceration rates (Beckett & Western, 2001; Stucky et al., 
2005).  Additionally, Stucky et al. (2007) argued that other models of crime causation 
focus less on individual choice and suggested that social conditions, such poverty or 
unemployment drive crime rates.  This view conflicts with “the intuitive appeal of 
thinking that corrections expenditures naturally increase in response to increases in 
crime” (Stucky et al., 2007, p. 100).  Thus, because a government that supports this view 
might increase spending on social welfare programs, job development, or education to 
address social problems and prevent crime, there may not be a direct positive relationship 
between crime rate and correctional spending.  Nevertheless, a study designed to analyze 
correctional spending policies would logically consider crime rate as an important 
variable for substantive, if not statistical, insight. 
Additional views on the inconsistent relationship between crime rate and correctional 
spending were substantiated by McGarrell and Duffee (2007) and in a 1984 study 
conducted by Krisberg, Litsky, and Schwartz for the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency (NCCD) (as cited in McGarrell & Duffee, 2007).  McGarrell and Duffee 
(2007) examined the causes of correctional spending in the United States by analyzing 
expenditures from the 1980s, a period when crime was stable or dropping for much of the 
time.  They noted substantial increases in corrections expenditures during the period of 
study and concluded that variations in factors other than crime were needed to explain the 
increase in expenditures since crime was stable or dropping during much of the time 
under study (p.260).  They considered variations in the task and institutional 
environments (e.g., size, crime rate, urbanization, racial heterogeneity, professionalism, 
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and unionization) of correctional systems in the 50 states as predictors of correctional 
spending.  The McGarrell and Duffee (2007) study supported the logic of the politics of 
social order argument, which recognized the importance of other variables and linked 
factors, such as partisan politics, citizen ideology, economic and racial threats, policy 
priorities, fiscal considerations, and crime to explain corrections spending.  McGarrell 
and Duffee (2007) noted that this same logic is applicable when explaining the 
association between crime and juvenile justice spending in an environment where 
differences in expenditures cannot be explained on the basis of crime rates or arrest data 
(p. 260). 
 Fiscal health and alternative policy priorities.  Fiscal health issues and alternative 
policy priorities influence a state’s ability to pursue any public policy, thus these factors 
are important variables in any analysis of state level spending in the variety of policy 
areas that each state must address, including juvenile justice.  Greenberg and West (2001) 
who found that better funded state governments are better able to address a broader 
variety of public policy demands, including spending on corrections, substantiated the 
significance of fiscal factors.  Similarly, research conducted by Jacobs and Helms (1999) 
and Taggart and Winn (1991) concluded that fiscal factors influence corrections spending 
decisions.  The Stucky et al. (2007) study confirmed the results of this earlier research in 
its finding that a 10 percent increase in gross state product was associated with a 5 
percent increase in corrections spending (pp. 109 and 111). 
Stucky et al. (2007) argued that a state’s decisions about spending on social policies 
overall is related to spending on corrections programs.  For example, when states increase 
funding of corrections or juvenile justice programs, they typically have fewer funds to 
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spend on other programs.  Conversely, the same would be true when states spend more 
on other social programs, such as welfare and education, they would have fewer funds 
available to spend on corrections and/or juvenile justice.  It is important to note that 
spending on alternative policy priorities may be seen as a way to garner votes or maintain 
social control by state officials; therefore, Stucky et al. (2007) considered spending on 
welfare and education in their investigation of spending on corrections.  This stance is 
supported in research studies, which showed a trend toward corrections spending and 
away from education, reflecting more conservative approaches to crime control in an 
effort to respond to a more conservative electorate (Lawrence, 1995).  Further supporting 
this position, Garland (1985) and Beckett & Western (2001) (as cited in Stucky et al., 
2007, p. 101) argued that social control of marginal populations (minorities and poor 
people) is accomplished formally by the corrections system and informally by the welfare 
system.  Both arguments are consistent with the politics of social order perspective, 
which holds that a primary responsibility of government is to maintain social order.  In 
contrast, in a study of party control and per capita state welfare spending, Dye (1984) 
found that party control of state government had policy relevance in only 20 of 50 states, 
fewer than half.   He further concluded that increased per capita welfare spending was 
associated with more liberal Democratic Party control of government, which is consistent 
with views espoused in POSOF for informal management and control of marginal 
populations.   
Summary 
In sum, the politics of social order perspective provides a framework for linking 
previous insights on criminal punishment and partisan politics, racial and economic 
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threats, state fiscal concerns and alternative policy priorities.  Stucky et al. (2007) used 
this framework to analyze annual state-level data on corrections expenditures from  
1980 – 1998 and found that legislative partisan politics, a state’s gross spending and 
spending on education and welfare, and the proportion of minorities in a state influence 
corrections expenditures.  Specifically, these researchers concluded that:  1) As the 
proportion of Republicans in the state legislature increased, so did the percentages of a 
state’s budget spent on corrections; 2) They found no evidence that citizen ideology 
affected corrections spending; 3) States with larger gross state products allocated larger 
shares of their budgets to corrections; 4) Richer states had higher relative corrections 
expenditures with the exception of states that spent more on their citizens for education 
and public welfare that had lower corrections expenditures; and 5) The proportion of 
African Americans in a state was associated significantly with corrections spending (p. 
114-115).  These findings are consistent with other research in the field as cited above.   
Overall, POSOF provides a well-researched model to use as a guide for analysis of 
state spending on juvenile justice programs.  In the next section, I discuss some of the 
characteristics of juvenile justice that are suitable for analysis using the POSOF model.    
 
Juvenile Justice Spending:  Does the Politics of Social Order Framework Apply? 
 
Can the tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) be extended to 
state juvenile justice spending?  This is the second research question addressed in this 
dissertation study.  Although my review of the relevant research literature did not reveal 
specific empirical research that dealt with political and socioeconomic determinants of 
state juvenile justice spending decisions, historical evidence of the development of 
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juvenile justice in the United States shows the influence of these factors.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, issues and concerns about the treatment of children in the juvenile justice 
system and juvenile crime led to citizen, state, judicial, and federal action affecting 
juvenile justice spending.    I present this information to highlight variables that show that 
some of the social, economic, and political arguments used in the POSOF theory may 
also be appropriate for explaining juvenile justice spending decisions.   
Juvenile justice history shows evidence of the response of state and federal 
policymakers, citizen reformers, academics, and the courts to the problems of juvenile 
delinquents (Eddy & Gribskov, 1999; Nunez-Neto, 2007b; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  
The driving forces behind the call to action that led to increased attention to and funding 
for juvenile justice were related to four key factors:   1) poverty among delinquent youth 
and their families, 2) citizen outcry concerning rising crime rates, 3) racial disparity in 
arrest and confinement of juveniles, and 4) the desire by state legislatures to create more 
aggressive policies to address public concern over juvenile crime (Snyder & Sickmund, 
2006).  These concerns resulted in unprecedented changes in the 1990s toward creation of 
more punitive juvenile laws and the development of new programs and system changes 
that required increased funding by states and assistance from the federal government in 
the form of grants-in-aid.  As discussed in Chapter 2, these changes in juvenile justice 
policy diminished the differences between the criminal and juvenile justice systems in 
recent years, thus providing background for relevance of POSOF theory to juvenile 
justice.   
Similar to the emphasis in POSOF theory on the significance of racial and economic 
threat and politics in corrections policy, previous research has shown that these factors 
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are key determinants of statistical and/or substantive importance in the juvenile justice 
policy area (Snyder, 1997 and 2008).   I provide statistics on these variables below for 
juveniles in the United States, which offer additional support for use of the POSOF 
model in my analysis of state juvenile justice spending policy.    
In spite of positive trends in the juvenile violent crime index rate, which showed a 
decade long decline of 49% (525.2 to 269.4 arrests per 100,000 persons ages 10 – 17 in 
the United States) from 1994 to 2004, racial disparity continues to merit attention 
(Puzzanchera, 2009).  For example, in 1996 (the earliest year included in this dissertation 
study), the composition of juveniles ages 10 – 17 in the population was approximately 
80% white, including youth of Hispanic ethnicity; 15% Black, and 5% other races 
(Snyder, 1997).  FBI arrest statistics for this age group showed approximately equal 
numbers of arrests for violent crimes involving white and Black youth (Snyder, 1997).  
This was in contrast to the proportion of each group in the population.  Snyder (2008) 
also found that in 2006 the Black juvenile population was about 17% while Black 
juveniles were involved in 51% of the juvenile violent crime index arrests and 31% of 
juvenile property crime index arrests.  For these reasons, I include race as an important 
variable in my analysis of state juvenile justice spending policy. 
Moreover, historical racial disparity is evident in the minority proportion of 
delinquent juvenile offenders, ages 10 – 17, incarcerated.  For example, the minority 
proportion of these offenders in 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003 was 64%, 63%, 61%, and 
62% respectively (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  In 2003, Black juveniles accounted for 
approximately 38% of all juvenile offenders in custody (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006). 
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Further, Snyder and Sickmund (2006) examined 2002 poverty rates for juveniles 
between the ages of 5 and 18 and found that poverty rates for white and Asian juveniles 
living below the poverty level were 9.4% and 11.7% respectively.  In contrast, the 
poverty rates for Black and Hispanic juveniles living below the poverty level were about 
32.3% and 28.6% respectively.  These statistics provide evidence of economic disparity 
and justification for including economic threat as a determinant in my state juvenile 
justice spending model. 
Finally, Feld (2003) provided an argument in support of the political influence in state 
juvenile justice policy.  Using qualitative methods, he analyzed the sociological, 
criminological, and racial factors; media coverage; and political dynamics of the 1970s 
and 1980s that contributed to more punitive changes in juvenile justice policies in the 
1990s.  He concluded that during this period, conservative Republican politicians 
practiced a “southern strategy” by using crime as a code word for race for electoral 
advantage, and advocated “get tough” policies, which resulted in punitive changes in 
juvenile laws and practices, which have had a disproportionate effect on racial minorities 
(Feld, 2003, p. 766). 
In summary, I believe that the POSOF theory offers an appropriate model for 
explaining juvenile justice spending decisions.  Absent empirical research specific to 
state spending on juvenile justice and based on the evidence of similar key variables in 
both juvenile justice and corrections, use of this model in my dissertation study is a 
catalyst to begin filling the void in the literature on factors that influence state spending 
decisions on juvenile justice.  The results of this study will determine whether the 
POSOF argument holds up empirically relative to state juvenile justice spending.  
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Summary of Review of the Literature 
 
My review of the literature indicates that federal aid plays a limited, yet important 
role in justice juvenile policy.  Additionally, while federal aid in various policy areas was 
shown to have a stimulative effect, the practice of substitution by state policy makers 
resulted in spending increases less than a hundred percent of the grant amount.  Previous 
research on corrections spending and related factors showed that legislative spending 
decisions are affected by partisan politics, racial and economic threats, state fiscal factors, 
and alternative policy priorities.  Statistics from juvenile justice reports confirmed that 
key explanatory variables in the POSOF model also merit attention in an analysis of 
juvenile justice spending. 
In Chapter 4, I use my findings from the literature to formulate research questions and 
hypotheses, which determine the research methods and type of analytic procedures 













RESEARCH QUESTIONS, VARIABLES, AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This research study departs from the typical approaches to examining spending in 
public policy areas.  The study seeks to examine the determinants of state juvenile justice 
spending by using two theoretical lenses:  1) specific principles of economic theory on 
public choice, demand, and intergovernmental grants (Fisher, 1996; GAO, 1996b; 
Gruber, 2007) and 2) the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) (Stucky, Heimer, 
& Lang, 2007).  This approach offers a model for understanding spending in the juvenile 
justice policy arena based on assumptions about politics, economics, and punishment.  In 
this Chapter, I present the research questions and theoretical model, variables, and 
hypotheses derived from my review of the relevant literature and theory on 
intergovernmental aid and POSOF assumptions presented in Chapter 3.  I conclude the 
chapter with a brief summary. 
 
Research Questions 
Two research questions are drawn from my review of the relevant literature and the 
theoretical frameworks described Chapter 3.  One question addressed in my research is:  
What impact does federal aid have on state spending on juvenile justice programs?  It is 
important to note that federal grants are designed to achieve national objectives; however, 
they are implemented by individual states with unique cultural, social, political, and 
economic characteristics that shape the state’s history.  To the degree that the pursuit of 
national goals is filtered through a state context, other factors emerge as potential 
influences on state juvenile justice spending.  Some of these factors are necessarily 
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included as control variables in the economic model.  The Politics of Social Order 
Framework, complemented by economic theory, provides a more sophisticated model for 
understanding the influences of these factors.  This leads to the second research question:  
Can specific tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework be extended to juvenile 
justice funding?  
Study Model 
 Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical model for this dissertation study, which includes a 
broad category of variables related to empirical research on federal grants-in-aid and the 
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The dependent variable (DV) under investigation is state general fund spending for 
juvenile justice.  A primary independent variable (IV) is federal aid.  Other covariates 
drawn from the politics of social order approach and economic theory to develop the 
research model include:  partisan politics (measured as Republican legislative percentage 
and Republican governor), citizen ideology, social threat (economic and racial), fiscal 
factors (gross state product and median income), alternative policy priorities, crime 
(juvenile index crime rate and juvenile incarceration rate), and structural, demographic, 
and geographic control variables.  Multiple studies described in the review of the relevant 
literature support the use of such variables in explanatory analysis of state spending in 
various policy areas, including corrections.  This dissertation will provide insight on their 
applicability in an explanatory analysis of state spending on juvenile justice, a topic on 
which there has been limited empirical research.  
 
Hypotheses 
The research hypotheses are grouped in two categories:  1) hypothesis based on 
economics theory on intergovernmental grants and 2) hypotheses based on the Politics of 
Social Order Framework.  Each hypothesis is stated below following a brief explanation 
of its relationship and origin in theory. 
Economics Theory   
As noted above, economic theory recognizes the role of federal grants in state 
spending and holds that matching grants are expected to induce and increase spending on 
the aided service.   This theoretical framework is the basis for my first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Federal aid will have a positive relationship with state own source 
spending on juvenile justice per capita. 
Politics of Social Order Framework 
Social threat is a composite of both economic and racial threats.  The concept of 
economic threat suggests that the degree of economic stratification has a positive 
relationship with enforcement of social norms of conduct through incarceration (Garland, 
1990, as cited in Stucky et al., 2007; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001).  Similarly, the concept 
of racial threat holds that incarceration and resulting corrections spending is positively 
related to the proportion of the population that is racial or ethnic minority (Behrens, 
Uggen, & Manza (2003), Blalock (1967), and Liska (1992), as cited in Stucky, et al., 
2007; McGarrell & Duffee, 2007).  Further, as the minority population gains significant 
numerical strength, or becomes a significant voting block, increases in their numbers 
have less impact on corrections spending and more impact on policy spending that is 
important to them, such as education, job training, and delinquency prevention programs.  
In the politics of social order view, when the minority population becomes a voting bloc 
with the potential to influence elections, legislators are less inclined to increase 
corrections, thus spending would be expected to decrease or flatten (Stuckey et al., 2007). 
Based on these arguments, I generated a second hypothesis concerning the effect of social 
threats on state spending on juvenile justice programs: 
Hypothesis 2:  A state’s poverty rate and percentage of minority population will have  
 
a significant positive relationship with juvenile justice spending per capita.  When the 
adult or voting age minority population reaches a significant numerical strength, there 
will be a curvilinear (quadratic) relationship with juvenile justice spending per capita. 
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Note that the threat hypothesis is relevant for both youth and adult populations, but the 
curvilinear aspect applies only to the adult voting age population. 
In addition to the arguments noted above, partisan politics and citizen ideology form 
the basis of key arguments posited in the Politics of Social Order Framework.  POSOF, 
supported by other empirical research, holds that partisan politics shapes policy and 
spending through party control.  Further, the empirical literature supports the notion that 
elected officials of both parties wish to be perceived as tough on crime by appealing to 
the sentiments of conservatives.  Hence, citizen ideology may have an effect on criminal 
punishment independent of the effects of partisan politics.  These theoretical arguments 
led to my third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  (a) Partisan politics (Republican legislative percentage and Party of 
Governor) is expected to be positively related to juvenile justice spending per capita, 
while (b) citizen ideology (most conservative versus most liberal) is expected to be 




The objective of this study is to fill a gap in knowledge by developing a quantitative 
analysis of determinants of state spending on juvenile justice programs using principles of 
economic theory in conjunction with tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework.  
The two approaches are complementary and applicable to the reality of governmental and 
administrative policymaking for juvenile justice.  Both theoretical views recognize the 
significant role of politics in the policy process, as well as social and economic issues that 
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characterize state jurisdictions and resulting policies that may shape spending decisions.    
With this in mind, the goal of this study is to provide a broader understanding of factors 
influencing state level spending in the juvenile justice policy arena while examining the 























The research questions under investigation require an analysis of the influence of 
federal aid and other social and economic factors on state spending on juvenile justice 
programs.  The goal of this chapter is to provide a clear and complete description of the 
specific steps followed to identify variables and data needed for my study, data collection 
procedures, and steps followed to answer my research questions and test my hypotheses.  
The chapter includes five subsections:  1) research design and unit of analysis; 2) 
analytical considerations; 3) data collection procedures; 4) data collection challenges and 
limitations; and 5) operational definition of variables.    
 
Research Design and Unit of Analysis 
I used a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) design to examine the 
determinants of state spending on juvenile justice programs for the years 1996-2006.   
This 11-year period was selected because the majority of states could not provide 
disaggregated budget information for their juvenile justice agencies prior to 1996, nor 
was the required information archived on their websites or the U. S. Census Bureau 
website.  Additionally, these years are representative of a period of significant increases 
in federal aid for juvenile justice followed by a leveling off by 2001 and significant 
decrease by 2006.   
Data were collected for all 50 states and the District of Columbia and used for 
descriptive purposes.  However, juvenile arrest data were unavailable for Florida for all 
11 years of the study; and unavailable for Montana and Kansas for one and four years, 
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respectively.  Illinois was the only state that did not provide any budget information for 
their juvenile justice agency, which was a division of their Adult Department of 
Corrections until 2006.  Furthermore, political party data was not available for Nebraska 
because its state legislature is nonpartisan and unicameral.   
Due to the need for a sufficient number of years of data for a meaningful time-series 
cross-sectional analysis, the statistical analysis includes only those states where eleven 
years of state own source, and at least 10 years of federal aid, budget data were available.  
Thus, the estimation sample consists of 30 states.  See Exhibit 4 for a list of the states 
included in the study sorted by region.   
 
Analytical Considerations  
The advantage of modeling a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis is that it 
combines observations from multiple cross sections, thus overcoming generalizability 
issues inherent to cross-sectional designs.  It allows for more variation in the variables; 
and the more cross sections that are combined reduce the influence of a given cross 
section.  Pooling is a critical assumption of time-series cross-section models, indicating 
that all units are characterized by the same regression equation at all points in time (Beck 
& Katz, 1995, p. 636).  
Key analytical considerations to properly test the hypotheses contained in the study 
include addressing 1) problems related to regression analysis and TSCS data, 2) selection 
of statistical software and type of statistical analysis, 3) treatment of missing data, 4) 
multicollinearity, and 4) model specification.  Discussion of the key analytical 
considerations follows. 
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Regression Analysis and TSCS Data  
In regression analysis, both the temporal and spatial properties of TSCS data make 
the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) problematic (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634).  In 
particular, three violations of the error term assumptions are generally characteristic of 
this type of data analysis:  groupwise heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and serial correlation (autocorrelation).   
Some researchers, such as Parks and Hicks and Swank (as cited in Beck & Katz, 
1995), have specified models for similar time series studies using Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) with fixed effects.  However, Beck and Katz (1995) conducted a 
series of Monte Carlo analyses that showed that the use of FGLS produces standard 
errors that led to extreme overconfidence in the error terms, understating variability by 
50% or more (p. 634).   As a result, they proposed to retain OLS parameter estimates, but 
replace the OLS standard errors with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).  Their 
Monte Carlo analysis showed that the use of PCSE as estimates of sampling variability 
are accurate and perform well, even in the presence of complicated panel error structures 
(Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634).  Additional research conducted by Beck and Katz (1996 
and 2004), Beck (2006), and Keele and Kelly (2006), supports the use of panel corrected 
standard errors with a lagged dependent variable (LDV).  The lagged dependent variable 
is included on the right hand side of the model as an independent variable as a correction 
for autocorrelation.   
The lagged dependent variable approach versus other methods, such as Prais-Winston 
used in FGLS, which produces overly optimistic estimates of standard errors, proved to 
be more appropriate for my study for several reasons.  First, the FGLS approach performs 
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best when the time frame for a study is at least as large as or greater than the number of 
units (Beck & Katz, 1995).  In my study, the number of units is more than two times the 
time frame.  Beck and Katz (1996) argued that the lagged dependent variable approach 
makes examination of model dynamics easier and allows for natural generalizations in a 
manner that the serially correlated errors approach does not.   
Keele and Kelly (2006) emphasized the logic of LDV models and provided two 
reasons for estimating such a model:  1) It rids the model of autocorrelation; and 2) it 
captures, in a statistical model, a type of dynamics that occurs in politics.  For example, 
theory may predict that current state spending in a policy area is influenced by the current 
state of the economy; however, theory also dictates that the legislatures and the public 
remember the past; and this implies that the state of the economy in previous periods will 
matter in spending decisions today.  Thus, specification of a LDV model implies, for 
example, that state spending today is a function of past legislative spending decisions as 
modified by new information on the performance of the economy and other social and 
environmental factors.  The LDV has a dynamic interpretation as it dictates the timing of 
the effect of X on Y (Keele & Kelly, 2006, p. 189).  The effects of past spending 
decisions will persist at a rate determined by the autoregressive effect of lagged Y.  This 
view is applicable to my study because one of the goals of my research is to understand 
the effect of partisan politics on state spending on juvenile justice programs.   
Additionally, use of a LDV is consistent with theory about the influence of lag in 
incremental budgeting, e.g., spending in a given year is the product of the previous year’s 
budget decisions influenced by such factors as politics, economics, and demographics.  
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In addition to prior research support of LDV models, I conducted sensitivity analyses 
using panel corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent variable, Prais-Winsten 
regression with common autoregressive 1 (AR1) panel corrected standard errors, and 
Prais-Winsten regression with panel-specific autoregressive 1 (PSAR1).  The results 
indicated that use of the LDV model is a more conservative approach. 
Given the findings of prior research and results of sensitivity analyses, I specified a 
pooled linear time-series cross-sectional OLS regression model using panel corrected 
standard errors.  The model included the dependent variable, lagged one time period 
(year), on the right hand side of the model as an independent variable.  This model 
accommodates heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and serial 
autocorrelation.  The confidence level was set at 95% (.05 significance level). 
Statistical Software Selection and Statistical Analysis 
I selected Stata for final model analysis because of its extraordinary performance in 
regression analysis of time-series, cross-sectional data (Yaffee, 2005; StataCorp LP 
2009).  Additionally, Stata has a command structure that is simple and consistent.  I used 
Stata 10.1 time series analysis functions with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) to 
conduct the regression analysis.  In Stata, this model specification calculates panel 
corrected standard error estimates for linear time-series cross-sectional data where 
parameters are estimated using OLS.  When computing the standard errors and the 
variance-covariance estimates, the assumption is that the disturbances are, by default, 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panel.  As discussed above, 




Multicollinearity frequently arises in social science research because many 
socioeconomic variables such as education, political preference, and income are typically 
interrelated (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986, pp. 71-72).  Moreover, time series 
data are likely to exhibit multicollinearity since many economic series tend to move in 
the same direction.   
Multicollinearity, which is usually reflected in high correlations between independent 
variables of .80, or higher, can be problematic in regression analysis when variables 
measure identical or highly overlapping concepts (Newton & Rudestam, 1999, p. 264).  
Although .80 is typically the cutoff level cited in the literature, it is important to note that 
it is difficult to define a cutoff value that is always appropriate.  For example, with a 
small sample size , such as the one used in my dissertation study, a single bivariate 
correlation among the independent variables of .70 could have serious consequences for 
estimation; with a larger sample size, a correlation of .85 might pose fewer difficulties 
(Berry & Feldman, 1985, p. 43).  Thus, in addition to common tests and inspections for 
multicollinearity, one must also inspect the standard errors of slope coefficient estimates, 
the width of confidence intervals, and the purpose for which the analysis is being 
performed to assess how much of a problem multicollinearity poses.   
When regression coefficients are estimated with correlated independent variables, 
they are unbiased; however, they tend to have larger standard errors than they would have 
in the absence of multicollinearity.  This will likely result in smaller values for the 
probability statistic and coefficients that are not significant.  In other words, there is less 
precision associated with estimated coefficients and consequently, little confidence that 
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the estimated coefficient accurately reflects the impact of X on Y in the population 
(Lewis-Beck, 1980, p.58; Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986, pp. 71-72).   
To assess the strength and direction of the relationship of the independent variables 
with the dependent variable and with each other and to detect overlapping variability or 
multicollinearity, I performed a bivariate correlation analysis for the study model.   
Exhibit 5 presents the results of the bivariate correlation matrix.  I used Levin and Fox’s 
(2004, p. 216) table of correlation coefficient ranges to interpret the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between any two variables included in the matrix and 
to assess potential multicollinearity.  (See Exhibit 6, Correlation Coefficient Range of 
Values.) 
The assessment for multicollinearity revealed positive statistically significant 
collinear relationships between the Black racial variables and between the Hispanic racial 
variables with coefficients higher than .90.  Generally, independent variables correlated 
higher than .80 indicate multicollinearity, which can lead to problems in accurate 
interpretation of the magnitude of regression coefficients based on theory and incorrect 
signs for the coefficients (Berry & Feldman, 1985, pp. 42 – 43).  Since all data available 
for 11 years for each variable for each state included in the model were used to conduct 
the regression analysis, the solution for multicollinearity of obtaining more information 
was not an option.  Adhering to the argument that “consequences of model 
misspecification, biased coefficient estimators, are more serious than those of 
multicollinearity” (Berry & Feldman, 1985, p. 47), I decided to conduct the regression, 
discussed below, including these variables.   While multicollinearity may exist, the 
variables were important to the assumptions and theoretical concepts about the 
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interaction of racial threats on legislative spending decisions.  Moreover, to the extent the 
individual variable regression coefficients were statistically significant, the presence of 
multicollinearity was not expected to present interpretation problems (Schroeder, 
Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986). 
Model Specification 
To conduct the regression analysis, I used the model denoted in the equation below:24 
 yit = f(yit-1 +  x1it +  x2it + x3it +…x26it + εit ) where 
 y = Juvenile Justice Spending Per Capita 
 y - 1 = Juvenile Justice Spending Per Capita lagged one year 
 i = Number of units or panels (30 states) 
 t = Number of periods (11) per unit 
 x = Independent Variables (26) 
 ε = Random error term 
 
The model is derived from the theory that state spending on juvenile justice is a 
function of the following types of independent variables:  economic, social threat, fiscal 
health, alternative policy priority, juvenile crime, partisan politics, ideology, and 
structural and demographic control variables 
 
Data Collection Procedures 
In this section, I describe the types of data collected, types and categories of variables 
generated from the data, variable sources, and methods employed for data collection.  
Additionally, I discuss measures taken to create the research data set from the 
information collected for the variables. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 The model is a semilogged specification.  See Table 3 for a detailed explanation of how each variable 
included in the model was measured. 
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Types of Data and Types and Categories of Variables 
The specific types of data collected for the variables identified to construct the panel 
data set and test my hypotheses included:  1) state general fund appropriations and 
revenue sources for juvenile justice; 2) federal aid included in juvenile justice budget 
data; 3) statistics on juvenile arrest rates, violent crime rates, and incarceration rates; 
population data; and related demographics, such race and poverty rates; 4) total state 
expenditures and median  income, gross state product, and education expenditures; 5) 
political party affiliations of state legislators and governors; 6) measures of citizen 
ideology; 7) and types of state level juvenile justice systems, juvenile justice agency 
responsibility for administration of OJJDP grants; and geographic region.   
Primary variables generated from the data collected for inclusion in the research 
model are described below.  The variables are organized by type - dependent, 
independent, structural, and control.  The independent variables are further grouped in 
seven categories:  1) budget data, 2) social threat, 3) fiscal health, 4) alternative policy 
priority, 5) juvenile crime, 6) partisan politics, and 7) ideology.25  The variable types and 
categories are described below: 
• Dependent Variable:  State Own Source Spending on Juvenile Justice;  
• Independent Variables:   
o Budget Data - Federal Aid; 
o Social Threat – Percentage Poverty, Percentage Black Population, 
Percentage Black Population Squared, Percentage Hispanic Population, 
                                                 
25
 The categories for the dependent and independent variables are drawn from the Stucky, et al. (2007) 
Politics of Social Order model. 
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Percentage Hispanic Population Squared, Percentage Juvenile Population 
Black, and Percentage Juvenile Population Hispanic; 
o Fiscal Health – Gross State Product and Median Income; 
o Alternative Policy Priority - Education Expenditures; 
o Juvenile Crime – Juvenile Crime Rate; 
o Partisan Politics – Republican Legislative Percent, Republican Governor; 
o Ideology – Citizen Ideology; 
• Structural Variables26 - Juvenile System Type (Centralized, Decentralized, and 
Combination) and OJJDP Grant Administration Agency; and 
• Control Variables – State Population, Urban Population, Juvenile Population, 
Total State Expenditures, Juvenile Incarceration Rate, and Region (Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West).27 
Variable Sources and Data Collection Methods 
To begin the study, I identified sources of reliable secondary data for all variables, 
except state spending and federal aid.  There are no existing secondary data sources that 
archive annual spending data (state own source and federal aid) for juvenile justice by 
state.  Therefore, I collected and compiled original budget data from individual states and 
their respective agencies responsible for implementing juvenile justice programs for these 
variables.  Exhibit 7 presents a description of each variable included in my study and 
their sources.     
                                                 
26
 System Type refers to the organization of juvenile delinquency services in the respective states:  
Centralized – State Controlled; Decentralized – Local Probation/State Institutions and Aftercare; 
Combination – State/Local/Judiciary.  OJJDP Grant Administration Agency indicates whether the state 
agency responsible for administering juvenile justice services is also the agency designated to administer 
the OJJDP grant programs.   
 
27
 Region names are U. S. Census Bureau designations. 
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Dependent variable and federal aid:  Budget data sources.  Prior to commencing 
the strategy of state-by-state contact to obtain juvenile justice budget data, including both 
state own source appropriations and federal aid revenue, I conducted an exhaustive 
search for the data.  I contacted several reliable sources for state juvenile justice data by 
telephone, internet, or direct face-to-face contact to determine whether juvenile justice 
spending data were archived by state and revenue source in a single repository.28  All 
confirmed that such data are not available. There are data for total justice expenditures, 
but they cannot be subdivided to obtain the juvenile dollars.  Consequently, it was 
necessary to implement the strategy of individual state-by-state contact to obtain budget 
data required for my study.   
Methods for collecting budget data.  Using the American Correctional 
Association’s 2007 Directory, I developed a Directory of State Juvenile Justice Agencies 
(See Exhibit 9) to organize contact information including names, addresses, phone 
numbers, and websites for each agency responsible for administering the state’s juvenile 
justice programs.  This directory, not only facilitated access to budget data, it also 
constituted the initial step in laying the foundation for ongoing professional contacts that 
were critical for completion of this dissertation study.     
In addition to this primary directory of juvenile justice state agencies, I created a 
hardcopy log including the names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses of the individual 
agencies’ fiscal officers, the Governor’s budget staff, and/or the Legislature fiscal 
analysts responsible for the juvenile justice budget in each state.  (Log is available upon 
request).  I also obtained a list of fiscal websites for all state legislatures from the Nevada 
Legislative Council Bureau (See Exhibit 10).  These additional measures were invaluable 
                                                 
28
 See Exhibit 8 – Data Sources for State Juvenile Justice Information.  
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for gaining access to information on the various types of funds appropriated for state 
operated and funded juvenile justice programs   In general, this contact information was 
available on the state website or by contacting the agency directly by phone and/or e-
mail.  I maintained a complete hardcopy telephone log and electronic e-mail log folder of 
all contacts with state representatives and collateral individuals throughout the extensive 
budget data collection phase of the project.  
 Research tools.  In addition to identifying existing sources of budget data, I 
developed a data collection form to collect information on revenue sources and 
appropriations for juvenile justice from states whose information was not available on 
their websites or from other printed materials.  (See Exhibit 11 - Annual Juvenile Justice 
Appropriation/Expenditures by Fund Source Form.)  This data collection form was 
distributed among four juvenile justice experts for feedback on design and usefulness for 
the intended purpose prior to distribution.  Exhibit 12 presents the names and contact 
information for these individuals.  Nineteen states used this form to submit their juvenile 
justice budget information.  The other states submitted the required budget information 
using portable document format (PDF) copies of their budget documents, Excel 
spreadsheet formats, or by providing instructions via telephone and/or e-mail on how to 
access and interpret budget documents accessible on their websites.  
 Sources for other independent, structural variables, and control variables.  
Exhibit 7 provides the complete list of independent, structural, and control variables and 
a detailed description of their sources.  Except for Federal Aid, as noted above, secondary 
data sets for the other independent variables were available from a variety of state, 
federal, and private sources through both direct agency contact to obtain copies of 
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documents and clarify information, agency and organization websites, and internet and 
direct library research.  The United States Census Bureau was a primary source of this 
information.  
Additionally, the OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book Online developed by the National 
Center for Juvenile Justice was the data source for the juvenile crime and racial threat 
population variables.29  This source was used because the National Center for Juvenile 
Justice is the nation’s oldest research organization for conducting studies on crime and 
delinquency and the major contractor for development and maintenance of the OJJDP 
Easy Access to FBI Statistics and the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement web 
based data analysis tools.    
Methods for collecting independent, structural, and control variable data.  I 
created electronic and hardcopy files to save and organize secondary data sets collected 
for each of the primary independent, structural, and control variables.  Variable data files 
are available upon request.  
Creating the Research Data Set 
After completing the preliminary data identification and collection methods described 
above, I designed a panel data structure in long format including variable observations for 
each state, the District of Columbia, and the United States as a whole for each of the 11 
years of the study.  Initially, I entered variable data from the original sources into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet/database, which was subsequently exported to SPSS 18 for 
variable examination and descriptive statistics and Stata 10.1 for model statistical 
analysis.  I found Excel to be easier to use in the initial design and management of the 
                                                 
29
 The OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book Online includes the Easy Access to FBI Statistics and the Census of 
Juveniles in Residential Placement.  It can be accessed at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/default.asp 
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dataset.  The SPSS variable explore function computes several descriptive tables and 
graphs by executing one command, thus facilitating an efficient approach to examining 
multiple variables.  Using the information collected, I generated 130 variables, including 
data for variables in their original matrix and transformations of variable data required for 
inclusion in trial and final model specifications.   
  
Data Collection Challenges and Limitations 
In this section, it is important to highlight three major challenges associated with a 
study of factors that influence state spending decisions in the juvenile justice policy 
arena.  Identifying these challenges may provide valuable insight concerning the 
difficulty in collecting reliable juvenile justice spending data, which may be why far less 
comparative research is directed at the topic and may begin to explain the gap in the 
literature on this topic.   
First, state spending on juvenile justice is not categorized in a similar manner across 
the fifty states.  As explained in Chapter 2, state agencies responsible for administering 
youth correctional services and institutions may fall into one of four categories 
(Loughran, Godfrey, et al., 2007).  Further complicating the data collection process, there 
is considerable variation within states in terms of how they divide the provision of 
juvenile justice services between the state and county levels of government.  Griffin and 
King’s (2006) description of three basic models of service delivery:  centralized, 
decentralized, and combination states was presented earlier in Chapter 2.   
The second data collection problem is that the United States Census Bureau does not 
collect separate annual expenditure data for the juvenile justice policy category.   Instead, 
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juvenile justice spending is aggregated with adult corrections or some other spending 
category, such as the judiciary or human services, or the category that is simply labeled 
other.  It is likely that this type of reporting is a consequence of the structural variation 
that exists among states, as well as the small share of overall state spending dedicated to 
juvenile justice compared to other more costly policy areas, such as Medicaid and 
elementary and secondary (K-12) education.  For example, in April 2009, the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities reported that Medicaid and K-12 Education accounted for 
about 14% and 25%, respectively, of state spending in fiscal year 2007.  In contrast, 
juvenile justice was aggregated with Corrections (including prisons, parole and other 
corrections programs), which accounted for 5% of state budgets.      
The third factor contributing to the difficulty in collecting reliable juvenile justice 
spending data is the variation among states in publishing budget information.   Not all 
state budget offices provide annual appropriation, expenditure, or revenue source data for 
juvenile justice on their websites or internet based archives.   When the data are available, 
they are not easily discernible, making the task of collecting state spending data for 
multiple years a significant challenge. 
In summary, this section describes the data collection challenges encountered during 
this study, which one could view as a reason to avoid the study of state spending on the 
juvenile justice policy area.  However, these challenges underscore the importance of this 
dissertation study, which resulted in the creation of a dataset including state level 
appropriations for juvenile justice for an eleven-year period.  The availability of this 
dataset and explanation of methodology may encourage future updates of the budget data, 
as well as continued research in this policy area.  
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Operational Definition of Variables 
Twenty-eight variables (1 dependent variable + 1 lagged dependent variable used as 
an independent variable + 26 additional independent variables) were included in the final 
regression analysis for state spending on juvenile justice programs.  Prior to model 
specification and statistical analysis, I conducted an exploratory analysis process to 
examine each variable, which I describe in Exhibit 13 – Examination of Variables.  This 
section proceeds with a discussion of the operational definitions for the dependent 
variable and independent variables organized by category.  See Table 3 – Model Variable 
Names, Descriptions, and Operational Definitions, below for a summary of the following 
discussion. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is State Own Source Juvenile Justice Spending Per Capita.30   
This variable was measured as the natural logarithm of state spending (appropriations) for 
juvenile justice per capita.  The natural logarithm of the variable was used because the 
range between low and higher spending amounts create huge discrepancies among the 
states, which skew the data.  Using the natural logarithm transformation helps to pull 
outlying data points from this positively skewed spending distribution closer to the bulk 





                                                 
30
 All monetary variables are adjusted to 2005 dollars.  See Exhibit 7, Variables and Data Sources, for the 
price index table used for the respective variables.  
 
31
 This explanation for use of the natural logarithm of a variable is applicable to the independent variables 




Model Variable Names, Descriptions, and Operational Definitions 











































Per capita spending on juvenile justice, 
state own source only 
 
 
Per capita spending on juvenile justice, 
state own source only,  lagged one year 
 
Per capita federal aid to states for 
juvenile justice 
 
Percent of population living in poverty 
 
 
Percentage of Black residents in total 
population 
 
Percentage Black population squared 
 
 
Percentage of Hispanic residents in 
total population 
 
Percentage Hispanic population 
squared 
 
Percentage of Black youth in juvenile 
population ages 10-17 
 
Percentage of Hispanic youth in 
juvenile population ages 10-17 
 
 
Gross state product per capita 
 
Median household income 
 






Natural log of  juvenile justice 
spending per capita 
 
 
Natural log of  juvenile justice 
spending per capita lagged one year 
 
Natural log of federal aid in juvenile 
justice budgets per capita 
 
Percent of population living in 
poverty 
 
Natural log of percent of Black 
residents in total population 
 
Natural log of percentage Black 
residents in population squared 
 
Natural log of percent of Hispanic 
residents in total population 
 
Natural log of percentage Hispanic 
residents in population squared 
 
Natural log of percent of Black youth 
in juvenile population ages 10-17 
 
Natural log of percent of Hispanic 
youth in juvenile population ages 10-
17 
 
Gross state product per capita  
 
Median household income 
 
Natural log of elementary and 










Table 3 – (continued) 
 
Model Variable Names, Descriptions, and Operational Definitions – (continued) 
Variable Name Description Operational Definition 















Juvenile System Type 1 
 
 


























Index crime rate per 100,000 juveniles 
ages 10 - 17 
 




Political party of the governor (1 = 
Democrat; 2 = Republican; 3 = 
Independent)  
 
Political ideology (0, most conservative 
to 100, most liberal) 
 
 
Centralized juvenile justice service 
system  
 
Combination juvenile justice service 
system    
 




Total state population 
 
Percentage urban of total state 
population 
 
Number of juveniles ages 10 to 17 in 
population 
 
Total state expenditures per capita 
 
 
Incarceration rate per 100,000 juveniles 
ages 10 to 17 
 
Region 1 -  Northeast 
 
Region 2 -  Midwest 
 




Natural log of index crime rate per 
100,000 juveniles ages 10 - 17 
 












Juvenile justice system type 1 – 
centralized 
 
Juvenile justice system type  2 – 
combination  
 




Natural log of total state population 
 
Percentage of state’s population 
living in urban areas 
 
Number of juveniles ages 10 to 17 in  
population 
 
Natural log of total state expenditures 
per capita adjusted to 2005 dollars 
 
Natural log of incarceration rate per 
100,000 juveniles ages 10 to 17 
 
Region 1 - Northeast      
 
Region 2 – Midwest 
 
Region 3 – South 
 
 
Note:  The statistical model includes 28 variables.  All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2005 dollars.  See 
Exhibit 7 for the price index table used for adjustment of respective variables.   
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The dependent variable is lagged one year and included as an independent variable.  
Federal Aid is the primary economic independent variable of interest.  Using the Politics 
of Social Order (POSOF) (Stucky, et al., 2007) model, the other 25 independent variables 
are grouped in seven categories:  social threat (economic and racial), fiscal health, 
alternative policy priority, juvenile crime, partisan politics, ideology, and structural and 
demographic control variables.  It is reasonable to assume that juvenile justice spending 
decisions vary depending upon the mutually exclusive categories assumed by these 
variables in a cross section.  
Lagged juvenile justice spending.  This variable is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the dependent variable, juvenile justice spending per capita, lagged one year.  
As explained in the Analytical Considerations section above, the lagged dependent 
variable is included in the model as a correction for autocorrelation and for its theoretical 
value in the analysis.  
Federal aid.  Federal Aid is included in the model to examine its impact on state 
spending on juvenile justice programs.  Federal Aid is defined as the federal aid revenue 
appropriated in state juvenile justice agency budgets per capita.  The variable is measured 
as the natural logarithm of federal aid per capita. 
Social threat variables.  Economic and racial threat variables are included in the 
model to test the POSOF theory that corrections spending decisions should be related to 
economic and racial threats perceived in a state’s environment by legislatures and the 
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governor when applied to juvenile justice spending.  Accordingly, I included the 
following variables: 
• Percentage Poverty (total all ages living in poverty in a state, divided by the total 
state population, and multiplied by 100) is defined here as the economically 
marginalized population.  Percentage Poverty is measured as the percent of a 
state’s total population living in poverty as determined by the U. S. Census 
Bureau using a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and 
composition; 
• Percentage Black (total number of Black residents living in a state, divided by the  
total state population, and multiplied by 100), measured as the natural log of the 
percentage of Black residents in the total state population;  
• Percentage Black Squared, used to determine the effect of increases in the size of 
the state’s Black population on  juvenile justice spending, measured as the natural 
log of the percentage of Black residents living in a state squared;   
• Percentage Hispanic (total number of Hispanic residents living in a state, divided 
by the total state population, and multiplied by 100), measured as the natural log 
of percentage Hispanic residents in the total state population;  
• Percentage Hispanic Squared, used to determine the effect of increases in the size 
of the state’s Hispanic population on juvenile justice spending, measured as the 
natural log of the percentage of Hispanic residents living in a state squared.  
In addition to the racial threat variables described above, which represent the total 
Black and Hispanic residents living in a state, I include variables for the Black and 
Hispanic youth populations in a state.  This adaptation was made to the POSOF model 
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because of the logical relevance to my research questions, which address the issue of 
spending on programs for youth involved in state juvenile justice systems: 
• Percentage Black Youth (total Black juveniles ages 10 - 17 residing in a state, 
divided by the state population ages 10 – 17, and multiplied by 100), measured as 
the natural log of the percentage Black youth in the juvenile population ages 10 – 
17; and  
• Percentage Hispanic Youth (total Hispanic juveniles ages 10 – 17 residing in a 
state, divided by the state population ages 10 – 17, and multiplied by 100), 
measured as the natural log of the percentage Hispanic youth in the juvenile 
population ages 10 – 17. 
Fiscal health.  As a state’s fiscal health improves and more funds are available, 
spending for juvenile justice and alternative programs, such as education, is expected to 
increase.  I included two variables in the model to test the impact of fiscal health on 
juvenile justice spending in a state environment of multiple public demands for funds:   
• Gross State Product, measured as gross state product per capita adjusted to 2005  
dollars; and 
• Median Income, measured as the median household income adjusted to 2005 
dollars;  
Alternative policy priority.  As noted above, social control of marginal, 
 minority populations may be accomplished using formal punitive measures or informal 
measures as a response to potential threats to social order.  I include a variable for 
education expenditures in my analytical model to address the importance of considering 
spending on alternative social programs in an analysis of spending on juvenile justice. 
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• Education Expenditures, measured as the natural log of elementary and secondary 
education expenditures per capita adjusted to 2005 dollars.  Using the log of 
education expenditures, allows one to assess changes in the outcome variable as a 
function of specified percentage changes in elementary and secondary education 
expenditures per capita;  
Juvenile crime.  The rational choice view of crime holds that there is a direct positive 
relationship between crime and punishment (spending on incarceration); whereas other 
views hold that the relationship between crime rates and correctional spending is not 
necessarily a direct positive relationship.  I included Juvenile Crime Rate in my research 
model to determine its influence, if any, on juvenile justice spending.   
Juvenile Crime Rate is measured as the natural log of index crime (violent crimes and 
property crimes) per 100,000 juveniles ages 10 -17.  The property crime index includes 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson; the violent crime index includes 
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  
Partisan politics.  To determine the effects of partisan politics and citizen ideology 
on juvenile justice spending, I used data from the legislative and executive branches of 
government to create two variables to measure party power because both influence state 
budgets.   
•    Republican Legislative Percentage is the percentage of state legislators in both    
   houses of the legislature who are Republican in each state for each year of the  
 study; and 
•    Governor’s Party is a binary variable with a value of 1 in years when the  
       Governor was Republican and 0 otherwise.     
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Ideology.  Following Stucky, et al. (2007), my model includes a measure of Citizen 
Political Ideology developed by Berry et al. (1998), updated in August 2007 to include 
data for 1960 - 2006.  Berry et al. (1998) constructed annual dynamic measures of the 
ideology of a state’s citizens and political leaders using the roll call voting scores of state 
congressional delegations, the outcomes of congressional elections, the partisan division 
of state legislatures, the party of the governor, and various assumptions about voters and 
state political elites (pp. 336-340).  Measures of citizen ideology range from 0, in the 
most conservative states, to 100, in the most liberal states.   
I selected the Berry et al. (1998) measure of citizen political ideology for three 
important reasons.  First, the researchers established the utility of their indicators by 
using sound research procedures.  They tested the assumptions on which the measures 
were based, assessed their reliability, assessed their convergent validity by correlating 
them with other ideology indicators, and evaluated their construct validity by analyzing 
their predictive power within multivariate models from some of the best research 
available in the state politics field (Berry et al., 1998, p. 327).   Second, the measure 
reflects the conceptionalization of the phenomenon in a manner that is consistent with my 
perspective.  Third, this measure has also been used in other academic research seeking to 
determine the influence of citizen ideology on spending decisions by legislatures (Yates 
& Fording, 2005). 
Structural Variables 
To control for structural variation among states based on the type of juvenile justice 
service delivery system and designated agency responsibility for OJJDP grant 
administration, I include: 
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• Juvenile System Type, as defined by the National Center for Juvenile Justice, as a 
binary variable with three categories included to measure the difference in the 
value of the dependent variable between centralized and combination juvenile 
systems and a decentralized juvenile system, which is the reference group for the 
analysis.  The categories are defined as centralized – 1, decentralized – 2; and 
combination – 3.  The value of the variable is 1 for a given category and 0 
otherwise; and 
•   OJJDP Grant Administration as a binary variable with a value of 1 when the state     
      agency responsible for administering its juvenile justice programs is also the    
      agency designated by the Governor to administer OJJDP grant programs and 0  
      otherwise.       
Control Variables 
One would reasonably expect the size of a state’s total population, size of urban 
population, size of juvenile population, total state expenditures, juvenile incarceration 
rate, and geographic region to be related to spending on juvenile justice.  Thus, to control 
for variation in juvenile justice spending, I included: 
• Total State Population measured as the natural log of the number of state residents 
and Urban Population measured as  percentage of the state’s population living in 
urban areas as defined by the United States Census Bureau; 
• Juvenile Population is measured as the number of juveniles ages 10 – 17 in the 
state’s population; 
• State Expenditures measured as the natural log of total state expenditures per 
capita adjusted to 2005 dollars.  It seems reasonable that a state’s average 
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spending on its citizens might be related to the per capita (average) spending on 
juvenile justice (Stucky et al., 2007).  Hence, the state expenditure variable 
provides a measure of the relative impact of juvenile justice spending per capita in 
the in a state’s overall per capita expenditures.    
• Juvenile Incarceration Rate is measured as the natural log of the juvenile 
incarceration rate.  The incarceration or custody rate is the number of juvenile 
offenders in residential placement on the designated date annually per 100,000, 
ages 10 through the upper age of original juvenile court jurisdiction in each 
state.32  The data on juvenile incarceration are published every two to three years 
and were available for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006.  Because data 
were not available for several years of the study, I used mean imputation to 
compute values for missing data (Newton & Rudestam, 1999, p. 160).33   
• Region is a binary variable included to measure the difference in the value of the 
dependent variable between the Northeast, Midwest, and South regions and the 
West region, which is the reference group for the analysis.  Region, as defined by 
the United States Census Bureau, is coded as follows:  Northeast – 1, Midwest – 
2, South – 3, and West – 4.  The value of the variable is 1 for a given region and 0 
otherwise.  
A discussion of the key findings and results of the various analyses conducted on the 
sample data is contained in the Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
32
 The United States Bureau of the Census collects juvenile incarceration data for the federal Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention biennially and designates the reference date for the census. 
33
 Of the various methods for handling missing data, Newton and Rudestam (1999) recommend mean 
imputation as the most straightforward and commonly used method of imputation.  This method consists of 
entering the mean value of a variable for any subject with missing data on that variable.        
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
This chapter is divided into to two sections:  1) findings related to descriptive data 
including frequency calculations for categorical variables; trend analysis of juvenile 
justice spending and key variables; and measures of central tendency and variability and 
2) results of regression analysis. 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics help organize and describe the distribution of and relationship 
among variables in any research study.  They provide a clearer view of raw data. 
Frequency Distributions 
Table 4 summarizes the frequency distributions for Region and the two structural 
binary variables, Juvenile Justice System Type and OJJDP Grant Administration.  Values 
for frequencies were calculated for each variable for all states included in the research 
sample and for the United States, including all 50 states and the District of Columbia.    
Calculations include observations for each year of the study, 1996-2006.  
Table 4 shows the number and percentage of states from each census region included 
in the study sample.  As shown, the sample is dominated by a majority of states (13) in 
the West Region, approximately (43%).   In comparison, the number and percentage of 
states in the sample from the other three regions are 10 (33%), 4 (13%), and 3 (10%) for 
the South, Midwest, and Northeast census regions, respectively.  The sample includes 30 
states, representing approximately 59% of the states.  All of the states from the West 
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Region are included in the analysis, approximately 59% of states in the South Region, 
and 33% of states in the Northeast and Midwest Regions, respectively. 
Table 4 
 
Distribution of Categorical Variables:  United States (U.S.) and Study Sample 
Frequency Observations for Number of States in Each Category, 1996 - 2006 
Variables Category  Frequency Percentage 











9               3 
12               4 
17             10 
13             13 
51             30 
 
17.7          10.0 
23.5          13.3 
33.3          33.3 
25.5          43.3 













12               7 
18              12 
21              11 
51              30 
23.5           23.3 
35.3           40.0 
41.2           36.7 









33              16 
18              14 
51              30 
64.7           53.3 
35.3           46.7 
100.0         100.0 
Note:  Percentages are rounded to the nearest decimal place.  Washington, D. C. is  
included in all U. S. totals.  
 
Considering the Juvenile System Type category, Table 4 shows that there is 
considerable variation within states in terms of the provision of juvenile justice services.  
The three basic service models, which describe the types of services provided at the state 
versus county level of government, are centralized, decentralized, and combination.34  
Table 4 presents the amount of variability among states by percentage of states included 
in each service delivery model.  As shown, a plurality of states (12, totaling 40%) 
included in the sample use the decentralized juvenile justice service model.  These states 
are characterized by local control of probation and detention centers and state control of 
                                                 
34
 See Chapter 2 for a description of the three basic juvenile justice service delivery system types. 
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juvenile institutions and aftercare services.  Eleven (36.7%) and 7 (23.3%) states in the 
sample use the combination and centralized models, respectively.   
Less than half (35.3%) of the state agencies in the United States responsible for 
administering their juvenile justice programs are also designated by their Governors to 
administer the OJJDP grant programs.  The percentage (46.7%) was slightly higher for 
the sample, but still less than half.  This means that federal aid from OJJDP is not directly 
awarded to state agencies responsible for juvenile justice programs in the majority of 
states.  Consequently, OJJDP funds may not be allocated through juvenile justice agency 
budgets unless transferred by the recipient agency to the juvenile justice agency.  Another 
result of this administrative structure is that not all OJJDP resources may be captured in 
the budget data collected from the states along with other available federal resources.  
Data are not available on how OJJDP funds are allocated by recipient state agencies that 
are not responsible for administering the state’s juvenile justice agency.  However, it does 
not necessarily follow that youth under the jurisdiction of these agencies do not benefit 
from programs developed with these federal funds in their respective communities.     
Summary.  In summary, Table 4 shows that for the period 1996 - 2006 the majority 
of states included in the study sample were located in the West Region, used the 
decentralized approach to delinquency service delivery, and were not designated by their 
Governors to administer the OJJDP grant programs.  Not shown in the table are 
frequency distributions for Governor’s Party, which showed that Republican governors 
were predominate with a 58.7% and 57.9% majority for the United States and the sample, 
respectively.  Comparing the sample to the United States during the years under 
investigation, the majority of states were in the South Region, used the combination 
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approach to juvenile delinquency service delivery, were not responsible for administering 
the OJJDP grant programs; and were represented by a Republican governor.  It is 
important to emphasize that the sample cannot be considered a probability sample.  Only 
those states where eleven years of state own source and at least ten years of federal aid 
budget data were available were included in the study in order to obtain a valid analysis.  
Therefore, while one must be cautious in making inferences to the total population of 
states, these data present important information from a robust sample of states in an area 
where none otherwise existed. 
Trend Analyses of Juvenile Justice Spending and Key Independent Variables  
Figure 3 presents a comparison of average state own source spending on juvenile 
justice and federal aid per capita for the study sample.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Average State Spending on Juvenile Justice and    
                 Federal Aid Per Capita for 30 State Sample, 1996 – 2006   
                                
I determined the average spending per capita for each year by calculating the mean 
per capita spending across the states in the sample for each year of the study.  As shown, 






























State Spending Federal Aid
 107 
$18.70 in 1996 to a high of about $26.50 (about 41.7% increase) in 2002, and then 
declined to about $23.00 (about 13.2%) by 2006.  This represents an overall increase in 
spending on juvenile justice of about 23% from 1996 to 2006.     
Figure 3 also shows that the average federal aid per capita included in state juvenile 
justice agency budgets was minimal, ranging from about $1.73 per capita in 1996, to 
approximately $3.40 in 2003, and then declined to approximately $2.70 in 2006.  This 
represents an overall percent change of about 56% increase in federal aid per capita from 
1996 to 2006.   
Although state budgets for own source and federal aid spending for juvenile justice 
represent a relatively small portion of overall state expenditures per capita, Exhibit 5 
(Bivariate Correlation Matrix) shows that the correlation between state own source 
spending for juvenile justice and federal aid was moderately positive and statistically 
significant at p < .05, r =.32.  Thus, one would expect state own source spending for 
juvenile justice to increase or decrease moderately as federal aid for juvenile justice 
increases or decreases overtime.  However, while the overall trend for the correlation 
between federal aid and state own source spending showed an increase in spending, there 
were periods of increase and decline that differed for each of the funding sources.  For 
example:  1) both funding sources increased from 1996 to 1997; 2) there were declines in 
federal aid in 1998, 2002, and 2004 through 2006; and 3) state spending continued to rise 
from 1996 through 2002 before experiencing a decline from 2003 through 2005, followed 
by an increase in 2006.  These results suggest that in general, federal aid may have a 
stimulative effect on levels of state spending on juvenile justice; but other factors may 
also influence state spending decisions.  As noted previously, these factors might include 
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a state’s response to instability and cutbacks in federal aid by replacing federal funds 
used to support ongoing essential services, such as juvenile justice.  Additionally, 
spending decisions may be influenced by social, economic, and political characteristics of 
the state, as well.         
Figure 4 shows per capita spending on juvenile justice for the United States and a 
subset of five states randomly selected from the study sample to assess the variability in 
spending on juvenile justice programs among states for 1996 - 2006.35  As shown, per 
capita spending for juvenile justice for the United States ranged from approximately 
$11.50 in 1996 to a high of approximately $19.38 in 2002, and then gradually declined to 
approximately $16.31 by 2006.  Utah showed a similar pattern of spending increase and 
decline; however, the rate of spending in Utah ranged from approximately $24.43 in 1996 
to approximately $45.00 in 2001 and 2002, and then declined to approximately $36.00 in 
2006.  Per capita spending for juvenile justice in Utah was more than twice the level of 
spending for juvenile justice in the United State per year.  Of the five states, Utah spent 
the most, while Hawaii and Missouri spent the lowest amounts per capita on juvenile 
justice.  Montana showed a spike in spending for juvenile justice in 2002 following two 
years of decline (approximately 28 % decline between 1999 and 2001).  Each state, 
except Arizona, showed a pattern of increased spending in 2002 followed by declining 
expenditures each year until 2006.  Arizona and Hawaii showed less marked variation in 
spending for juvenile justice over time.    
 
                                                 
35
 States included in the study sample were organized alphabetically and numbered from 1 to 30.  The 
Random Integer Generator, retrieved from http://www.random.org/intergers/ , was used to select the five 
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              Figure 4.  Per Capita Spending for Juvenile Justice, Selected States, 1996 – 2006 
 
Juvenile justice spending as a percentage of all state spending for the selected states 
and the nation is illustrated in Figure 5 below.  Figure 5 shows that spending on juvenile 
justice is less than 1% of all state expenditures for the selected states and the nation from 
1996 – 2006.   Only two states (Florida and South Carolina), not included in the 
illustration, exceeded 1% of expenditures.  These states spent 1.24% and 1.19% of their 
total state expenditures on juvenile justice, respectively.  As expected, the timing and 
pattern of increases, and in some cases decreases, varied across states, as did the actual 
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expenditures among the states.     
Figure 5.  Percentage of State Spending for Juvenile Justice, Selected States, 1996 – 2006  
The other results are percentage illustrations of the per capita amounts shown in 
Figure 4.  Relative to the other states examined, Utah spent a higher percentage of its 
overall state expenditures on juvenile justice.  Hawaii spent the lowest percentages and 
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As shown in Figures 4 and 5, spending on juvenile justice showed variation within 
and among states and over time.  This variation is consistent with what is known about 
state spending decisions, which are affected by characteristics of individual states as 
noted above. (Fisher, 1996; Gruber, 2007).  Furthermore, it is additional justification for 
including variables that measure state characteristics in my research model to determine 
the extent of their influence on state spending for juvenile justice.  
Next, Figure 6 is an illustration of the relationship between average state own source 
and federal aid spending on juvenile justice and juvenile crime per year between 1996 
and 2006.  As shown, per capita spending on juvenile justice steadily increased from 
about $20.45 in 1996 to about $29.54 in 2002 before beginning a gradual decline to about 
$25.69 in 2006.  During the same period, the juvenile crime rate for indexed crimes 
(violent crimes and property crimes) per 100,000 juveniles ages 10 - 17 decreased sharply 
from about 3150 to about 1836 in 2002, and then experienced a continuous gradual 
decrease to 1500 by 2006.   This trend suggests that spending on juvenile justice does not 
have a direct positive relationship to the index crime rate and/or that spending decisions 
lag behind crime rate causing what appears to be a negative relationship.  The correlation 
between juvenile justice spending and juvenile crime rate as shown in Exhibit 5 was 
positive, statistically insignificant, and negligible with an approximate r value of .03.   
Figure 6 suggests that other factors besides juvenile crime may influence legislative 
spending decisions.  The period covered by this study occurred during the punitive phase 
in the evolution of juvenile justice in the United States.36  Although the index crime rate 
for juveniles declined sharply during this period, legislatures enacted more punitive laws 
                                                 
36
 See Chapter 2 for a description of the historical overview of juvenile justice in the United States, 
including the four phases of development. 
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as a response to the public’s concerns about juvenile crime.  These legislative changes 
undoubtedly resulted in increased spending for programs designed to curb juvenile crime.  
Logically, legislatures would seek to continue to support spending on successful 
programs with a goal of continued reductions, or at least stabilizing, the juvenile crime 
rate.  Thus, spending on juvenile justice shows an overall increase while the index 
juvenile crime rate declined.  In sum, juvenile crime rate is not necessarily a predictor of 
juvenile justice spending for the sample states. 
Figure 6.  Comparison of Average Per Capita Spending on Juvenile Justice and    
                 Index Crime Rate Per 100,000 Juveniles Ages 10 – 17, for 30 State 
                 Sample, 1996 – 2006 
 
Summary.  In general, the results of the trend analyses of juvenile justice spending as 
a percentage of total state spending per capita for selected states and the nation showed 
less than one percent (1%) of spending being allocated to juvenile justice program 
operations during 1996 - 2006.  Moreover, the data showed variability in per capita 






























State and Federal Spending Crime Rate
 113 
juvenile justice and federal aid was positive and statistically significant.  One would 
logically assume that the juvenile crime rate is a key factor in juvenile justice spending 
decisions; however, the data showed the correlation between the two variables was 
statistically insignificant. 
Measures of Central Tendency  
Table 5 below presents the descriptive statistics for measures of the mean, standard 
deviation, and range, including the state and year for minimum and maximum amounts 
for variables included in the study model, except binary variables.37  The variables are 
grouped by type and category as defined in Chapter 5.  I discuss some of the highlights of 
the results below.     
First, the mean state expenditure for juvenile justice was $23.44 per capita with a 
range of $61.04 per capita for South Carolina, the state with the highest spending, 
compared to $5.11 per capita for Pennsylvania, the lowest spending state.  Likewise, the 
spread of the distribution for federal aid contributions for juvenile justice ranged from 
$14.98 per capita in Wyoming to zero with a mean federal aid allocation of $2.74.  
California and Texas had the lowest federal aid allocations for juvenile justice per capita, 
spending zero to .02 cents per capita.  On average, federal aid was approximately 10.5% 
of state spending on juvenile justice.  Based on the results of prior research, one would 
expect per capita allocation of federal aid to be highest for less populous states, such as 
Wyoming and South Dakota and lowest for larger states, such as Texas and California 
(GAO, 1996b, pp. 27 – 28).  In sum, the average per capita spending for juvenile justice, 
including state and federal revenue ($26.13), was relatively small (approximately .53%) 
in comparison to average total state expenditures per capita ($4,953). 
                                                 
37




Descriptive Statistics for Model of Factors Affecting State Juvenile Justice Spending  
Per Capita, 1996 - 2006  
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Table 5 – (continued) 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Model of Factors Affecting State Juvenile Justice Spending  

















  Republican    
  Legislative  










  Juvenile System 
  Type 1    
 
  Juvenile System  
  Type 3 
 
  OJJDP Grant  
  Administration 
 
Control: 
  State  Population 
   
  
 Urban Population 
 
  
  Juvenile  
  Population 
 
  Total  
  Expenditures                     
 
  Juvenile   
  Incarceration     
  Rate 
 
  Region 1 
 
  Region 2 
 









1 = political party of governor 
       Republican 
 
 
Political ideology index (0, most 
conservative to 100, most liberal) 
 
 
1 = Centralize juvenile justice   
      service system  
 
1 = Combination juvenile justice  
      service system  
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Note:  Valid N = 303; missing observations = 27; total N = 330.  All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2005 
dollars.  NA indicates not applicable.  aCalculated to three decimal places, the minimum value for Federal 
Aid is .003.  bAmounts rounded to nearest dollar.  cIndex crimes as defined by the FBI include burglary, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault; amounts are rounded to nearest rate.   
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Second, results for the social threat variables also showed the average poverty rate 
among sample states was about 12%.  The poverty rate for the nation during the same 
period as the study (1996 – 2006) was approximately 12%, as well.38  This finding 
suggested that the sample, while not random, was representative of the nation in terms of 
the poverty rate variable.  New Mexico had the highest poverty rate of 20.31% compared 
to Maryland, which had the lowest rate of 7.60%. 
 Furthermore, on average for the sample, the percentage of Hispanics (10.26%) in the 
sample population and the percentage of Hispanic youth in the juvenile population 
(12.43%) slightly exceeded that of Blacks in the sample population (9.52%) and Black 
youth in the juvenile population (11.92%).  The opposite finding was true for the nation, 
where on average, the percentage of Blacks overall (13.01 %) and Black youth (16.12%) 
during the period of the study slightly exceeded that of total Hispanics (12.91%) and 
Hispanic youth (15.84%).  The District of Columbia (60.86%), Mississippi (36.74%), and 
Louisiana (32.70%) had the highest average population of Black residents between  
1996 – 2006; however, they were not included in the study.  This could account for the 
slight difference in findings for minority population percentage between the sample and 
the nation.  The findings also showed that South Carolina and Montana had the highest 
and lowest percentage of Black residents while New Mexico and Maine had the highest 
and lowest percentage of Hispanic residents for the sample, respectively.   
  As an example of an alternative policy priority, education expenditures far exceeded 
spending for juvenile justice as expected.  On average, states spent approximately $1,348 
per capita for education, which was $1,322 (5148%) more per capita or 51.5 times the 
                                                 
38
 See U. S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, State and County Interactive 
Tables.  http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html   
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average per capita spending on juvenile justice ($26.18) including state and federal 
sources.  The disparity among sample states in terms of gross state product per capita was 
relatively large at approximately 60.49%. 
Another key issue for consideration in describing the characteristics of the sample is 
juvenile crime rate.  The results in Table 5 show that the average index crime rate per 
100,000 juveniles ages 10 to 17 was approximately 2,119 for the 30 states included in the 
sample.  Washington and South Dakota had the highest (4,547) and lowest (581) index 
juvenile crime rates, respectively.   
In general, during the study period, state legislatures were on average about 52% 
republican; and the political ideology index score for citizens was moderately 
conservative at about 44.81 on average.  Hawaii was the most liberal state, with a score 
of 82.41, and Kentucky, at 8.45, was most conservative.  Additionally, an average of 73% 
of the total state populations were residents of urban areas, while an average of 11.57% 
were juveniles between ages 10 and 17 during the period under investigation.  
Summary.  As expected, the results in Table 5 show that the standard deviations for 
the measures included in the study had a wide dispersion of values around their 
respective means.  As discussed in Chapter 5, several variables were transformed to help 
normalize the distribution of data values, which is important in achieving precise results 
in statistical analysis (Newton, & Rudestam, 1999, p. 56).   
 
Results of the Regression Analysis 
This section begins with an assessment of the overall fit of the statistical model 
specified in Chapter 5.  Next, I present the results of the regression analysis for the 
 118 
hypothesized relationships and the other covariates included in the analytical model.  
Table 6 shows the coefficient estimates, standard errors, z scores, and the accompanying 
p values for the model variables, which are presented by type and category.  See Exhibit 
14 for guidelines for interpreting log transformed variables and the lagged dependent 
variable.  Table 7 presents a summary of the study hypotheses explained in detail in 
Chapter 4.         
General Model Fit  
As shown in Table 6, the model predicts the effect of federal aid and other social, 
political, and fiscal factors on the observed outcome of per capita state spending devoted 
to juvenile justice reasonably well.  The overall regression model, computed on 302 
observations, confirmed the absence of autocorrelation.  The model is statistically 
significant with Wald Chi Square (27 degrees of freedom) = 114,416, p (0.000) <.05, 
yielding a relatively large effect size (R2 = .869).  These results suggest that 
approximately 87% of the variance in the dependent variable (Juvenile Justice Spending 
Per Capita) can be explained by the independent variables.   This large R2, however, 
should be viewed with caution and considered as additional information, not as a 
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 Aggregate data from many units, such as states, hide certain differences in behavior among the units 
since “high” and “low” values cancel each other.  Such averaging means that there is less variability in the 
dependent variable to be explained by the independent variables and often results in higher R2 values for the 
aggregate information than for comparable micro data (Schroeder et al., 1986, p. 55).   
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Table 6 
Regression Analysis for Model of Factors Predicting State Juvenile Justice 
Spending Per Capita, 1996 - 2006 
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Note:  N = 302.  R2 = .869, Wald Chi2 (27) = 114,416.  a  Values are rounded to the nearest 




Summary of Hypotheses 
Federal Aid: 
Hypothesis 1:  Federal Aid will have a positive relationship with state own source  
                        spending on juvenile justice per capita. 
 
Social Threat: 
Hypothesis 2:  A state’s poverty rate and percentage of minority population will have a  
                        significant positive relationship with juvenile justice spending per  
                        capita.  When the minority population reaches a significant numerical  
                        strength, there will be a curvilinear (negative) relationship with juvenile  
                        justice spending per capita. 
 
Partisan Politics and Citizen Ideology: 
Hypothesis 3:  (a) Partisan politics (measured as Republican legislative percentage and  
Republican Governor) is expected to be positively related to juvenile              
justice spending per capita, while (b) citizen ideology (measured as 
index values for most conservative to most liberal) is expected to be 
negatively related to juvenile justice spending per capita and the effects 
should be statistically significant. 
 
 
Examination of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation study is focused on answering two research questions:  1) What 
impact does federal aid have on state spending on juvenile justice programs? and 2) Can 
specific tenets of the Politics of Social Order Framework (POSOF) be extended to 
juvenile justice funding?  Examination of the related hypotheses, as shown in Table 7, 
developed to examine the research questions follows.  The findings for Research 
Question 1 and Hypothesis 1 are presented first.  Next, I discuss the results for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, which were drawn from Research Question 2.  Finally, I present a 
summary of additional findings from the regression analysis for state fiscal health and 
alternative policy priority variables, juvenile crime, structural variables, and control 
variables, which further inform the outcome of the analysis.  Where applicable, I compare 
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my findings for juvenile justice spending with the results for similar measures from the 
POSOF model (Stucky et al., 2007).40  As noted above, Table 6 shows the statistical 
results for the regression analysis with statistical significance at the p < .05 level.   
Research Question 1.  What impact does federal aid have on state spending on  
juvenile justice programs? 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Federal Aid will have a positive relationship with state own source  
                         spending on juvenile justice. 
This hypothesis predicts that as federal aid increases one can expect an increase in 
state spending on juvenile justice.  The regression results were statistically significant; 
however, the association was negative.  The results revealed that federal aid had a 
substitution, rather than a stimulative, effect on juvenile justice spending.  As shown in 
Table 6, a 1% increase in federal aid results in a decrease, or approximately -.04% 
change, in juvenile justice spending per capita, holding all other variables constant.  This 
finding means that total state spending for juvenile justice per capita increased upon 
receipt of federal aid, but by less than the full amount of the grant because states reduced 
their own spending on juvenile justice by approximately .04% on average.41  This finding 
supports the notion that federal aid is a determinate in a state’s decision on how to 
allocate state funds in an environment where federal aid is available.  In this study, the 
change in spending is relatively small; however, the result is a significant indicator of 
state behavior previously documented in the empirical literature (GAO, 1996b; GAO 
2004; Tsang & Levin, 1983).         
                                                 
40
 The POSOF model was based on adult corrections; therefore, did not analyze information for juveniles.  
The POSOF model did not include comparable variables for median income, structural variables, or 
geographic region. 
41
 See Gruber, J. (2007) and GAO (1996b, p. 2 - 6) for a detailed explanation of the substitution effect and 
intergovernmental grants. 
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Research Question 2.  Can specific tenets of the Politics of Social Order 
Framework be extended to juvenile justice funding?  
  
Social Threat.  Economic and racial threat variables identified in the POSOF 
model are defined as social threats, which affect state spending decisions on adult 
corrections.  These variables are also predicted to have an effect on juvenile justice 
spending.  The seven social threat variables shown in Table 6 are included in the model 
to assess the effect of poverty and race on state spending decisions on juvenile justice.  
Previous research has shown that states with greater racial and ethnic heterogeneity and 
economic inequality (poverty) are more punitive and, thus, spend more resources on 
corrections and social control than states with homogeneous populations (Behrens, 
Uggen, & Manza, 2003; McGarrell & Duffee, 2007; and Stucky, et al., 2007).   
Hypothesis 2:  A state’s poverty rate and percentage of minority population will have  
 
a significant positive relationship with juvenile justice spending per  
 
capita.  When the minority population reaches a significant numerical  
 
strength, there will be a curvilinear (negative) relationship with 
 
juvenile justice spending per capita.42  
 
Results for the variables included in the regression model to test Hypothesis 2 were 
mixed, with most contradicting the predicted relationships.   
Percentage Poverty:  Based on economic threat theory, one would expect Percentage 
Poverty to be positively related to juvenile justice spending.  However, the results show 
that the relationship is negative, yet statistically significant.  This means that for each 1% 
increase in poverty rate, per capita juvenile justice spending is expected to decrease 4.3%.  
                                                 
42
 Percentage Black Squared and Percentage Hispanic Squared are included in the model to estimate 
mathematically the increase in population of the designated minority groups to assess the effect of the 
quadratic terms.   
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In comparison, Stucky et al. (2007) found the relationship between poverty and 
corrections spending to be positive, but statistically insignificant, p = .293.  Although 
there is ample evidence in the empirical literature for including poverty as a social threat 
measure, the results of my analysis contradict the hypothesized relationship.  This is an 
important finding for juvenile justice spending policy.  One possible explanation is that 
rather than increase spending for formal juvenile justice programs for social control, 
legislators were more likely to allocate funding for alternative measures (i.e., delinquency 
prevention programs, such as after school tutoring programs and mentoring programs) to 
address the needs of poor children involved in the juvenile justice system.  There is also 
evidence of mixed results for testing the relationship between poverty and spending on 
corrections in the empirical literature (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001).    
Percentage Black Population:  The results of the regression analysis revealed a 
statistically significant negative relationship between Percentage Black Population and 
Juvenile Justice Spending.  For a 1% increase in the percentage of Black residents, per 
capita juvenile justice spending is expected to decrease .83%.  This finding contradicts 
the predicted outcome based on the racial threat theory that the relationship would be 
significant and positive.  The implication here, albeit counterintuitive with the empirical 
literature, is that juvenile justice spending is not driven by the threat of the Black 
population growing significantly in size to represent a threat to majority interests.  A 
primary premise of the racial threat theory is that majority interests influence legislative 
spending decisions (Stucky et al., 2007).  Results from the POSOF model for this 
measure were consistent with racial threat theory indicating that Percentage Black 
Population was a statistically significant positive determinate of corrections spending. 
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Percentage Black Population Squared:  The relationship between Percentage Black 
Population Squared and juvenile justice spending per capita was positive (.02% increase 
in spending for each 1% increase in Black Population) and statistically insignificant (p = 
.146) for my sample.  Recall in Chapter 5, I explained that the quadratic form of the 
variable measure was expected to yield a curvilinear response or negative relationship 
between the predictor and outcome variable. This means that it was expected that once 
the minority population reached a significant size, it would be viewed as a voting bloc 
that could influence legislators to spend less on punitive measures for crime control and 
more on alternative programs.   Again, the results for this measure contradict the 
hypothesis, indicating that the racial threat theory does not hold true in juvenile justice 
spending analysis for my sample.  One possible explanation for the contradictory finding 
is that inspite of increases in the Black population during the period of the study, it was 
not viewed as a significant voting bloc on juvenile justice issues.  In comparison, the 
POSOF model finding for corrections was negative and statistically significant.  
Consistent with the racial threat theory, the POSOF model results showed that racial 
threat played an important role in corrections spending.   
Percentage Juvenile Population Black:  As predicted, the relationship between 
Percentage Juvenile Population Black and Per Capita Juvenile Justice Spending is 
positive and statistically significant.  Table 6 shows that a 1% increase in the Black 
juvenile population is associated with a significant increase of approximately .60% in 
spending.  This finding suggests that the size of the Black juvenile population plays an 
important role in decisions to increase juvenile justice spending.   
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Percentage Hispanic Population and Percentage Hispanic Population Squared:  The 
results support the predicted relationships between these two measures and Per Capita 
Juvenile Justice Spending.  A 1% increase in the percentage of Hispanic residents is 
associated with approximately 1.81% increase in juvenile justice spending, p = .000; and 
a 1% increase in the percentage of Hispanic residents squared is associated with a 
statistically significant decrease of about .09%.  These findings suggest that racial threat 
posed by the Hispanic population plays an important role in juvenile justice spending and 
that the growth of the Hispanic population into a voting bloc may influence legislators to 
spend less on punitive control measures for Hispanic juveniles in the justice system and 
more on other desired programs to support the juvenile justice system.  In the POSOF 
model, Percentage Hispanic was statistically insignificant and negatively associated with 
the proportion of a state’s budget allocated for corrections, thus the racial threat theory 
did not hold true.  The quadratic term for percentage Hispanic was not associated with 
corrections, thus it was not included in the POSOF model (Stucky et al., 2007, p. 104).   
Percentage Juvenile Population Hispanic:  The predicted relationship between 
Percentage Juvenile Population Hispanic and Per Capita Juvenile Justice spending was 
not supported by the findings.  The results were statistically significant; however, the 
relationship is negative.  This means that there was no racial threat factor related to the 
size of the Hispanic youth population and juvenile justice spending for my sample.  
Social Threat Summary:  The regression results for the social threat variables showed 
differences in their impact on legislative spending decisions for juvenile justice compared 
to findings by Stucky et al. (2007) for corrections spending.  The economic and racial 
threat variables were all statistically significant in their impact on juvenile justice 
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spending, except for Percent Black Squared.  However, only the predicted associations 
between Percentage Hispanic, Percentage Hispanic Squared, and Percentage Juvenile 
Population Black and Per Capita Juvenile Justice Spending, respectively, were supported 
by the data.  Thus, the social threat theory does not hold consistently for juvenile justice 
spending.  These findings showed mixed results for the influence of economic and racial 
threats in understanding legislative spending decisions for juvenile justice.  This suggests 
that the picture may be more complicated for juvenile justice spending than threat theory 
alone is able to explain.  Nagin, Piquero, Scott, and Steinberg (2006) provided one 
explanation for such results in their study of public preferences for rehabilitation versus 
incarceration of juvenile offenders in Pennsylvania.  They assessed public support for 
both incarceration and rehabilitative policy alternatives for serious juvenile crime and 
concluded that there was less support for punishment (incarceration) than for treatment 
(rehabilitation) in addition to current punishment levels.   
Rather than being solely defined by social threat theory, juvenile justice spending my 
be more fluid meaning that legislators are just as likely to support punishment, as well as 
rehabilitative measures, in the interest of community protection.  Hence, one would 
expect two overlapping policy positions when analyzing legislative spending decisions 
concerning juvenile justice.  Additionally, cost-conscious legislators may be more likely 
to support rehabilitative measures, which are typically less expensive, less harmful, and 
more effective than punitive measures, such as incarceration, when considering how to 
allocate limited public funds (Cullen & Gendreu, 2000; Clear, 1994; as cited in Nagin et 
al., 2006). 
 127 
Overall, regression results for the social threat variables highlight the differences 
between legislative spending decisions for juvenile versus adult offenders.  The 
differences in spending may be interpreted as legislators’ cognizance of the special needs 
of young offenders; therefore, different factors are considered when formulating juvenile 
justice policy. 
Partisan Politics and Citizen Ideology.    
Hypothesis 3:  (a) Partisan politics (measured as Republican legislative percentage 
and Republican Governor) is expected to be positively related to 
juvenile justice spending per capita, while (b) citizen ideology 
(measured as index values for most conservative to most liberal) is 
expected to be negatively related to juvenile justice spending per 
capita and the effects should be statistically significant. 
As shown in Table 6, the results for Republican Legislative Percentage (Republican 
Party control) contradict the hypothesized relationship for partisan politics and spending 
devoted to juvenile justice, holding all other variables constant.  The results show that a 
1% increase in Republican Legislative Percentage was associated with a statistically 
significant decrease of .40% in spending devoted to juvenile justice.  In comparison to the 
POSOF model, which showed that an increase in the percentage of Republican legislators 
was associated with a statistically significant increase in spending on corrections, the 
results for juvenile justice spending indicated that state Republican legislative party 
strength mattered, but the relationship was in the opposite direction.   Additionally, Table 
6 shows that states with a Republican Governor were more likely to increase spending on 
juvenile justice; however, the finding was statistically insignificant (p = .582).  This 
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finding is analogous to the finding by Stucky et al. (2007) for corrections spending.  
Overall, the regression results for partisan politics are important in light of the fact that 
the POSOF model, as well as other research on corrections spending characterizes the 
Republican Party as the more conservative, law and order party using spending to control 
crime versus social programs that more liberal politicians tend to support (Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001; Yates & Fording, 2005).  These studies found a positive, statistically 
significant relationship between corrections spending and a republican dominated 
legislature.  Thus, if the law and order depiction of the Republican Party were true, one 
would expect juvenile justice spending to be significantly higher during Republican 
administrations.  As shown, the data do not support this view of the Republican Party in 
relation to juvenile justice spending decisions.43 
Further, the analysis does not support the hypothesis that the relationship between 
citizen ideology and state juvenile justice spending per capita is expected to be negative 
and statistically significant.  The regression coefficient is -.002, p = .082.  Since the data 
show that the relationship between citizen ideology and juvenile justice spending per 
capita is approaching significance; one can reasonably assume that the relationship 
between the two variables is negative, as shown.  The evidence suggests that a more 
liberal citizenry is associated with decreased spending.  In other words, as a state’s citizen 
ideology index value increases, its spending on juvenile justice programs is expected to 
decrease.  Stucky, et al. (2007) found no evidence of an association between citizen 
ideology and state-level corrections spending.    
                                                 
43
 I conducted calculations to examine my dissertation regression model for interaction effects between 
Governor Party (Republican) and Percent Republican Legislature.  The results showed that the interaction 
terms were statistically insignificant in the model. 
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In sum, the findings from the Stucky, et al. (2007) study using the POSOF model and 
my study results indicate that social threats, partisan politics, and citizen ideology 
influence legislative spending decisions on corrections and juvenile justice in different 
ways.  Explanations for the differences may be related to the perceived threat posed by 
the adult corrections population versus the juvenile justice population, the size of the 
respective populations, or the period in which each study was conducted.  To illustrate 
the discussion above, Table 8 shows a comparison of the hypothesized relationships of 
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Regression Results for the Remaining Variables in the Model 
Fiscal Health and Alternative Policy Priority.   The fiscal health variables were 
derived from theory that holds that a state’s fiscal health is consequential for spending 
decisions in the various policy areas it is responsible for funding (Stucky et al., 2007; 
Greenberg & West, 2001).  Table 6 shows that Gross State Product is statistically 
significant, but negatively associated with Juvenile Justice Spending Per Capita.  Juvenile 
Justice Spending Per Capita is expected to decrease less than .1% for each 1% increase in 
Gross State Product.  Although, the magnitude of the coefficient is small, it suggests that 
states spend proportionately less on juvenile justice as they become wealthier.  This result 
is not consistent with the POSOF finding where there was a strong positive association 
between gross state product and corrections spending, supporting the spirit of the POSOF 
perspective that wealthier states were more likely to favor punitive responses to crime 
(Stucky et al., 2007).    
Turning to the analysis of the relationship between Median Income and Juvenile 
Justice Spending Per Capita, the results showed a significant positive increase of less than 
.1% in the outcome variable for each 1% increase in Median Income of residents.  
Similar to findings for Gross State Product, the coefficient estimate showed a weak 
relationship leading to a minimal percentage change in the outcome variable. However, it 
is in the positive direction for Median Income, suggesting that as residents’ incomes 
increase, they are likely to favor a more punitive response to juvenile crime.       
The relationship between Education Expenditure Per Capita and Juvenile Justice 
Spending Per Capita was positive and statistically significant.  Table 6 shows that a 1% 
increase in education spending results in a .41% increase in per capita juvenile justice 
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spending.  Unlike POSOF findings, which showed evidence of policy trade-offs between 
education and corrections spending, there is no such evidence for the relationship 
between education and juvenile justice spending.  This means that legislators in sample 
states showed no propensity to decrease juvenile justice spending as a trade-off for 
increased education spending.  
Overall, the findings for the Fiscal Health and Alternative Priority variables indicated 
that states do not tend to allocate a higher level of spending for juvenile justice as they 
become wealthier.  This finding may be attributed to a preference for funding less costly 
prevention programs for juveniles to enhance social control and competency 
development; unlike corrections where Republican controlled legislatures, in particular, 
will tend to increase corrections spending for social control through incarceration.  
However, as the median income of residents increased, there was evidence of minimal 
increase in juvenile justice spending, an inconsistent finding given the negative results for 
gross state product.  As expected, per capita education expenditure increased at a greater 
rate than juvenile justice spending; however, there was no evidence of policy trade-off 
between the two program areas 
Juvenile Crime.  Logically, juvenile crime is considered a factor, which may affect 
spending on juvenile justice programs.  Research on corrections spending has shown 
disparate results for the relationship of crime rate to spending (Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001, p. 65; Stucky et al., 2007, p. 100).  Table 6 shows that Index Juvenile Crime Rate 
was positively related to juvenile justice spending, but statistically insignificant, p = .589.  
The implication is that an increase in the index juvenile crime rate will lead to increased 
juvenile justice spending; however, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; therefore, one 
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cannot definitively conclude that the crime rate is a driving force behind changes in 
juvenile justice spending.  This finding is consistent with POSOF and other research 
(McGarrell & Duffee, 2007), which found that the perception of crime and its use as a 
political issue is more important than the reality of crime.  These researchers argued that 
other factors including social conditions, partisan politics, economic and racial factors, 
and fiscal considerations are important in explaining corrections spending.   
Conversely, Juvenile Incarceration Rate was significant and positively related to 
juvenile justice spending.  The implication here is that states increase spending to address 
increases in the juvenile incarceration rate.  While this finding conflicts with POSOF 
results for imprisonment rate, a reasonable explanation for the difference in state 
behavior relative to juveniles might be a greater emphasis on preventing overcrowding in 
juvenile correctional facilities, which could lead to ineffective programming, 
noncompliance with safety standards for juvenile correctional facilities, lawsuits, and loss 
of federal aid.     
Structural Variables.  Sample states that used the centralized or combination model 
to deliver their juvenile justice services spent approximately 23.10% and 6.70% more, 
respectively, on juvenile justice per capita compared to states that used the decentralized 
model (the referent category).  The respective differences in expenditures were 
statistically significant.  This means that in decentralized states where there is more local 
control over delinquency services, such as probation, detention centers, and aftercare 
services the level of spending devoted to juvenile justice is less than in states where there 
is a greater state overall responsibility.  Similarly, when the state’s agency responsible for 
juvenile justice programs was also the designated agency to administer OJJDP grant 
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allocations for delinquency prevention, spending for juvenile justice was a statistically 
significant 8.80% more compared to non-OJJDP grant administration agencies.  These 
findings suggest that organizational structure for juvenile justice administration and 
methods of service delivery affect how states allocation funds for juvenile justice. 
 Control Variables.   Turning to the demographic control variables included in the 
analysis, I found that total state population size, percentage of urban population, and total 
juvenile population, ages 10 – 17, were statistically significant predictors of spending on 
juvenile justice.  The findings showed that as total state population increases spending 
devoted to juvenile justice increased.  Urban population percentage and total juvenile 
population, ages 10 – 17, were both associated with decreased spending devoted to 
juvenile justice.  For both predictors, the effects were very small, resulting in barely 1% 
decrease in spending associated with urban population percentage and approximately 
.10% decrease associated with juvenile population, ages 10 – 17.  The percentage of state 
spending devoted to juvenile justice was unrelated to total state expenditures per capita.  
In contrast, Stucky et al. (2007) found that spending on corrections was unrelated to 
state population size, but a unit increase in total state spending per capita was 
significantly associated with decreased corrections spending.  These findings suggest that 
states that spend more on their residents devote less of the budget to corrections and 
punitive outcomes, and perhaps, more on addressing social problems.  The same logic is 
applicable to states in my sample that spend less on juvenile justice as urban and juvenile 
populations increase, and perhaps, more on social programs to address delinquency 
prevention. 
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Finally, geographic differences in juvenile justice spending for sample states are 
represented in the results for the region binary variables shown in Table 6.  The West 
region is the referent category.  Differences in spending on juvenile justice were 
statistically insignificant between the West and Midwest regions; however, substantively, 
the data show that Midwest states spent 3.10% more than states in the West.  Data for the 
Northeast and South regions yielded significant results with the Northeast spending 
20.40% less and the South spending 25.30% more on average than the West on juvenile 
justice.  Clearly, there are geographic differences in spending on juvenile justice among 
sample states either statistically or from a substantive perspective.  The fact that states in 
the South region spent substantially more on juvenile justice and had the highest African 
American populations leads one to question the impact of race and other regional 
differences on juvenile justice spending.  Further analysis of regional differences in 
juvenile justice spending is beyond the scope of this study; however, I include it in my 
recommendations for future research. 
Summary 
Overall regression results showed that 20 of 26 model variables, not including the 
dependent and lagged dependent variables, showed statistically significant results.  
However, the results were mixed for predicted and observed relationships for the sample 
and for comparison of sample results with Stucky et al. (2007) results using the POSOF 
model.  The findings suggest that the while federal aid was a statistically significant 
factor in juvenile justice spending decisions, its fiscal impact was minimal leading to 
more total juvenile justice spending by states, but a decrease in state own source 
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spending.  As stated previously, this is an important finding because it is indicative of the 
substitution effect on spending policy in an environment where federal aid is available. 
Moreover, it is important for theory building on juvenile justice spending policy that 
the hypothesized relationships were not confirmed for all social threat, partisan politics, 
and citizen ideology variable relationships with state own source juvenile justice 
spending.  Recall that the hypothesized relationships were primarily drawn from the 
literature on corrections spending due to the lack of empirical research on juvenile justice 
spending policy.  Juvenile justice history shows evidence of the influence of similar 
socioeconomic and political variables as those that influence corrections spending.  
However, the effect of these variables is different in the two policy areas.  The results of 
this dissertation suggest that the POSOF offers an appropriate model for identification of 
variable types and categories for examination, but results confirm that legislators respond 
differently when making decisions about juvenile justice and corrections.  This is 
reassuring and as it should be since juvenile justice and corrections policy focus on 
different populations with distinctly different needs. 
The variables examined in the POSOF model seem appropriate for examination of 
juvenile justice spending; however, the theoretical basis for inclusion of the social threat, 
partisan politics, and citizen ideology variables does not hold true in all instances for 
determinants of juvenile justice spending based on sample data.  One explanation for this 
difference is that the level of state spending devoted to juvenile justice (.53% of total 
state expenditures per capita on average) was small in comparison to other policy areas.  
Thus, legislators and other state level administrators who are responsible for juvenile 
justice spending decisions are obligated to maintain state own source spending with 
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limited funding trade-offs, since states are primarily responsible for funding juvenile 
justice with limited federal support. 










































CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There are number of studies on juvenile offenders and victims and juvenile justice 
reform in the United States.  However, there has been limited research on state-level 
juvenile justice spending.  In this dissertation study, I address this gap in the academic 
literature by examining two research questions:  1) What impact does federal aid have on 
state spending on juvenile justice programs? and 2) Can specific tenets of the Politics of 
Social Order Framework (POSOF) be extended to juvenile justice funding?   This study 
is a contribution toward building a body of research in which state spending on juvenile 
justice is analyzed from a policy perspective across 11 years from 1996 – 2006 for 30 
states.  Drawing from economic theory on federal aid to states and principles of the 
POSOF, I present a model to examine the relationships between state spending on 
juvenile justice and federal aid, economic and racial threats, fiscal concerns, alternative 
policy priorities, juvenile crime, and partisan politics for the 30 states included in the 
study. 
Conclusions 
Juvenile justice in the United States has primarily been the responsibility of states and 
their localities; however, Congress has had a significant influence in the area through 
funding for grant programs administered by the Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  In the absence of a national, centralized juvenile 
justice system in the United States, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
(JJDPA) of 1974 sets forth national priorities for juvenile justice and delinquency 
prevention, which exemplify the federal government’s influence on the distinct juvenile 
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justice systems in operation across the states and districts of the nation.  Although the 
federal government plays a limited role in funding juvenile justice programs at the state 
level of government, states welcome federal support to help develop and implement 
optimal juvenile justice programs and practices.  Considerable variation among and 
within states affects how state and federal governments fund juvenile justice programs 
and how services are provided. 
This research contributes several important findings to advance our understanding of 
juvenile justice spending policy decisions.  First, my research data show that spending on 
juvenile justice represents less than one percent (1%) of total state spending per capita for 
the nation.  This small amount suggests that there will be minimal likelihood of policy 
spending trade-offs in the juvenile justice policy arena beyond substitution of grant funds 
for state resources, which tends to occur in an environment where federal aid helps to 
support essential government functions.  Variability in state own source funding and 
federal aid marked by different periods of increase and decline during the period of this 
study indicate that state legislators respond to factors other than federal aid when making 
spending decisions.  Some of these factors are highlighted in the conclusions below for 
Research Question 2. 
Second, in response to Research Question 1, the data show that the relationship 
between federal aid and juvenile justice spending is negative, but statistically significant.  
Although federal aid data are not broken down by grant type in the state budget 
information available for this study, what is known is that matching and nonmatching 
block grants are the primary type of federal aid available to state juvenile justice 
agencies.  Moreover, economic theory and empirical literature on these types of grants 
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hold that substitution is an expected outcome for price inelastic public services, such as 
juvenile justice.44  When demand for a service is price inelastic, matching and 
nonmatching grants may stimulate increases in total expenditures, but not stimulate 
increases in state money spent on the service, which accounts for the negative 
relationship between juvenile justice spending and federal aid.  When assessing the 
results for the regression analysis, one must keep in mind that beyond statistical 
significance, the size of a finding is informative, as well.  In this instance, the coefficient 
estimate of approximately -.04 indicates that a 1% increase in federal aid has a negligible 
effect on the percentage change in per capita spending on juvenile justice 
Third, in response to Research Question 2, this research contributes some initial 
considerations for theory building for determinants of state juvenile justice spending.  
The hypothesized relationships between juvenile justice spending and the social threat, 
partisan politics, and citizen ideology variables are based on theory and the empirical 
literature, which supports the applicability of the POSOF model as a guide for analysis of 
state spending on juvenile justice.  However, as shown in Table 8, the findings are mixed.  
The results for the respective hypothesized relationships between juvenile justice 
spending and percentage poverty, percentage Black, percentage juvenile population 
Hispanic, and Republican legislative percentage are statistically significant, but in the 
opposite direction from the predicted relationship.  These results contradict the relevant 
hypotheses and provide useful information to develop preliminary assumptions about 
how these factors affect juvenile justice spending.  Further, only the results for the 
association between Republican Governor and juvenile justice spending, positive and 
                                                 
44
 Juvenile justice is an essential service, which states are responsible for maintaining at basic core levels, 
although services may vary by state.   
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statistically insignificant, are the same as Stucky et al. (2007) found using the POSOF 
model.   
From the analysis of the other independent variable categories, one is able to 
conclude that a state’s fiscal health, education expenditures per capita, juvenile justice 
agency structural characteristics, population and urbanization, and juvenile incarceration 
rate are significant predictors of juvenile justice spending.  On the other hand, the index 
juvenile crime rate and total state expenditures per capita are statistically insignificant as 
predictors of juvenile justice spending, indicating that one cannot conclude that either 
variable has an independent effect on juvenile justice spending.      
While some of the results did not support my hypotheses, the results are substantively 
informative in the sense of forwarding knowledge in the juvenile justice policy area.  
Although my findings for juvenile justice spending are different from Stucky et al. (2007) 
research findings for corrections spending, the two basic arguments of the POSOF view 
still seem to be applicable to the study of juvenile justice:  1) Punishment is inherently an 
exercise of state power, thus theoretical explanations of spending on criminal punishment 
must examine the role of the state.  Logically, this argument is true for examining 
spending on punishment of juveniles since states are primarily responsible for juvenile 
justice.  2) Punishment is driven by two factors:  a) the state’s responsibility for 
maintenance of social order and b) partisan politics.  The state is responsible for 
maintaining social order by funding measures that control adults, as well as juvenile 
offenders.  However, as explained in Chapter 6, state officials and legislators response to 
social threats, partisan politics, citizen ideology, and other key predictors included in my 
regression model differently for youth than the responses found by Stucky et al. (2007) 
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for adults.  As noted previously, one explanation for these findings is that legislators, in 
their quest to maintain office through public support, are influenced by a public that is at 
least as willing to pay for rehabilitation and prevention as for incarceration and harsher 
punishment as policy responses for juvenile offenders (Nagin et al., 2006).  This 
explanation may have particular salience when applied to the results for the social threat 
and partisan politics variables.  It suggests that the POSOF basic arguments may need to 
be expanded to capture the complexity of public influence on legislators’ decisions about 
juvenile justice policy.  
Finally, one must use caution in using these results to generalize about factors that 
influence juvenile justice spending policy beyond the sample used in this study.  The 
influence of each of the variables included in this study is channeled through the 
institutions of individual states, which leave their own impression on the final spending 
decision.  This research is a first step toward creating empirical evidence to assess the 
statistical and substantive significance of determinants of state spending behavior in the 
juvenile justice policy arena.  Further, this research should be viewed as an initial step 
toward moving juvenile justice spending to a more prominent place among policy 
researchers.  
Contributions to Literature 
As noted in the Introduction, I address two gaps in the POSOF perspective in this 
dissertation research.  First, I consider the influence of federal aid on state spending 
behavior in the juvenile justice policy arena.  This is an important consideration since the 
federal government uses its resources to influence what states do about juvenile crime.  
Second, I extend the model to the study of juvenile justice and identify results that 
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suggest that the variable categories inform ones’ understanding of state spending on 
juvenile justice and how the POSOF theory does or does not apply.  Moreover, this 
dissertation study begins to fill a gap in the empirical literature on the study of 
determinants of state juvenile justice spending policy.  Further, some of the findings 
represent contradictions to POSOF assumptions that may stimulate future academic 
research.  Finally, this study culminated with the creation of a data set, including state 
level appropriations and federal aid for juvenile justice for 30 states, including all 13 
states in Census Region 4 (western states) for eleven years (1996 – 2006).  In addition, 
eleven years of data are available for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the 
United States for all variables, except missing years of state budget data and federal aid 
for the states that were not included in the study.  A data set of this type did not 
previously exist.      
Limitations 
As I explained previously, budget data were not available for all 50 states for the 
eleven years of the study.  I sought to collect as many years of budget data as possible.  
However, only the 30 states where eleven years of state own source and at least ten years 
of federal aid budget data were included in the study.  Analysis of at least 20 years of 
data for all 50 states would have allowed for more variation in variables and more cross 
sections to reduce the influence of any given cross section and improve generalizabilty of 
findings.   
From the perspective of using POSOF as a model for this dissertation, the study was 
limited due to the use of different data collection periods.  Stucky et al. (2007) analyzed 
corrections spending for 1980 – 1998.  During this period, imprisonment rates more than 
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tripled and corrections spending nearly doubled (Stucky et al., 2007).  The data collection 
period for this dissertation was 1996 -2006.  This was a period of overall sharp decline in 
the juvenile justice index crime rate; while juvenile justice spending showed an overall 
modest increase (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  The different time periods were 
characterized by different political and social events in the country (i.e., terrorist attack of 
September 11, 2001), which likely influenced spending decisions.  Investigation of these 
dynamics was beyond the scope of this dissertation study.     
Recommendations for Future Research 
Findings from this dissertation study suggest several directions for future research.  
First, future research on determinants of juvenile justice spending that is based on the 
assumptions in this dissertation study, but increases the time points and units, will be 
useful to confirm results present here.  Second, future studies using different 
combinations of the independent variables included in this study or different variables 
that have been used in related studies on state spending behavior that employ other 
appropriate analytical models would also expand the baseline of knowledge generated by 
this study.  Third, survey research to gather information from legislators in a cross-
section of states about factors that influence their decisions on juvenile justice spending 
policy would contribute to theory building and filling the gap in empirical knowledge on 
the determinants of state juvenile justice spending policy.  
A number of additional research topics would also expand upon research 
opportunities created by this dissertation.  They include:  investigation of the extent to 
which states engage in substitution of federal aid for state own source spending on 
juvenile justice; analysis of periods of stability, increase, and decline in federal aid to 
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juvenile justice to identify factors that may have contributed to changes; comparison of 
descriptive statistics relative to the 30 states included in the study to those of the 20 states 
that were not included; analysis of the structural organization of juvenile justice agencies 
in the states and regional differences in spending patterns for juvenile justice; and 
examination of the influence of interest groups on Congressional and state level juvenile 
justice spending decisions.  Pursuing these research avenues would contribute to the 
literature by directing more attention to factors that matter in state juvenile justice 
spending decisions.  Furthermore, it would illuminate a dynamic policy area with state 
and national significance in the important and challenging work of providing services for 






























JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) – CORE 
MANDATES 
(Nunez-Neto, 2007a, p. 12; Snyder & Sickmund, 2006, p. 97) 
 
The original JJDPA of 1974 included two core requirements, or mandates, that states 
had to adhere to in order to receive formula grant funding.  Subsequent revisions to the 
JJDPA expanded the list of core mandates to the four that exist today.  Failure to adhere 
to these requirements will result in a 20% reduction of funding for each of the four 
mandates with which the state is not in compliance.  Additionally, the state will be 
ineligible for future funding unless: the state agrees to spend 50% of the allocated 
funding to achieving compliance with whichever mandate it is noncompliant with; the 
Administrator of OJJDP determines that the state has achieved “substantial compliance”; 
or the state has demonstrated an “unequivocal commitment to achieving full compliance 
with such applicable requirements within a reasonable time.”   Following are the four 
core mandates as they are codified today: 
• Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders and Non-offenders (DSO) (1974) - 
Juveniles who are charged with or who have committed an offense that would not 
be a crime if committed by an adult, and juveniles who are not charged with any 
offenses, are not to be placed in secure detention or secure correctional facilities. 
• Sight and Sound Separation (1974) - Juveniles are not to be detained or confined 
in any institution in which they would have contact with adult inmates.  
Correctional staff that work with both adult and juvenile offenders must have 
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JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) – CORE 
MANDATES 
 
• Jail and Lockup Removal (1980) - Juveniles are not to be detained or confined in 
any jail or lockup for adults, except for juveniles who are accused of nonstatus 
offenses.  These juveniles may be detained for no longer than six hours as they 
are processed, waiting to be released, awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility, or 
awaiting their court appearance.  Additionally, juveniles in rural locations may be 
held for up to 48 hours in jails or lockups for adults as they await their initial court 
appearance.  Juveniles held in adult jails or lockups in both rural and urban areas 
are not to have contact with adult inmates, and any staff working with both adults 
and juveniles must have been trained and certified to work with juveniles. 
• Disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) (1988) - States are required to 
show that they are implementing juvenile delinquency prevention programs 
designed to reduce, without establishing or requiring numerical standards or 
quotas, the disproportionate number of minorities confined within their juvenile 
justice systems.  The 2002 reauthorization of the JJDPA broadened the DMC 
concept to encompass all stages of the juvenile justice process; thus, DMC has 







JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) GRANT PROGRAMS 
ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 
1996 – 2006 
 










Type of Assistance: 
 
Match Requirement: 
State Formula Grants a 
 
16.540 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Allocation to States  
 
To increase the capacity of state and local governments to support the development of more effective education, training, 
research, prevention, diversion, treatment, accountability based sanctions, and rehabilitation programs in the area of 
juvenile delinquency and programs to improve the juvenile justice system.  Supports state efforts to comply with the core 
mandates of the JJDPA. 
 
Formula Grants; Project Grants 
 










Type of Assistance: 
 
Match Requirement: 




To develop programs, effective approaches, and techniques, such as community-based alternatives to institutional 
confinement, diversion programs, intervention efforts to strengthen and maintain the family unit, programs to prevent hate 
crimes, and programs to prevent youth gun and gang involvement. 
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JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) GRANT PROGRAMS 
ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 
1996 - 2006 
 








Type of Assistance: 
 
Match Requirement: 




To increase the capacity of State and local governments to support the development of more effective prevention programs 

















16.549 Part E – State Challenge Activities 
 
To provide incentives for States participating in the Formula Grants Program to develop, adopt, and approve policies and 
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JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (JJDPA) GRANT PROGRAMS 
ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 
1996 – 2006 
 










Type of Assistance: 
 
Match Requirement: 




To provide States and units of local government with funds to develop programs to strengthen and promote greater 
accountability in the juvenile justice system and a system of graduated sanctions to hold juvenile offenders accountable; to 
provide funding for construction and operation of juvenile correction or detention facilities; and to provide funds for hiring 
and training juvenile court personnel, including judges, probation officers, and prosecutors. 
 
Formula Grants; Project Grants 
 








Type of Assistance: 
 
Match Requirement: 




To support and enhance states’ and local jurisdictions’ efforts to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors and the 
purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages by minors.   
 
Project Grants; Block and Discretionary Grant Awards 
 
None 
Note:  Sources - The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.  Retrieved from http://www.cfda.gov  and U. S. Census Bureau, Governments 
Division, Consolidated Federal Funds Report Retrieved from http://harvester.census.gov/cffr  aThe State Formula Grant program was authorized 
by the original JJDPA in 1974.  b This program is no longer funded as of 2007.  c The JABG program signified the federal government’s movement 




DEFINITIONS OF GRANT TYPES AND CONTROL MECHANISMS 
 
Grant Type Definition 
General Purpose Grants Unrestricted grants that provide pure 
income transfers from the federal 
government to recipients that do not place 
conditions on use of the funds or require 
matching contributions. 
Categorical or Specific Grants Fund narrow purpose activities with 
specific objectives and tend to be the most 
restricted. 
Block Grants Authorize funds to be used for a wide range 
of activities within a broadly defined 
functional area, such as juvenile justice, 
education, or social services.  Use of funds 
is restricted or conditional. 
Control Mechanism Definition 
Matching Requirement Provisions that require states to share a 
designated percentage of the cost of 
providing the aided service with the federal 
government. 
Nonmatching Grants Provide funds to recipients without any 
requirements for state cost sharing. 
Maintenance-of-Effort Provisions that require states to continue a 
designated spending level from their own 
revenue sources in order to receive federal 
aid.  Limits the ability of a state to 
substitute federal funds for their own funds. 
Closed-Ended Grants Amount of federal aid available for the 
aided service is limited to a fixed amount.  
State spending beyond the amount needed 
for the federal match is without federal 
incentive. 
Open-Ended Grants Federal share of program spending is 
unlimited.  Generally applies to a few large 
entitlement programs, such as Medicaid, in 
which the federal government matches 
state spending on services.  Federal 
government cannot control or predict state 
spending on these programs, thus it has 
limited control over the amount of 
spending for the grant programs that have 





 STATES (30) INCLUDED IN MODEL SPECIFICATION SORTED BY 
                  REGION 
 





























































BIVARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX SAMPLE MODEL 
 
Variables X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 
JJ Spend (X1) 1.000               
Lag JJ Spend (X2) .853* 1.000              
Fed Aid (X3) .322* .297* 1.000             
Poverty (X4) -.094 -.065 -.214* 1.000            
Percent Black (X5) -.163* -.149* -.178* .083 1.000           
Percent Black Sq (X6) -.073 -.084 -.176* .086 .919* 1.000          
Percent Hisp (X7) -.030 -.023 -.254* .060 .043 -.158* 1.000         
Percent Hisp Sq (X8) -.121* -.103 -.358* .195* -.013 -.201* .951* 1.000        
Juv Pop Black (X9) -.171* -.154* -.176* .087 .997* .916* .025 -.028 1.000       
Juv Pop Hisp (X10) -.076 -.061 -.256* .057 -.013 -.220* .995* .951* -.028 1.000      
GSP (X11) .060 .059 .092 -.543* .185* .023 .382* .284* .180* .364* 1.000     
Edu Expend (X12) .227* .192* .125* -.444* .054 .045 -.004 -.054 .048 -.018 .627* 1.000    
Crime Rate (X13) .029 .003 -.001 -.180* -.389* -.380* .047 .051 -.414* .069 -.114* -.059 1.000   
Rep Leg (X14) .316* .277* .123* -.237* -.499* -.422* .056 .003 -.503* .058 .108 .089 .156* 1.000  
Rep Gov Dum (X15) .032 .008 -.085 .174* -.077 -.013 .155* .144* -.092 .151* -.149* -.192* -.023 .179* 1.000 
Ideology (X16) -.409* -.358* -.149* -.231* .104 .069 .084 .136* .121* .111 .203* .133* -.033 -.470* -.234* 
Total Pop (X17) -.400* -.344* -.609* .126* .655* .546* .344* .357* .653* .322* .111 -.069 -.220* -.284* -.048 
Urban Pop (X18) -.224* -.193* -.244* -.345* .209* -.014 .785* .676* .183* .778* .493* .051 .185* -.063 .011 
Juv Pop (X19) -.371* -.328* -.699* .169* .337* .248* .426* .486* .326* .418* .216* .105 -.148* -.157* .037 
Total Expend (X20) .308* .259* .212* -.215* -.210* -.284* -.015 -.061 -.216* -.018 .438* .676* .060 .021 -.224* 
Median Inc (X21) .048 .024 -.003 -.771* .183* .086 .268* .150* .166* .247* .737* .510* .126* .024 -.195* 
Incarceration (X22) .259* .235* -.040 .159* -.162* -.152* .056 .078 -.166* .047 .083 -.023 .001 .510* .161* 
Juv Sys 1 Dum (X23) .305* .238* .110 .102 .074 .112 -.264* -.142* .074 -.298* -.047 .252* .107 -.178* -.193* 
Juv Sys 3 Dum (X24) .057 .076 .245* -.210* -.140* -.041 -.180* -.268* -.149* -.184* .061 .097 -.113* .129* .070 
JJ Grant Dum (X25) .241* .208* .450* .029 -.300* -.348* -.097 -.063 -.293* -.079 .029 .208* .046 .122* .003 
Region 1 Dum (X26) -.301* -.281* -.144* -.303* -.018 .008 -.207* -.137* .005 -.177* .076 .439* -.066 -.016 -.117* 
Region 2 Dum (X27) -.158* -.096 .246* -.076 -.087 -.093 -.276* -.244* -.085 -.263* -.057 -.134* -.130* .236* -.005 
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BIVARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX GENERAL MODEL 
 
Variables X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 X28 
Ideology (X16) 1.000             
Total Pop (X17) .212* 1.000            
Urban Pop (X18) .306* .469* 1.000           
Juv Pop (X19) .156* .807* .415* 1.000          
Total Expend (X20) .063 -.423* -.044 -.153* 1.000         
Median Inc (X21) .320* .167* .629* .148* .323* 1.000        
Incarceration (X22) -.419* -.103 -.190* .123* .005 -.244* 1.000       
Juv Sys 1 Dum (X23) .074 -.210* -.322* -.206* .416* .014 -.124* 1.000      
Juv Sys 3 Dum (X24) -.052 -.215* -.008 -.187* -.062 .088 -.111 -.397* 1.000     
JJ Grant Dum (X25) -.250* -.487* -.336* -.376* .269* -.178* .069 .219* -.085 1.000    
Region 1 Dum (X26) .387* .145* -.055 .062 .078 .144* -.275* .097 -.020 .145* 1.000   
Region 2 Dum (X27) -.055 -.136* -.209* -.115* -.238* -.113* .212* -.172* .270* .105 -.114* 1.000  
Region 3 Dum (X28) -.196* .341* -.268* .115* -.315* -.232* .-094 .198* -.035 -.172* -.243* -.226* 1.000 
Note:  Variable names are shortened to save space in the columns.  Listwise Observations = 302.  Correlations are rounded to 






CORRELATION COEFFICIENT RANGE OF VALUES 
(Levin & Fox, 2004, p. 216) 
 
-1.00     =     perfect negative correlation 
-.60       =     strong negative correlation 
-.30       =     moderate negative correlation 
-.10       =     weak negative correlation 
 .00       =     no correlation 
+.10      =     weak positive correlation 
+.30      =     moderate positive correlation 
+.60      =     strong positive correlation 
+1.00    =     perfect positive correlation           
  
       
       
 
 


















































































VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Data Source 
Juvenile Justice Spending 
Federal Aid 
I collected individual state budget documents via internet access and/or direct contact with state 
agency representatives.  See Exhibit 9 – Directory of State Agencies and Exhibit 10 – State 
Legislatures:  Fiscal/Budget Websites.  
 
Data adjusted to 2005 dollars using U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.9.4.  Retrieved from www.bea.gov 
Percentage Poverty U. S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, State and County Interactive 
Tables.  Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html 
Percentage Total Population  
  Black 
Percentage Black Squared 
Percentage Total Population  
  Hispanic 
Percentage Hispanic Squared 
Juvenile Population ages  
  10 - 17 
Percentage Juvenile Population  
  Black 
Percentage Juvenile Population 
  Hispanic 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book Online.   
Puzzanchera, C., Sladky, A. & Kang, W. (2008).  Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-
2007.   Retrieved from http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezapop/ 
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VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Data Source 
Gross State Product 
 
 
U. S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Survey of Current Business, July 2006 and June 2009.  Table 652: Gross State Product in 
Current and Real (2000) Dollars by State: 1977 to 2005  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2007/tables/07s0652.xls  
Table 655:  Gross Domestic Product by State in Current and Chained (2000) Dollars by 
State.   
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0655.xls 
Data adjusted to 2005 dollars using U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.9.  Retrieved from www.bea.gov 
Median Income U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements.  
Table H-8.  Median Household Income by State: 1984 to 2009.  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/H08_2009.xls 
 
Data adjusted to 2005 dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, CPI-
U-RS, March 2010.  Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/   
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiurs.htm 
Education Expenditures U. S. Census Bureau, Public School Finance Data 
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/govs/school/ 
 
Data adjusted to 2005 dollars using U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.9.4.  Retrieved from www.bea.gov 
Juvenile Crime Rate 
 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book Online.   
Puzzanchera, C., Adams, B., and Kang, W. (2008).  Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 
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VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Data Source 
Republican Legislative Percentage 
Governor’s Party 
Data provided by:  Tim Storey, Senior Fellow, National Conference of State Legislatures, 7700 
East 1st Place, Denver, CO  80230. 
 
Supplemental Sources: 
1)  U. S. Census Bureau, The 2010 Statistical Abstract, Elections.  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html 
Citizen Ideology Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research 
Study 1208:  Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the United States.  Principal 
Investigators:  William D. Berry, Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 
Juvenile System Type (1 – 3) National Center for Juvenile Justice, State Profiles.  Retrieved from  
http://70.89.227.250:8080/stateprofiles/overviews/faq1.asp 





U. S. Census Bureau, Population Division 
1)   Table CO-EST2001-12-00 – Time Series of Intercensal State Population Estimates:  April 1, 
1990 to April 1, 2000.   
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/vintage_2001/CO-EST2001-
12/CO-EST2001-12-00.xls 
2)  Table 1.  Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, 
and Puerto Rico:  April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 (NST-EST2009-01).  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2009-01.xls 
3)  2000 Census of Population and Housing, Population and Housing Unit Counts PHC-3.  Table 
29.  Urban and Rural Population by State:  1990 and 2000.  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/index.html 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0029.xls 
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VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Data Source 
Total State Expenditures U. S. Census Bureau, State Government Finances, Historical Data 
Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/govs/state/historical_data.html 
 
Data adjusted to 2005 dollars using U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.9.4.  Retrieved from www.bea.gov 
Juvenile Incarceration Rate 
 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book Online.   
Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook  
Retrieved from http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08601.asp?qaDate=1997 
Region (1 – 4) U. S. Census Bureau.  Retrieved from 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf 





EXHIBIT  8 
 
DATA SOURCES FOR STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION 
 
American Correctional Association 
Alice Heiserman         
Manager of Publications and Research 
American Correctional Association 
206 N. Washington St. 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
(800) 222-5646 ext. 0194 or (703) 224-0194 
Fax (703) 224-0179 
 
Wayne Madison 
Editor, Directories and Research 
206 N. Washington, Suite 200 
Alexandria, VA 22314 
(703) 224-0192 
(703) 224-0179 fax 
1-800-222-5646, ext. 0192 toll free 
WayneM@aca.org 
 
Coalition for Juvenile Justice 
Tara Andrews, Esq., Deputy Executive Director 
Coalition for Juvenile Justice 
202-467-0864, Ext. 109 
andrews@juvjustice.org 
 
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators 
Kim Godfrey, Deputy Director 
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators 
170 Forbes Road, Suite 106 
Braintree, Ma. 02184 
781.843.2663 
Kim Godfrey [kim.godfrey@cjca.net] 
 
Council of State Governments 
Amy Vandervort-Clark 
Public Safety & Justice Policy Analyst 
The Council of State Governments 
2760 Research Park Drive 
Lexington, Ky.  40578 
Phone:   859-244-8013 
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Library of Congress 
Elizabeth Jenkins-Joffe 
Reference Librarian, Main Reading Room 
Humanities and Social Sciences Division 
Library of Congress 






National Association of State Budget Officers 
444 N. Capitol Street NW, Ste. 642 
Washington, DC 20001 
Phone:  202-624-5382 
http://www.nasbo.org/Home/tabid/38/Default.aspx 
 
Benjamin Husch, Staff Associate 
Phone:  202-624-5949 
bhusch@nasbo.org 
 
National Center for Juvenile Justice 
Gregg Halemba 
Director of Applied Research 
National Center for Juvenile Justice 
3700 S. Water Street, Suite 200 
Pittsburgh, PA 15203 




Senior Research Associate 
National Center for Juvenile Justice 
3700 South Water Street, Suite 200 
Pittsburgh, PA 15203 
Phone:  412-246-0834   Fax:  412-227-6955 
puzzanchera@ncjj.org 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
Tim Storey, Senior Fellow 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
7700 East 1st Place 
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National Criminal Justice Reference Service 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service 
http://www.ncjrs.gov 
 
Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau 
Jennifer M. Chisel 
Senior Research Analyst 
Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau 
401 S. Carson Street 
Carson City, NV  89701-4747 
Phone:  775-864-6825; Fax:  775-684-6400 
jchisel@lcb.state.nv.us 
 
Sherie Silva, Office Manager 
Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/fiscal/FISBU210/ 
 
Nevada State Library 
C. Mitch Ison, Librarian II 
Nevada State Library 
100 N. Stewart St. 








Lisa Mataloni, Economist 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 




Small Area Estimates Branch 
U.S. Census Bureau 




United States Department of Justice 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
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United States Department of Justice 
Dorothy Lee 
Office of Justice Programs 
Office of the General Counsel 
810 7th St., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20531 
Phone:  202-616-3267 
Dorothy.A.Lee@usdoj.gov 
 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas 
Department of Criminal Justice 
Timothy C. Hart, Ph.D. 
Director, Center for the Analysis of Crime Statistics 
Box 455009 
4505 Maryland Parkway  
Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-5009 
Phone: 702-895-0233 
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Alabama 
Department of Youth Services 
PO Box 66, I 85 Service Rd. 
Mt. Meigs, AL  36057 
Phone:  334-215-3801 / Fax:  334-215-1453 
www.dys.alabama.gov 
Alaska 
Department of Health and Social Services 
Division of Juvenile Services 
PO Box 110635; 240 Main Street, Suite 700 
Juneau, AK  99811 
Phone:  907-465-2212 / Fax:  907-465-2333 
www.hss.state.ak.us/djj 
Arizona 
Department of Juvenile Corrections 
1624 W Adams 
Phoenix, AZ  85007 
Phone:  602-542-4302 / Fax:  602-542-5156 
www.juvenile.state.az.us 
Arkansas 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Division of Youth Services 
Donaghey Plaza S, 700 Main Street, Slot S501 
Little Rock, AR  72203 
Phone:  501-682-8755 / Fax:  501-682-1351 
www.state.ar.us/dhs/dys 
California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
Division of Juvenile Justice 
4241 Williamsbourgh Drive, Suite 201 
Sacramento, CA  95823-2088 




Department of Human Services 
Division of Youth Corrections 
4255 S Knox Ct 
Denver, CO  80236 
Phone:  303-866-7341 / 303-866-7344 
www.cdhs.state.co.us/dyc 
Connecticut 
Department of Children and Families 
Bureau of Juvenile Services 
505 Hudson St 
Hartford, CT  06106 
Phone:  860-550-6300 / Fax:  860-566-7947 
www.state.ct.us/dcf/ 
Delaware 
Department of Services for Children, Youth,  
and Their Families 
Division of Youth Rehabilitative Services 
1825 Faulkland Rd 
Wilmington, DE  19805 
Phone:  302-633-2620 / Fax:  302-633-2636 
www.state.de.us/kids/ 
District of Columbia 
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services 
1000 Mt. Oliver Rd, NE 
Washington, DC  20002 




Department of Juvenile Justice 
2737 Centerview Dr., Knight Bldg 
Tallahassee, FL  32399 
Phone:  850-413-7313 / Fax:  850-922-2992 
www.djj.state.fl.us 
Georgia 
Department of Juvenile Justice 
3408 Covington Hwy 
Decatur, GA  30032 
Phone:  404-508-6500 / Fax:  404-508-7340 
www.djj.state.ga.us  
Hawaii 
Department of Human Services 
Office of Youth Services 
820 Mililani Street, Suite 817 
Honolulu, HI  96813 
Phone:  808-587-5706 / Fax:  808-587-5734 
www.hawaii.gov/dhs/youth/oys 
Idaho 
Department of Juvenile Corrections 
PO Box 83720, 400 N 10th, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID  83720 
Phone:  208-334-5100 / Fax:  208-334-5120 
www.idjc.idaho.gov   
Illinois 
Department of Juvenile Justice 
PO Box 19277, 1301 Concordia Ct 
Springfield, IL  62794 
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Indiana 
Indiana Department of Corrections 
Division of Youth Services 
302 W. Washington Street, Room E334 
Indianapolis, IN 46204 
Phone:  317- 2232-5711; 317-233-2286 /  




Department of Human Services 
Hoover State Office Building 
1305 E. Walnut Street 
Des Moines, Iowa 50319 
Phone:  515-281-5452 / Fax:  515-281-4980 
www.dhs.state.ia.us 
Kansas 
Kansas Juvenile Justice Authority 
Jayhawk Walk, 714 SW Jackson, Suite 300 
Topeka, KS  66603 
Phone:  785-296-4213 / Fax:  785-296-1412 
http://jja.state.ks.us  
Kentucky 
Department of Juvenile Justice 
1025 Capital Center Dr, 3rd Floor 
Frankfort, KY  40601 
Phone:  502-573-2738 / Fax:  502-573-4308 
http://djj.ky.gov 
Louisiana 
Office of Youth Development 
PO Box 66458, Audubon Station 
Baton Rouge, LA  70896 
Phone:  225-287-7900 / Fax:  225-287-7969 
www.oyd.louisiana.gov 
Maine 
Department of Corrections 
Division of Juvenile Services 
State House Station 111, 25 Tyson Dr 
August, ME  04333 
Phone:  207-287-4362 / Fax:  207-287-4370 
www.state.me.us/corrections/JuvServices.htm  
Maryland 
Department of Juvenile Services 
One Center Plaza, 120 W Fayette Street 
Baltimore, MD  21201 
Phone:  410-230-3101 / Fax:  410-333-4199 
www.djs.state.md.us 
Massachusetts 
Department of Youth Services 
27 Wormwood Street, Ft. Point Pl, Ste 400 
Boston, MA  02210 
Phone:  617-960-3304 / Fax:  617-727-0696 
www.mass.gov/dys 
Michigan 
Department of Human Services 
Bureau of Juvenile Justice 
PO Box 30037, 235 S Grand Ave, Ste 401 
Lansing, MI  48909 
Phone:  571-335-3489 / Fax:  571-241-5632 
www.michigan.gov/dhs  
Minnesota 
Department of Corrections (Adult/Juvenile) 
1450 Energy Park Drive, Suite 200 
St. Paul, MN  55108-5219 
Phone:  651-642-0200 / Fax:  651-642-0414 
www.doc.state.mn.us 
Mississippi 
Department of Human Services 
Division of Youth Services 
PO Box 352, Jackson, MS  39202 
750 N State ST, Jackson, MS  39205 
Phone:  601-359-4972 / Fax:  601-359-4970 
www.mdhs.state.ms.us/dys.html  
Missouri 
Department of Social Services 
Division of Youth Services 
PO Box 447, 221 W High St 
Jefferson City, MO 65102 
Phone:  573-751-3324 / Fax:  573-526-4494 
www.dss.mo.gov.dys 
Montana 
Department of Corrections, Youth Services Division 
Steve Gibson, Director 
PO Box 201301, 1539 11th Ave 
Helena, MT  59620 
Phone:  406-444-0851 / Fax:  406-444-0522 
http://www.cor.mt.gov/YouthServices/default.mcpx 
Nebraska 
Health and Human Services Agency 
Protection and Safety Division 
PO Box 95044, 301 Centennial Mall S 
Lincoln, NE  68509 
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Nevada 
Depart. of Health & Human Services, Division of  
Child and Family Services, Juvenile Justice Services 
4126 Technology Way, 3rd Fl 
Carson City, NV  89706 




Department of Health and Human Services 
Division for Juvenile Justice Services 
1056 N River Rd 
Manchester, NH  03104 
Phone:  603-625-5471 / Fax:  603-669-1203 
www.dhhs.state.nh.us 
 New Jersey 
Department of Law and Public Safety 
Juvenile Justice Commission 
PO Box 107, 1001 Spruce St, Ste 202 
Trenton, NJ  08625 
Phone:  609-292-1444 / Fax:  609-943-4611 
www.njjjc.com 
New Mexico 
Children, Youth, and Families Department 
Juvenile Justice Services 
PO Box Drawer 5160, 1120 Paseo De Peralta 
Santa Fe, NM  87502 
Phone:  505-827-7629 / Fax:  505-827-8408 
www.state.nm.us/cyfd/index.htm 
New York 
Office of Children and Family Services 
Division of Rehabilitative Services 
52 Washington St 
Rensselaer, NY  12144 
Phone:  518-473-8437 / Fax:  518-486-7550 
www.ocfs.state.ny.us 
North Carolina 
Department of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention 
1801 Mail Service Center, 410 S Salisbury St 
Raleigh, NC  27699 
Phone:  919-733-3388 / Fax:  919-733-6809 
www.ncdjjdp.org   
North Dakota 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
Division of Juvenile Services  
3100 Railroad Ave  PO Box 1898   
Bismarck, ND 58502-1898  
Phone:  701-328-6362 / Fax:  701-628-6651 
http://www.nd.gov/docr/juvenile/ 
Ohio 
Department of Youth Services 
51 N High St 
Columbus, OH  43215 
Phone:  614-466-8783 / Fax:  614-387-2606 
www.dys.ohio.gov 
 Oklahoma 
Office of Juvenile Affairs 
PO Box 268812, 3812 N Santa Fe, Ste 400 
Oklahoma City, OK  73126 
Phone:  405-530-2806 / Fax:  405-530-2890 
http://www.ok.gov/oja/ 
Oregon 
Oregon Youth Authority 
530 Center St NE, Ste 200 
Salem, OR  97301 
Phone:  503-373-7212 / Fax:  503-373-7622 
www.oregon.gov/OYA 
 Pennsylvania 
Office of children, Youth, and Families 
Bureau of Juvenile Justice Services 
PO Box 2675, 1401 N 7th St, 4th Fl 
Harrisburg, PA  17105 




Department of Children, Youth, and Families 
Division of Juvenile Correctional Services 
300 New London Ave 
Cranston, RI  02920 
Phone:  401-462-7240 / Fax:  401-462-7239 
www.dcyf.state.ri.us     
South Carolina 
Department of Juvenile Justice 
PO Box 21069, Columbia, SC  29221 
4900 Broad River Rd, Columbia, SC  29212 




Department of Corrections, Juvenile Services 
1600 Sedivy Ln 
Rapid City, SD  57703 
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Tennessee 
Department of Children’s Services 
Division of Juvenile Justice 
436 6th Ave N 
Nashville, TN  37243 
Phone:  615-741-9701 / Fax:  615-532-8079 
www.state.tn.us/youth   
Texas 
Texas Youth Commission 
PO Box 4260, 4900 N Lamar Blvd 
Austin, TX  78765 
Phone:  512-424-6001 / Fax:  512-424-6099 
www.tyc.state.tx.us 
Utah 
Department of Human Services 
Division of Juvenile Justice Services 
195 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT  84116 
Phone:  801-538-4330 / Fax:  801-538-4334 
www.jjs.utah.gov 
Vermont 
Department of Children and Families 
Family Services Division 
103 S Main St, Osgood Bldg, 3rd Fl 
Waterbury, VT  05671 
Phone:  802-241-2100 / Fax:  802-241-2980 
www.dcf.state.vt.us 
Virginia 
Department of Juvenile Justice 
PO Box 1110, 700 E Franklin St, Ste 400 
Richmond, VA  23219 




Department of Social and Health Services 
Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration 
PO Box 45045, 14th and Jefferson Streets 
Olympia, WA  98504 
Phone:  360-902-7804 / Fax:  360-902-7848 
www.dshs.wa.gov/jra   
West Virginia 
Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety 
Division of Juvenile Services 
1200 Quarrier St, 2nd Fl 
Charleston, WV  25301 
Phone:  304-558-9800 / Fax:  304-558-6032 
www.wvdjs.state.wv.us  
Wisconsin 
D1epartment of Corrections 
Division of Juvenile Corrections 
PO Box 8930, 3099 E Washington Ave 
Madison, WI  53708 
Phone:  608-240-5901 / Fax:  608-240-3370 
http://www.wi-doc.com/index_juvenile.htm 
Wyoming 
Department of Family Services 
Division of Juvenile Services 
2300 Capitol Ave, Hathaway Bldg 
Cheyenne, WY  82002 




Source:  American Correctional Association.  (2007).  2007 Directory:  Adult and 
juvenile correctional departments, institutions, agencies, and probation and parole 



















































Mississippi http://www.peer.state.ms.us/  
Missouri http://www.moga.mo.gov/oversight/overhome.htm  
Montana http://leg.mt.gov/css/fiscal/default.asp  
Nebraska http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/contact/fiscal.php  
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New Jersey http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/budget.asp 
New Mexico http://nmlegis.gov/lcs/lfc/lfcstaff.aspx  
New Yorkb http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/ 
http://www.senate.state.ny.us/senatehomepage.nsf/Home?OpenForm 
North Carolina http://www.ncleg.net/FiscalResearch/  
North Dakota http://www.legis.nd.gov/council/general/overview.html  
Ohio http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/  
Oklahomaa http://www.okhouse.gov/Fiscal/Index.aspx  
http://www.oksenate.gov/staff/divfiscal.htm 
Oregon http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm/lfo/home.htm  
Pennsylvania http://lbfc.legis.state.pa.us/  




South Dakota http://legis.state.sd.us/fiscal/index.aspx  
Tennessee http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/Joint/Staff/lba/lba.htm  
Texas http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/  
Utah http://www.le.state.ut.us/lfa/index.htm  
Vermont http://www.leg.state.vt.us/jfo/  
Virginia http://leg2.state.va.us/MoneyWeb.NSF/sb2008  
Washington http://fiscal.wa.gov/  
West Virginia http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Joint/budget/budget.cfm  
Wisconsin http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/  
Wyoming http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2009/Budget.htm  
Note:  a These states have a separate fiscal or budget division for each house of the 
legislature.  b These are the legislative home pages since it appears there is no direct link 
to a fiscal or budget webpage. 
 
Source:  Jennifer M. Chisel  
Senior Research Analyst 
Nevada Legislative Counsel Bureau 
401 S. Carson Street 
Carson City, NV  89701-4747 
Phone:  775-864-6825; Fax:  775-684-6400 
jchisel@lcb.state.nv.us 










ANNUAL JUVENILE JUSTICE APPROPRIATIONS/EXPENDITURES BY FUND 
SOURCE FORM  
 
The purpose of this form is to collect data on annual state juvenile justice program budget 
appropriations and/or expenditures from 1996 through 2006.  Most states have both 
appropriations and expenditure date available.  The data will be used to provide the basis for 
analyzing overall changes in state juvenile justice spending during the eleven-year period covered 
rather than for direct comparisons of state expenditures.  Direct comparisons of state expenditures 
would be invalid due to differences in budget development procedures and variations in cost by 
state and region; cultural differences among states; different population sizes and demographics; 
variation in methods of service delivery; and differences in eligibility requirements and the need 
for services.  
Data collected will be used in a methodological analysis for my dissertation research, 
which seeks to determine the effects of federal aid on state spending on juvenile justice programs.   
I would appreciate your assistance by providing your state’s expenditure data for state operated 
and funded juvenile justice programs for FY 1996 – FY 2006.  For your convenience, I developed 
the attached Excel spreadsheet entitled, Annual Juvenile Justice Appropriations/Expenditures by 
Fund Source Form for data collection.  However, most states have preferred to provide the 
relevant sections of their budget documents for FY 1996-2006 in PDF documents or their own 
Excel spreadsheets.  Whichever method you elect that is most convenient and efficient for you is 
acceptable for my project.   Instructions for the form and definitions of terms are provided below.   
Instructions:   
1. Please provide the total annual general fund juvenile justice operating budget 
appropriations and/or expenditures for 1996 through 2006.  The total amount for each  
year is requested.   It is not necessary to provide the total allocation for each budget line 
item category.  For purposes of this project, operating expenditures include standard  
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juvenile justice budget categories, such as salaries and benefits, administrative costs, 
maintenance, institutions and residential programs, community programs, treatment and 
other support services, and contractual services.  Please do not include capital 
expenditures in your total operating expenses.   However, if your system is structured 
such that capital expenditures are included with operating expenses, please identify 
capital expenditures in a separate line item.    
2. Please include all federal funds that are awarded to your agency for juvenile justice 
programs annually.  Note that additional rows are provided on the data collection form 
for you to identify each grant source by name if this is how your fiscal data is collected. 
3. Please include all other state funds spent on juvenile justice annually.  Note that 
additional rows are provided on the data collection form for you to identify other state 
funds by name if this is how your fiscal data is collected.   
Your assistance with collecting the information requested is greatly appreciated.  If you 
have any questions, or need further clarification about the information requested, please 
contact me by phone at 702-263-4377 or 702-241-9191 (cell) or e-mail:  
smithwb941@cox.net  
Thank you in advance for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
 
Ms. Willie B. Smith 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas 
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State: Agency/Department Name: 
Revenue Source FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2993 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 
General Fund 
Appropriationsa 
           
General Fund 
Expendituresa 
           
Other State Fundsb            
            
            
            
            
Federal Fundsc            
            
            
            
Total Funds            
            
            
Contact Informationd:            
Name:            
Title:            
Address:            
Phone:            
E:mail:            
Note:  aInclude total annual general fund operating budget appropriations and annual general fund expenditures.  b Please identify any other 
revenue sources separately by name, if possible.  c Please include all federal funds awarded directly to your agency for juvenile justice programs 





JUVENILE JUSTICE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
 
Kirby L. Burgess 
Formerly, Director, Clark County Juvenile Justice Services 
601 N. Pecos 
Las Vegas, NV  89101 
Currently, Executive Director, Agape children’s Services 
1055 E. Tropicana Avenue 
Suite 201 
Las Vegas, NV  89119 
Phone:  702-739-7716 
http://www.agapechildrensservices.org/ 
 
Larry Carter, Assistant Director 
Clark County Juvenile Justice Services 
601 N. Pecos 
Las Vegas, NV  89101 
Phone:  702-455-5200 
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/depts/jjs/Pages/ContactUs.aspx 
 
Kim Godfrey, Deputy Director 
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators 
170 Forbes Road, Suite 106  
Braintree, Ma. 02184 
Phone:  781-843-2663 
http://cjca.net/ 
 
Ken Weese, Division Director 
Fiscal Management Services 
Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections                                         .   
1624 West Adams                                                  

















EXAMINATION OF VARIABLES 
I used the following analytical measures to examine the variables included in the 
regression model:  inspection for recording errors, distribution of variables, and trends 
and correlations between the dependent and independent variables.  
Prior to selecting variables to include in my statistical model, I used Stata to generate 
a variable codebook to initiate the data cleaning/data screening process.  Using the 
codebook, I inspected the entire dataset for errors in recording and coding.   The data 
were checked for accuracy and all responses were within range.  I generated frequency 
tables to examine the distribution of categorical variables to get a preliminary sense of 
how categories, such as region, juvenile justice system type, and governor’s party might 
affect the model (juvenile justice spending).   
Furthermore, I examined each variable included in the model specification using 
SPSS output for variable exploration.  This procedure produces several descriptive results 
for multiple variables in table format, as well as visual representations of the data, such as 
histograms, stem & leaf diagrams, and box plots.  While all of these graphs provided 
valuable information that helped determine whether the data were normally distributed 
and/or the degree of skewness of kutosis in the distribution of each variable, Beck (2006) 
recommends the box plot for exploratory analysis of cross-sectional issues in TSCS data.  
Following Beck’s recommendation, I generated box plots for the dependent variable and 
the primary independent variable of interest (federal aid) for each state.  The box plot 
helps one to discern whether the center and spread of the variables differ by unit, or 
whether one or a few units are considerably different from the others.   
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EXAMINATION OF VARIABLES 
Sensitivity analysis of findings indicated that the majority of the variables were likely 
to be skewed, supporting the decision to transform some of the variables to help 
normalize the distributions of selected variables.  Additionally, this type of wide 
dispersion is expected when using TSCS data with a relatively small time period and 
given the variability among states.  Findings from these procedures informed my 
decisions regarding variable transformations required before proceeding to model 
specification. 
Finally, I plotted line graphs of the dependent variable and key independent variables 
against time to examine for trends in state spending relative to juvenile justice and related 














EXHIBIT 14  
 
INTERPRETATION OF COEFFICIENTS 
Log Transformed Variable 
The general analytical model specified for this dissertation study employs a log 
transformed dependent variable, some independent variables in their original metric, and 
some log transformed independent variables.  There are different requirements for 
interpretation of coefficients dependent on the form of the variable.  The standard 
interpretation of coefficients in a regression analysis is applicable when both the 
dependent and independent variables are in their original form.45  In contrast, log 
transformed variables are interpreted in terms of percent change. Hence, when both the 
dependent and independent variables are log transformed the interpretation format is:  a 
one percent increase in the independent variable results in a b% change in the dependent 
variable while all other variables in the model are held constant.  When the dependent 
variable is log transformed and the independent variable is in its original metric, the 
interpretation format is:  a one-unit increase in the independent variable results in a 
100(b) percent change in the dependent variable while all other variables in the model are 




                                                 
45
 Standard interpretation of regression coefficients is that a one unit change in the independent variable 
results in the respective regression coefficient change in the expected value of the dependent variable while 
all the predictors are held constant. 
 
46
 See UCLA Academic Technology Services, Interpreting a Regression Model with Log Transformed 
Variables.  Retrieved from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/sas_interpret_log.htm and 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/log_transformed_regression.htm  
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Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) 
In this study, the LDV is not interpreted as a unit change in last year’s y causes a Φ 
(phi coefficient) change in current y (Beck & Katz, 2004, p. 18).  The past state of y is 
included in the model as an algebraic transformation to control for autocorrelation.  The 
LDV has a dynamic interpretation as it dictates the timing of the effect of X on Y 
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